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Agrobiodiversity is declining across global farm production systems. These declines 
transcend both farm animal genetic resources (FAnGR) and plant genetic resources (PGR). 
Both can sustain greater adaptability and resilience in commercial production through so 
called ‘option value’. In addition, PGR and FAnGR embody cultural and heritage attributes 
that are often absent in global agriculture, but remain valued by society. Conservation is 
therefore important and economic incentives represent a potential supply-side mechanism to 
improve the status of rare breeds, cultivars and crop wild relatives. Yet, the exploration of 
incentive instruments for their conservation remains underexplored but may improve 
conservation outcomes. Using different survey instruments and modelling approaches 
(including choice modelling, linear programming and multi criteria decision analysis) I 
investigate how rationalising incentive support, through more targeted interventions, could 
result in better conservation outcomes.  
 
The findings suggest optimising subsidy support relies on three key factors. First, 
conservation contracts offered to farmers for conservation should reflect local farm business 
preferences and circumstances. This includes addressing barriers-to-entry in conservation 
programmes and the design of contractual schemes, that when improved will likely increase 
participation in conservation contracts. Second, identifying least cost suppliers of 
conservation services may enable more diversity to be conserved at comparable cost. Third, 
optimising what species, varieties and breeds are supported may improve conservation 
outcomes through more rational investments in diversity.  
 
Policy responses to address declining agrobiodiversity should consider the use of tender 
instruments (i.e. reverse auctions) to identify least cost suppliers for conservation services. 
Optimisation modelling and decision analysis techniques can be used to measure trade-offs 
inherent in different conservation goals, including social equity and diversity. Ultimately 
there is a need to balance the supply of use and non-use values of diversity that span the total 
economic value framework. While the drive for sustainable intensification of production 
may improve productivity, we need to be clear how breed and cultivar diversity can be 
encompassed into future policy priorities that reflect the need for greater food security plus 
cultural and heritage value attributes. The implications of deploying new and potentially 





Lay summary  
Farm systems globally are becoming more uniform and more reliant on a small sub-set of 
livestock breeds and crop varieties for food production. This is because the economics of 
production favours the most productive varieties and breeds. This narrowing of the genetic 
base is having an adverse effect on production sustainability and food security, most notably 
a loss of adaptive capacity that is compounded by climate change. In addition, many genetic 
resources are synonymous with different regions and cultures and are valued for reasons 
beyond food production. While there is a recognisable need to conserve so-called farm 
animal genetic resources (FAnGR) and plant genetic resources (PGR) in agriculture there 
have been few studies exploring how conservation approaches could be improved. This work 
addresses this gap, though the application of different modelling approaches that aim to 
explore how conservation agencies (usually government departments and non-governmental 
organisations) can improve the cost effectiveness of conservation programs. Results of this 
thesis suggest three key factors that may improve conservation outcomes.  
 
First, conservation contracts that pay farmers subsides for conserving genetic diversity 
must reflect the local circumstances in which farmers operate. Farmer preferences and farm 
businesses are variable. This is particularly true when contrasting developed and developing 
countries, but also different regional contexts. Ensuring contractual schemes match farm 
business circumstances and preferences will likely increase participation in contracts. 
Second, novel approaches to identify least cost suppliers of conservation services can be 
used by conservation agencies to reduce cost. These competitive tenders allow farmers to bid 
to supply conservation services relative to a pre-defined contract (similar to tendering for 
construction contracts). Employing such approaches ensures suppliers that deliver the 
greatest benefits relative to the cost can be selected as conservation service providers. Third, 
developing indicators to better monitor the status of rare breeds can lead to improved where 
investments in genetic resources. 
 
Ultimately, while there is a need to improve the sustainability of global food production 
there is also a need to consider non-productive factors in agriculture. These include 
adaptability, resilience, cultural and heritage values that reflect the fabric of rural landscapes. 




Graphical abstract  
 
Graphical depiction of the thesis key findings according to alternative farm production pathways. Note: the red dotted arrows indicate interventions 
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1.1 Agricultural production challenges 
Global agricultural production is at a crossroads. On the one side, the need to produce 
more food more cheaply is homogenising production systems with dramatic consequences 
for biodiversity, ecosystems and biomes. On the other, population growth, changing 
consumption patterns, rising incomes and globalisation are changing what and where food is 
consumed. Meanwhile, global production of meat is projected to more than double from 258 
million tonnes in 2006 to 455 million tonnes in 2050, whilst milk production is expected to 
grow from 664 to 1,077 million tonnes (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) has estimated annual global production of crops will need 
to increase by 60% from 2006 levels by 2050 to keep pace with rising demand (FAO, 2016).  
 
Potential yield gains for crops and livestock are hindered by widespread land degradation, 
land scarcity, and climate change, which threaten where and how much food we can produce 
(D’Odorico et al., 2014; Tai et al., 2014; Alexander et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2017). A 
review conducted for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests 
climate change will adversely effect crop yields post 2030 (Porter et al., 2014), and these 
impacts will vary regionally in response to precipitation variation and temperature change 
(De Pinto et al., 2016). For livestock, climate change related impacts will likely decrease 
meat and milk production primarily due to changing quality of forage (Chapman et al., 
2012), pest/disease prevalence (Nardone et al., 2010; Bett et al., 2017) and water availability 
(Thornton et al., 2009; Havlík et al., 2015). Webb et al. (2017) and Bommarco et al. (2018) 
suggest retaining biodiversity and ecosystem services in agriculture are paramount to 
meeting these food security challenges.  
 
Meanwhile, farm systems worldwide are being homogenised in pursuit of productivity 
goals that are at the expense of local diversity and farm-systems resilience (Tscharntke et al., 
2012; IPES-Food, 2016). Reduction in diversity increases vulnerability to climatic and other 
stresses, raises risks for individual farmers, and undermines the adaptability of agriculture to 
meet future drivers of change (Thrupp, 2000).  
1.2 Agrobiodiversity is undersupplied 
Agrobiodiversity (see Figure 1.1) can be broadly defined as all domesticated biodiversity 
(i.e. crops and livestock) within agricultural systems, plus non-domesticated biodiversity that 
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interplay in various ways with the health and functioning of agricultural systems (Pascual et 
al., 2011). The former is declining primarily in response to farm intensification, which has 
eroded natural capital in many agroecosystems (Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2015; Tsiafouli et al., 
2015).  
 
Global agriculture is increasingly reliant on a limited subgroup of plant and animal 
diversity. Only 15 animal species account for 90% of livestock production (Villanueva et al., 
2004). Just 12 plant species worldwide provide more than 70% of all human calorific intake 
from arable crops (Frison et al., 2012). Within these species, a declining number of breeds 
and varieties are responsible for the  majority of production (FAO, 2015a; Gruber, 2017). 
Yet, the ability to grow crops and graze pastures in challenging environments, particularly 
those most affected by climate change will require adaptive genetic resources. Rojas-
Downing et al. (2017) suggests crop and animal diversification are the most promising 
adaption measures for climate change and this suggests a role for farm animal genetic 
resources (FAnGR) and plant genetic resources (PGR) for agriculture.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Biodiversity and agrobiodiversity are underpinned by sustaining natural 
capital and agroecosystems. The various elements that comprise agrobiodiveristy are 
outlined. Adapted from FAO (2004). 
 
FAnGR can be defined as the avian and mammalian species used for food production, 
while PGR comprises cultivars and their wild relatives (FAO, 2015b). Both facets of 
diversity are undersupplied and this can be appreciated with reference to the economic 
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conceptual framework that suggests diversity is a public good whose value is not captured by 
markets. As such this element can lack an explicit value for providers (Pearce and Moran, 
1994). Diversity is therefore not considered in the cost of food production and this leads to 
undersupply as farmers ‘disinvest’ in pursuit of profit (Pascual and Perrings, 2007; 
Sustainable Food Trust, 2017). The resulting market failure has homogenised production 
landscapes worldwide and corrective measures are necessary to supply more diversity 
through policies that govern food production and biological resource use (IPES-Food, 2016).  
  
The need to conserve genetic resources for agriculture has been formally recognized by 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Aichi Biodiversity Targets (CBD, 2013) and 
various international declarations
1
. Recent work by The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity for Agriculture and Food (TEEBAgriFood) has stressed the importance of 
valuing natural capital in agroecosystems, and the need to invest in agrobiodiversity for 
future food security (TEEB, 2018). This is further stressed by The Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2018), which 
suggests such investments make sound economic sense, i.e. the benefits generally outweigh 
the costs.  
 
But while much work has explored the costs and benefits of preserving biodiversity, 
much less has focused on the supply and demand side aspects of agrobiodiversity. Work by 
Bioversity International (2018) has begun to offer insights by exploring the use of payments 
for agrobiodiversity conservation services (PACS) for the delivery of agrobiodiveristy from 
private land via incentives (e.g. Narloch et al., 2011, 2013; Pascual et al., 2011; Krishna et 
al., 2013). The thesis develops this agenda further by focusing on a key literature gap: how to 
improve the design of agrobiodiveristy incentive schemes for better conservation outcomes.  
1.3 Economic incentives to supply more diversity 
The market is currently failing to supply the various elements of breed diversity that are 
valued by society but are not reflected in supply-side policies to conserve diversity (as 
discussed in Section 2.3). There is therefore a need to correct for this failure by constructing 
new harmonised frameworks for rationalising investments in diversity that better reflect the 
social value of supplying more diversity. The main suppliers of diversity are farmers, though 
                                                     
1
 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) was 
effective from 2004 while the Global Plan of Action (GPA) for FAnGR was adopted in 2007.  
Chapter one: Introduction 
5 
 
this group spans a plethora of different farm typologies including hobby farming; upland and 
marginal farms and more intensive farm systems. Each feature different motivations and 
costs associated with supplying diversity. The consumers of diversity are broad, most 
notably farmers, breeders, food suppliers and retailers and wider society. 
  
Economic incentives can address market failures through a range of policy tools 
including regulation, taxation, certification, and subsides. Incentives work by influencing the 
behaviours of actors and firms through the alteration of market signals, and have become an 
increasingly popular way to address a range of environmental problems, including 
biodiversity loss (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2016). Market-based incentives are preferred 
because they offer more flexibility than ‘command and control’ policies that typically 
require firms to adhere to minimum standards or regulations (de Vries and Hanley, 2016). 
These tend to be more costly ways of insuring compliance with environmental objectives 
(OECD, 2018). 
 
The advantages of market-based approaches extend to voluntary incentive schemes, such 
as payments for ecosystem services (PES), where landowners are rewarded for supplying 
ecosystem services on private lands (Farley and Costanza, 2010). While incentive 
instruments for biodiversity are proving more popular worldwide, funding limitations are a 
major constraint  (McCarthy et al., 2012; Waldron et al., 2013). Moreover, buyers of 
conservation services (usually governments) often face uncertainty and lack of information 
on how the costs of supplying diversity are distributed across landowners. The conservation 
benefits can also vary across sites (and genetic resources). This poses challenges to the 
design of incentive mechanisms in being both effective and efficient at sustaining 
agrobiodiveristy improvements by targeting lowest cost providers. It is therefore of interest 
to explore how the design of incentive schemes can be made more (cost) effective.  
 
Globally, incentive schemes specifically targeting PGR conservation are uncommon as 
most conservation occurs either ex situ or in protected areas and reserves rather than on-farm 
(FAO, 2010; Frese et al., 2014). Where such schemes are implemented, they generally work 
by providing landowners with a fixed payment (per ha) for providing conservation services 
(Pascual et al., 2011). Similarly, schemes for FAnGR provide fixed payments (usually per 
animal) to landowners for conserving rare breeds (Kompan et al., 2014). The key problem 
with such uniform payment schemes is adverse selection – i.e. payment levels might not 
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actually relate to the actual costs of participation for scheme entrants, resulting in over-
compensation due to information asymmetries (de Vries and Hanley, 2016). Additionally, 
fixed price schemes are seldom differentiated based on different value attributes of diversity 
or extinction risk and few target specific suppliers (agents) of conservation services. The 
challenge of revealing suppliers true opportunity cost, preferences for conservation contracts 
and overall costs/benefits from conservation investments has given rise to a range of 
empirical approaches that can be used to better inform  policy. This thesis considers three 
approaches to improve conservation policy design. 
 
Choice modelling has been a common approach to elicit landowner preferences for the 
design of conservation schemes and to measure willingness to accept (WTA) monetary 
rewards for contracts, thereby revealing cost heterogeneity (e.g. Ruto and Garrod, 2009; 
Greiner, 2015). Such approaches have been used to identify factors that may impact 
participation in schemes (e.g. contract length) and ultimately the cost of implementing 
schemes under specific contractual terms (Hanley et al., 2012). Alternatively, conservation 
auctions are an incentive based mechanism that can potentially deal with the issues of 
adverse selection, information asymmetry and poor cost effectiveness by promoting price 
competition amongst landowners opting to supply conservation services (Windle and Rolfe, 
2008; Whitten, 2017). Such approaches can be combined with optimisation modelling to 
maximise a certain objective function relative to various constraints, and have been shown to 
outperform fixed priced schemes (Rolfe et al., 2017). Lastly, decision support tools, such as 
multi criteria decision analysis (MCDA), have emerged  to combine technical information 
and stakeholder preferences to appraise costs/benefits of different project alternatives (Adem 
Esmail and Geneletti, 2018). Despite an urgent need to rationalise investments for more 
effective conservation outcomes the development of simple decision making frameworks to 
guide investments in agrobiodiveristy has been lacking (Bruford et al., 2015; Verrier et al., 
2015).  
1.4 Aims and objectives 
The motivation for the thesis lies in an on-going need to demonstrate how valuation can 
inform policy decisions on supplying biodiversity. Indeed, demonstrating value is important 
for both developed and developing country contexts, where the drivers of biodiversity loss 
are often different, meaning supply-side responses must be tailored accordingly. The thesis 
employs largely quantitative analysis of the conservation problem reflecting the overarching 
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motivation to demonstrate how valuation approaches (i.e. measuring costs and benefits) can 
be used to better inform conservation policy decisions.   
 
The thesis is comprised of four studies, each presented as individual multidisciplinary 
(i.e. encompassing economics, genetics, geography, social science methods and rural policy) 
chapters based on specific country case studies. The countries span both developed, 
transition and developing economies, to demonstrate the valuation and supply-side 
challenges common in different contexts. A range of methodological approaches have been 
applied to capture the different economic and ecological outcomes that may arise as result of 
employing different policy and economic mechanisms to achieve a stated conservation goal. 
The focus on different PGR and FAnGR case studies offers broader insight into the various 
drivers that are eroding diversity, many common to both facets of diversity, and the 
corrective policy actions necessary to ameliorate further losses in diversity through 
approaches that may improve the cost effectiveness of conservation schemes.  
 
The contribution of this thesis lies in the application of different modelling approaches 
(outlined below) to explore how incentive instruments could be improved or implemented to 
support PGR and FAnGR conservation. Developing rationalised incentive instruments for 
FAnGR conservation is a stated research and policy challenge outlined by Cardellino and 
Boyazoglu (2009), while the need for on-farm conservation of PGR through PES type 
schemes has been noted by Wale et al. (2011). This work therefore improves our 
understanding of the likely costs of maintaining farm system diversity and the role of supply 
side instruments and incentives to affect (good) conservation outcomes in developed and 
developing countries.  The overarching aim of the thesis is to document how alternative 
valuation approaches can be employed to rationalise policy decisions concerning the supply 
of rare breeds. The chapter-specific aims are too: 
 
 Explore the measurement of “diversity” as a public good, with a focus on  
genetic metrics that denote difference  
 Determine the use and non-use values of FAnGR and to evaluate how such 
values are supplied across different institutions, including the market 
 Outline key proximate threats to FAnGR, and to consider how these threats can 
be addressed by different supply side mechanisms 
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 Explore the factors driving farmer choice of breeds and motivations for 
participating in conservation schemes 
 Measure farmer WTA contracts for conserving rare breeds in small-scale farm 
systems through different contract options using a choice experiment (CE)  
 Explore cost heterogeneity for supplying PGR conservation services using a 
competitive tender mechanism  
 Use linear programming (LP) to assess how different site selection goals impact 
the cost of establishing an incentive scheme for PGR  
 Develop a decision analysis framework using MCDA to prioritise investments 
in rare breeds according to different value attributes of diversity  
 
The objective of the thesis is to explore the current supply of animal and, to a lesser 
extent plant diversity, with a view to developing our understanding of the potential cost of 
supplying more diversity through incentive instruments. The former will broadly consider 
how contractual forms might be improved under existing agri environmental schemes (AES) 
or stand-alone schemes (e.g. PES), and how investments in such schemes can be rationalised 
for better conservation outcomes. The thesis is comprised of four studies, each presented as 
individual multidisciplinary chapters. An overview of how each chapter contributes to the 
overarching thesis goal is provided in Figure 1.2.    
 
 
Figure 1.2: Schematic diagram of the chapter contributions to the overarching thesis aim 




Chapter 2 provides a review of public good characteristics associated with rare breeds and 
is complimented by discourse concerning how institutions mediate rare breed conservation. 
Multiple proximate threats to diversity and issues pertaining to the use of incentive support 
schemes are discussed. Chapter 3 employs choice modelling to determine farmer preferences 
for rare breed conservation contracts in Romania. Uptake in conservation programmes is 
modelled based on various payment scenarios related to farmer WTA conservation subsides. 
Barriers-to-entry that may preclude farmers from enrolling in incentive schemes are 
discussed, particularly in the context of small-scale producers where conservation arguably 
has a pivotal role to play. Chapter 4 describes a competitive tender (CT) survey applied in 
Zambia to identify least cost conservation service providers for crop wild relative (CWR) 
conservation. An LP model is used to demonstrate how selection of conservation sites and 
service providers can be optimised, subject to multiple diversity and social equity 
constraints. The appropriateness of selection under certain selection goals is discussed 
alongside resource needs and costs for national scale CWR conservation programmes. 
Chapter 5 provides an application of MCDA to determine how livestock breeds (in the UK) 
could be prioritised to maximise returns on investments in diversity. Ethical arguments 
around prioritisation are provided alongside consideration of potential trade-offs between 
different conservation goals. Finally, Chapter 6 offers conclusions and recommendations 
from the thesis, plus suggestions for further work.  
 
The data from the three empirical chapters of the PhD can be accessed form a repository 
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This chapter considers the state of rare livestock breeds and farm animal genetic 
resources (FAnGR) in the context of global biodiversity conservation and agricultural 
development trajectories that may favour forms of intensification and breed homogenisation. 
I focus on European Union (EU) and particularly United Kingdom (UK) FAnGR 
conservation where the percentage of breeds classified as ‘at risk’ is above the global 
average and rising. The chapter considers the demand-side value concepts that apply to breed 
attributes and considers how institutions mediate or respond to wider societal preferences for 
conservation. I consider that rare breeds span the tensions between conservation of cultural 
capital and the need to maintain productivity options in pursuit of sustainable agricultural 
intensification (SI). Economic issues such as forms of market failure appear to exacerbate 
breed status and diversity. I suggest policy options and highlight important considerations 
concerning the use of policy instruments to balance conservation for use (production), 
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2.1 Introduction  
Climate change, associated resource scarcities, population growth and shifting dietary 
preferences are reshaping global agriculture with increasing calls for sustainable 
intensification (SI) of production (Nellemann et al., 2009; Godfray et al., 2010). SI generally 
refers to resource use efficiency in production plus the management of demand or 
consumption for some products (Garnett et al., 2013). Both approaches are typically but not 
exclusively focussed on the reduction of environmental externalities arising from agriculture. 
Within this discourse the management of other public goods is less clearly articulated, 
particularly notions of cultural capital and diversity of farm systems that provide national or 
local public good properties. Arguably, these attributes are most closely linked to public 
support for more sustainable production and we need to be clear how they feature in future 
priorities concerning SI. 
 
In the UK and Europe, broader discussion concerning intensification has been most 
conspicuous regarding technological change, economies of scale, and the need to farm for 
profit. The advent of so-called mega dairies is, for many, symbolic of the anxieties of rural 
and urban populations actively or passively engaged in the debate about future farming 
systems. As a form of production efficiency, intensification in housed or confined feeding 
systems is often negatively ingrained in public perceptions that associate large scale housing 
systems with lower welfare conditions than externally grazed animals (Scholten, 2014). They 
are also seen as part of a supply chain re-configuration tilting the economics of production 
against small farms (Anderson and Harper, 2003).  
 
Less clearly articulated or measured is the perceived accelerating homogenisation in 
systems, with the intensive dairy production debate representing a deeper psychological 
diminishment related to the perceived irreversible loss of both biological and cultural 
heritage and production options (Daugstad et al., 2006). In truth, breed homogenisation (the 
reliance on few breeds for animal production) is a result of centuries of deliberate breeding 
for trait specialisation, accelerated by globalisation and the rise of multinational breeding 
companies supported by reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination (AI) 
(Hoffmann, 2010). In this context, the institutions and incentives for breed and diversity 
preservation become crucial to counterbalance a tendency to breed for productivity and 
economic benefit at the expense of cultural heritage and diversity (Drucker, 2010). The latter 
is important because it allows breeders to incorporate new traits into future breeding lines, 
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thereby ensuring greater resilience in livestock systems against continuous technological and 
environmental change. Meanwhile, the heritage dimensions of rare breeds often relate to 
rural identities through so-called sense of place; that is the geographic characteristics of 
specific regions and landscapes. Yet, surprisingly little is documented concerning public 
preferences for breed preservation and this complicates the interpretation of institutional 
successes or failures regarding conservation agendas and public demand for breed-related 
public goods.  
 
 Livestock breeding agency is often spatially explicit and is most pronounced in 
developed countries where investments in breeding technologies are generally higher. Breed 
diversity is therefore unevenly distributed (FAO, 2007a) and while developed countries may 
harbour fewer but more advanced (commercial) breeding lines, developing countries may 
possess a greater proportion of the world’s breeds that are well adapted to indigenous 
extensive production systems. Yet, the importation of improved ‘exotic’ breeds poses a 
serious threat to indigenous breeds in developing countries (Rege and Gibson, 2003) and is 
homogenising global breed genetic diversity. Thus, actions in both developed and 
developing countries are necessary to reduce further declines in diversity.  
 
  The UK is particularly important for farm animal genetic resources (FAnGR) 
conservation given it has approximately 700 breeds, or 9% of global livestock breeds,  across 
the major farm species (cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, horses ponies and poultry). Some133 of 
these are native (excluding poultry) of which 106, or 80%, are classified as a native breed at 
risk (NBAR) by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  (Defra, 2016)  
The Rare Breeds Survival Trust (RBST, 2017) suggests 17 of these breeds  can be 
considered as ‘critical’ or ‘endangered’ populations on their ‘watchlist’. Urgent action is 
therefore required to prevent the loss of these breeds with some discrimination in terms of 
the relevant values that they encode.  
 
This chapter reviews the roles and responsibilities of institutions and how they are 
supplying the public good dimensions of rare breeds. The chapter aims to improve our 
understanding of the use and non-use values of FAnGR and to evaluate how such values are 
supplied across different institutions, including the market. I consider institutional 
contributions to global and national efforts for rare animal breed conservation and the 
preservation of FAnGR more generally. Many of the observations can equally apply to PGR 
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but the focus on animals reflects lower levels of international effort on livestock genetic 
resources conservation and more specific issues in terms of resource conservation by 
collective voluntary effort in situ. While providing international context, the chapter focusses 
on factors in the UK, considering the roles played by voluntary and market-led initiatives. I 
conceptualise the public good cultural and biological elements embodied in rare breeds and 
convey the tensions between market failures and institutions (some of which face challenges 
outside of their control) that may be conserving for different reasons. This discourse helps to 
understand current competing objectives that may be pulling the economics of conservation 
in opposing directions.   
 
Section two of this review considers relevant metrics of diversity and rarity and more 
objective genetic measures of difference. I also define the values associated with diversity 
and rarity concepts, including public good values and the need for producers to capture these 
largely non-market values as a return to conservation efforts. Section three considers 
institutional responses including market-based incentives to transact for public good values. 
Section four considers how these responses can be used to address identifiable proximate 
threats to rare breed conservation, including SI. Section five provides conclusions. 
2.2 Characterising rarity, diversity and FAnGR  
 Much commonly observed farm or agri-diversity is a result of long-standing human 
stewardship and is an adjunct to a sub-set of broader naturally occurring biological diversity 
(Evans and Yarwood, 2000). This stewardship and agency is evident in both producer 
breeding decisions and demand-side preferences for use and non-use of species. As with 
wild species, farmed or domesticated animals can be classified using the common diversity 
nomenclature of species and genes, as well as their functional role in specific agro 
ecosystems. Rare breeds embody additional morphological, physiological and territorial 
attributes that can define their cultural status, but that do not necessarily match more 
objective genetic metrics denoting biological difference (Gandini and Villa, 2003). There is 
therefore a potential tension between a focus on FAnGR for productivity and other socially 
desirable breed attributes.  
 
 Criteria used to define a breed are usually based on population structure, genetic and 
phenotypic attributes that are objectively and subjectively measured, whilst acknowledging 
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the social organisations and institutional frameworks that support cultivation. Table 2.1 
outlines national and international breed definitions.  
 
Table 2.1: Breed definitions by multilateral, ministerial and non-governmental 
organisation   
Organisation and 
reference  





A sub specific group of domestic livestock with definable and 
identifiable external characteristics that enable it to be separated by 
visual appraisal from other similarly defined groups within the same 
species or a group for which geographical and/or cultural separation 




and Rural Affairs 
(Defra, 2013) 
An interbreeding population of husbanded or formerly husbanded 
domesticated animals of consistent genotype and phenotype with a 
recognised history and administrative framework. 
Rare Breeds Survival 
Trust (RBST, 2014) 
A group of animals that has been selected by humans to possess a set of 
inherited characteristics that distinguishes it from other animals within 
the same species. 
 
 Breeds may be at risk because they suffer from low actual or effective population 
sizes, have low genetic variability, are geographically isolated, or face challenges adapting to 
a particular environment (Carson et al., 2009; Simm et al., 2004; Villanueva et al., 2004). 
The FAO defines livestock breed risk as dependent on male and female population sizes. 
Further differentiation between species with high and low reproductive capacity, population 
trends and pedigree, i.e. the recorded ancestry of an animal, is also used (FAO, 2015a).  
   
 The EU defines risk assessment thresholds for the purposes of providing 
conservation incentive payments to farmers. Calculations are based on the number of 
breeding females summed across all EU countries with separate thresholds for each species 
(Alderson, 2009). Thresholds are conservative but, as argued by Gandini et al., (2004), 
preventing loss of a population is easier than  restoration. Other breed watch list criteria add 
heritage dimensions. For example, in addition to  the number of breeding females, the RBST 
requires continuous existence of the breed for 75 years and at least two criteria from a list 
including: a) accepted herd book registrations for six generations; b) <20% genetic 
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contribution from other breeds; c) parent breeds used in the formation of the breed are no 
longer available. DEFRA (2012) classify a NBAR as satisfying similar criteria. Hence, even 
crude endangerment metrics are accommodating both option/insurance value and 
recognising historical pedigree. 
2.2.1 Measuring diversity   
 Genetic diversity, both within and between breeds, represents an objective metric to 
guide conservation decisions. Low numerical populations within a breed can result in a range 
of negative implications including inbreeding depression (reduced fitness of a given 
population due to matings of related individuals); population bottlenecks (sharp reductions in 
population size that reduce variation in the gene pool), and genetic drift (fixation of alleles
2
). 
Matings of related animals, inevitable in closed populations but occurring at different rates, 
leads to an increase in the frequency of animals that carry two identical copies of the alleles 
present at a given locus (the position on the chromosome where the gene occurs). These 
animals are termed homozygotes. The higher the degree of homozygosity, the lower the 
genetic diversity in a population and vice versa (Falconer and Mackay, 1996). Maximisation 
of diversity generally relies on ensuring matings between more distantly related individuals 
to maintain variation within the population (Hartl et al., 1997).  
 
  Numerical estimates of breeding population size employed as proximate indicators 
of population diversity can be a poor determinant of within-breed genetic variation, 
particularly because not all animals of breeding age contribute to the next generation 
(Koenig and Simianer, 2006; Weigel, 2001). This has given rise to a number of metrics to 
determine more accurately the genetic diversity and structure of breeding populations.  
 
 Within breed diversity can be measured most accurately by molecular approaches, 
but a commonly used alternative statistical indicator is effective population size, Ne. Ne is 
defined as the number of reproducing individuals, bred in an idealized population (ideal 
refers to a hypothetical population with a constant population size, equal sex ratio, and no 
immigration, emigration, mutation, or selection) that leads to the same decrease of genetic 
diversity as the population being studied (Harmon and Braude, 2010). Ne is a globally 
accepted measure of within-breed genetic diversity  and can be measured crudely through 
                                                     
2
 An ‘allele’ is an alternative form of a gene that can be found at the same place on a chromosome 
that encodes for a specific trait but in various forms - e.g. coat colour (Falconer and Mackay, 1996).   
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numerical population data of males and females (Wright, 1931), but more accurately through 
the use of ancestral pedigree records that detail specific matings between individuals and 
their lineage (Cervantes et al., 2011).  
 
 Between breed diversity is often measured by phylogenetic methods that describe 
the evolution of a species or breed, being based on the assumption that more closely related 
breeds will embody similar characteristics. Studies generally use molecular data to infer 
genetic breed divergence  (Nei, 1972, 1987). This approach has been proposed for decision 
making in biodiversity conservation where decisions are framed as maximising difference 
for minimum cost (Weitzman, 1993), and the need to identify unique breeds for conservation 
priority setting (Bruford et al., 2004). However, different methodologies to calculate genetic 
distance lead to fundamentally different recommendations for breed prioritisation (Baumung 
et al., 2004). The complexity of accounting for the phylogenetic component of diversity in 
farm animal breeds and the need to maintain desired levels of variation within those breeds 
may produce conflicting management strategies (Bruford et al., 2003). Thus, development of 
diversity indicators seeking to maximise diversity conservation using within and between 
breed diversity might not always be desirable or possible.  
 
 Recent progress in genetics means animals can be characterised at greater speed and 
detail with decreasing cost. As such, genetic diversity in farm animals is becoming 
recognized as a highly significant resource (Bowles, 2015). Advances  in DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) sequencing technologies, coupled with availability of single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) chips
3
 for most farm animal species, means molecular 
approaches are increasingly used for breed improvement including work addressing global 
sheep and cattle diversity (Decker et al., 2014; Hayes, 2009; Kijas et al., 2009; Wengel et al., 
2015). However, many applications of new molecular technologies focus on enhancing 
productive traits in commercially leading breeds (Bowles, 2015). This has resulted in a 
divergence between current state-of-the-art tools to characterise genetic resources and 
application to many non-commercial, or rare, breeds (Bruford et al., 2015).  
 
 In parallel, a number of other socially valuable traits (e.g. methane emissions 
intensity or fatty acids profile in milk and meat) are yet to be intensively selected for, but this 
may change in the future following work to address climate change, nutrition and health 
                                                     
3
 A DNA sequence variation occurring when a single nucleotide in the genome differs between 
members of a species or paired chromosomes in an individual (ISoGG, 2017) 
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 and gene editing
6
 will also be critical in addressing these challenges 
(Hayes et al., 2013; Newman and Ausubel, 2016; Boichard et al., 2015). Such technologies 
may permit rapid identification of beneficial traits at decreasing cost. At the same time, the 
resurrection of extinct species or their close genetic proxies is becoming a technical 
possibility (Bennett et al., 2017) but this raises further questions concerning human attitudes 
towards species and their social value.  
2.2.2 Defining value 
  Breeding and conservation decisions reveal different facets of private and social 
value that can be complementary or mutually exclusive. In the context of agricultural reform 
and potential system transformations, clarity on these values may help to define incentives 
and alternative institutional roles on both the supply (producer) and demand (public and 
consumers) sides. In broad terms rare breeds can be defined using the total economic value 
(TEV) taxonomy (Table 2.2) where ‘economic’ refers to the variety of societal preferences 
typically expressed in relation to status of the resource (Roosen et al., 2005). Breed attributes 
are most clearly demanded for their contribution to market products that provide a proximate 
incentive for producers, breeders and to a lesser extent, consumers, to support conservation. 
In practical terms this suggests an emphasis on adaptive or productive traits embodied within 
certain breeds for commercial use primarily through the maintenance of FAnGR collections 
for potential future use and  option value (Hoffmann, 2010). These attributes are largely 
private and excludable in production and consumption but this focus can crowd-out some 
other public good attributes where demand is harder to identify and measure.  
 
 Significant non-market value categories are indirect, optional and existence values 
(Pearce and Moran, 1994) which act as strong incentives for supplying both rarity and 
genetic difference (Tamminen, 2015). These values are often more complex to estimate 
(Christie et al., 2006). Indirect value derives from the functional role of an animal in a 
specific system. Thus, some breeds may be valued for the way they contribute to farm 
resilience or because they are relatively efficient or less polluting and resource-intensive per 
                                                     
4
 Augmenting prediction of the genetic merit of animals from markers covering the genome. 
5
 The process of determining the complete DNA sequence of an organism’s genome. 
6
 A type of genetic engineering allowing the insertion, deletion or replacement of DNA at a 
specific site in the genome of an organism or cell. 
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unit product. Thus, their value relates to the environmental objective they serve relative to 
another breed.   
Table 2.2: use and non-use values associated with FAnGR 
Type of value Description 
Direct use - Food or fibre; tourism; breeding programmes  
Indirect use  
- Risk aversion (farm income); climate change adaption; landscape 
management 
Option values - A portfolio for future breeding programmes hedging against risk 
Existence values - Value from knowing rare breeds exist irrespective of any other uses   
Bequest values 
- Value from the knowledge that future generations might benefit from 
breed diversity in the future  
Cultural values 
- Cultural heritage preference that arguably cross-cuts use and non-use 
motives 
Intrinsic values - The value of a breed irrespective of human agency and preferences 
  
 Option value suggests maintaining the largest portfolio of assets or resources, in this 
case genetic diversity, as insurance for potential agri-food sector adaptation to environmental 
change or changing consumer preferences. This might encompass private and public good 
eventualities although the public good dimensions may be undersupplied by markets. The 
categories of cultural and bequest value suggest intergenerational preferences maintained by 
keepers of rare breeds whose value often overlap commercial systems (Yarwood and Evans, 
1999). These values are commonly embedded in geographical denominations that are also 
signifiers of specific production systems, for example ‘terroir’ in France (Bérard and 
Marchenay, 1996, 2006) and ‘streuobst’ in Germany (Herzog, 1998). Existence and intrinsic 
values are more complex. The former derives from knowing a resource exists  irrespective of 
other use (UK NEA, 2011). This is sometimes conflated with intrinsic value, which by 
definition is outside the domain of utilitarian value systems (Davidson, 2013).  
 
 Private and public value incentives overlap, with many producers supplying breeds 
and genetic material motivated by non-market value to safeguard traditional breeds, often 
with support but sometimes voluntarily (Gibson et al., 2006). Supplier and consumer 
preferences can also overlap in that consumers can reveal preferences for rare breeds out-
with marketable products, as well as for the market products they provide. While preferences 
may overlap, the current status of many breeds reveals an extent of both market and 
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institutional failure that need to be addressed more systematically in the face of new threats 
posed by global environmental change and the ways we respond.  
2.3 Institutions and instruments  
 Institutional and policy responses can be judged on how they address information 
and market failures that undermine producer and consumer incentives.  Private and public 
sector actors have a complementary role in correcting market failure, improving information 
and regulating supply; in some cases creating new markets and incentive mechanisms that 
can transact between public preferences and a conservation effort.  
2.3.1 Multilateral organisations  
 Supranational bodies and multilateral organisations (e.g. United Nations) work to set 
common conservation standards across nations. Above centres of formal and informal 
conservation and breeding effort, global conservation initiatives are implemented via 
international agreements. Most prominent is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
a global institutional arrangement defining conservation obligations. The important 
institutional objective is the need for improved information on global species conservation, 
including values and benefits, and the challenges of national sovereignty and unmet needs 
(or costs). The CBD objectives have been reinforced by the Aichi Biodiversity targets (2011-
2020), which highlight the need to strengthen conservation of rare farm animal breeds.  
  
 The CBD overlaps the FAO’s role as a global platform for information provision on 
best practice for food security. The FAO working groups address the provision of global 
public goods and the failures inherent in markets to supply them without interventions. Its 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture identifies global conservation 
priorities for PGR and FAnGR and seeks governmental commitment to combat diversity loss 
(Hoffmann and Scherf, 2010).  
2.3.2 Markets  
 Global agreements and institutions seek to moderate or enhance the role of markets, 
which are a fundamental driver of conservation behaviours. As institutions that broker the 
exchange of value, markets typically fail to allow the transaction of public good values 
thereby depriving producers of a return on conservation effort. On the demand side, 
consumers can only use market transactions to a limited extent to signal preferences, mainly 
Chapter 2: Institutions 
21 
 
for labelled products that clearly convey some information on diversity and rarity status. 
Consumers cannot demand what producers and other supply chain agents do not supply. 
Thus, while successful in some small-scale initiatives, formal markets are limited in their 
influence.  
 
 A second form of market failure lies in the nature of imperfect competition that 
allows the prevalence of market power at key points of supply chains. This can encourage 
homogenisation in production, deliberately or inadvertently driving diversity from systems 
as a cost-saving measure through greater optimisation. Such failure is increasingly prevalent 
as agri-food systems become more concentrated across fewer input suppliers, processors and 
retailers (Burch and Lawrence, 2005). These distinct failures require different solutions. In 
the first case, non-market valuation of costs and benefits is a prerequisite for market 
development. In the second, government intervention may be necessary to regulate supply 
chains or to offer incentives for the maintenance of diversity in production methods and the 
way products are labelled.  
2.3.3 Non market valuation  
 Revelation of non-market values and their internalisation in decision making has 
been a focus of economic research seeking to correct market failure in the supply of public 
goods (Macmillan et al., 2002; White et al., 2001). The costs and benefits of each breed will 
vary depending on biophysical and social context, which can be appreciated when set in an 
ecosystem services framework (Figure 2.1).  
 
 This framework allows management options to be directly and indirectly linked to 
ecosystem service flows and societal values. The latter can then be quantified using revealed 
preference (RP) or stated preference (SP) methods (Bateman et al., 2011). The former uses 
existing market data and transactions to infer value. Thus, as well as buying products from 
rare breeds, an individual may travel some distance to visit a rare breed or be willing to pay 
to enter a farm park housing rare breeds. SP uses non-market data to reveal both use and 
non-use values associated with a wide range of goods and services. This usually involves 
surveys constructing hypothetical markets to elicit respondent preferences or willingness to 
pay (WTP) directly.  
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 Several papers have acknowledged the largely non-market element of cultural value 
associated with rare breeds (Gandini and Villa, 2003; Martin-Collado et al., 2014; Roosen et 
al., 2005; Zander et al., 2013) and high WTP for conservation services (Zander and Drucker, 
2008; Ahtiainen and Pouta, 2011; Martin-Collado et al., 2014), revealing the need for in-situ 
conservation strategies to supply such values. These values often relate to anthropocentric 
attributes such as charisma, rarity and heritage goods like sense of place, history and 
tradition (Christie et al., 2006; Tempelman and Cardellino, 2007). Inevitably, due to bounded 
rationality, preferences tend to favour breeds with richer histories (e.g. Aberdeen Angus 
cattle), distinctive phenotypic appearances (e.g. Highland cattle), and strong sense of place 
(e.g. Herdwick Sheep). Such preferences can crowd-out lesser-appreciated breeds 
emphasising the importance of institutions that improve information and wider appreciation. 





Figure 2.1: Ecosystem services associated with conservation of FAnGR, dependant on 
the breed. Arrow width indicates the strength of linkages between each process.  
2.3.4 Market creation and supply-side incentives   
 Correcting market failure is the objective of incentive structures that reward 
producers from public and private sources. Government can intervene as a surrogate for 
consumer demand using mechanisms under pre-existing farm support schemes such as the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), or through public and private surrogate markets 
including PES or PACS schemes. 




 Interest in PES has increased in the last decade in recognition of potential 
efficiencies related to private-to-private transactions for the supply of environmental 
benefits. Novel conservation mechanisms for rare breeds have been widely discussed (e.g. 
Carson et al., 2009; Ligda and Zjalic, 2011; Simianer et al., 2003; Simon, 1999) and the 
concept of PACS is mooted to incentivise the supply of domesticated plant and animal 
diversity. PACS is advantageous because it can be combined with protocol for the rational 
prioritisation of cultivars and breeds (e.g. Cañón et al., 2001; Fadlaoui et al., 2005; Martín-
Collado et al., 2013; Reist‐Marti et al., 2003; Zander et al., 2009). In addition, PACS can be 
used in conjunction with a safe minimum standards approach (Drucker, 2006) and 
competitive tenders (CT)
7
 that permit the identification of least cost conservation service 
providers (Narloch et al., 2013, 2011; Pascual et al., 2011). While CTs have been piloted in 
PGR (Narloch et al., 2013) and biodiversity conservation (Blackmore and Doole, 2013) their 
use in rare breed conservation remains  under-explored.  
2.3.5 Public subsidy schemes and regulation  
 Information failures mean market-based approaches are slow to emerge, and support 
is usually provided through public subsidy schemes or interventions supporting diversity and 
fostering market development. In Europe, public support for FAnGR works through three 
main policy vehicles: the CAP, including subsidy schemes and specific agricultural 
regulations (e.g. The EU Animal Health Law), biodiversity legislation (e.g. The EU 
Biodiversity Strategy to 2020) and eco-labelling and certification of origin schemes (e.g. 
Product Designation of Origin (PDO)). The latter help to make breeds economically self-
sustaining and have been promoted for minority breeds that produce desirable products. PDO 
schemes offer important valorisation opportunities for traditional breed keepers (Zjalic et al., 
2012) allowing consumers to express demand for specific breed-related attributes. Such 
mechanisms only offer a limited demand-side correction of market failure, tending to favour 
breeds with greater market potential.  
 
 EU subsidy payments can be initiated through Rural Development Programme 
(RDP), the CAP or under the discretion of national policies (Hall, 2013). Relevant 
conservation policies often have multiple objectives, for example conservation grazing that 
                                                     
7
 An auction process where environmental services are more efficiently procured from landholders 
using either public or private funds (Windle and Rolfe, 2008). 
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meets wider landscape goals (Yarwood and Evans, 2003) and  financial support given to 
farmers rearing ‘local breeds in danger of abandonment’ (Ligda and Zjalic, 2011). Analysis 
of European subsidy programmes by Kompan et al (2014) indicates inconsistent 
conservation approaches across Europe. While many countries reported increasing numerical 
population sizes of breeds, there is little indication any objective measures of diversity are 
used to optimise conservation.  
2.3.6 National bodies – the case of the UK  
 In the UK a range of policy measures influence rare breed conservation with 
additional oversight form the FAnGR Committee, which acts as an independent non-
departmental advisory body to the UK government (Small, 2013). Several UK conservation 
initiatives operate through agri-environmental schemes (AES) linked to the delivery of 
habitat management (Van Diepen et al., 2007).  
 
 Natural England, a non-departmental public body responsible for management of 
England’s natural environment, used conservation grazing supplements (worth £70 / ha) to 
support NBAR (Natural England, 2012).  These have been widely adopted, and from 2005 to 
2015 there were 1,468 agreements covering ~59,244 ha (Natural England, 2015). These 
supplements have recently been increased to £94 / ha for the period 2015 to 2020. Evidence 
suggests supplements have benefited sheep and cattle breeds most while equine and pig 
breeds are in severe decline, suggesting a need for differentiated conservation incentives 
(Defra, 2016).  
2.3.7 Domestic and international non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) 
 NGO’s deliver support for FAnGR conservation through breeding activities, training 
of farmers, promotion of local products and public awareness (SAVE Foundation, 2004). 
Their activities complement governmental conservation efforts and around 18 out of 35 
European countries reportedly have specialised NGO’s for conservation (Kompan et al., 
2014). They also provide a powerful social network for breeders, policy makers, genetic 
resource managers and academics (Hall, 2013). NGO’s are arguably more focussed 
supplying the public good characteristics of conservation (i.e. cultural and existence value) 
as opposed to genes or traits of commercial interest.  
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 In the UK, the RBST serves as an important communication platform between 
stakeholders, strengthening collective actions to reduce decline in rare breeds (Gamborg and 
Sandøe, 2005). They have worked to promote rare breed food products alongside introducing 
conservation grazing initiatives for NBAR with the National Trust, a charitable conservation 
organisation with statutory powers (Van Diepen et al., 2007). RBST activities also support 
ex-situ conservation, managing the UK’s largest heritage genebank for native breeds. 
 
 Breed societies act as essential information centres through the operation of pedigree 
registers that are fundamental to the maintenance of genetic variation within breeds. 
However, maintaining accurate pedigree records in appropriate data formats largely depends 
on the technical ability of staff (Hall, 2013). Despite being cultural strongholds, the 
involvement of new actors in breed societies can lead to institutional changes that inevitably 
augment tensions between different stakeholders with diverging interests (Labatut, 2013). 
The level to which change is tolerated and encouraged within a breeding group could reduce 
or increase the desirability of a breed (Lauvie et al., 2014). This reveals attitudes towards 
breed evolution that may be desirable from a commercial perspective, but less so from a 
cultural viewpoint. In extreme cases, these tensions have led to the divergence of breed 
societies into separate institutions representing now distinct breeds (e.g. Aberdeen Angus 
and Aberdeen Angus Original).  
2.3.8 Private sector breeding and retailing  
 As noted, imperfect competition represents a distinct form of market failure of 
relevance to the maintenance of diversity. Breeding efforts in the private sector, including 
breeding companies and commercial breeders, typically follow a pyramid structure with an 
elite or nucleus herd at the top, followed by one or more middle tiers of pure bred (or cross 
bred) multipliers which feed into a final commercial flock or herd (Simm, 1998). This has 
resulted in a highly consolidated breeding sector for poultry (DEFRA, 2006a), pigs (Laval et 
al., 2000) and dairy (Mc Parland et al., 2007) leading to substantial rates of genetic gain in 
many breeds but a reduction of genetic diversity (Taberlet et al., 2008).  
 
 In contrast, the beef and sheep sectors encompass a  more fragmented breeding 
system as all tiers of the breeding pyramid are usually operated by individual breeders 
(Simm, 1998) resulting in higher levels of breed diversity (Todd et al., 2011). This diversity 
is partly a consequence of breeding history but also the  nature of beef and sheep systems, 
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which require a range of genotypes to optimise production in characteristically extensive 
systems (Morgan-Davies et al., 2014).  
 
 Supply chain processors and retailers further impact diversity through demand for 
animal products of consistent quality, appearance and size, in response to both consumer 
preferences and supply chain optimisation. This has tended to favour the highest yielding 
breeds that offer better economic performance (Notter, 1999). Several supermarkets now sell 
traditional breed specialised product lines (e.g. Hereford beef) responding to consumer 
demand for improved meat quality. For example, Morrison’s (a large UK retailer) supports 
conservation through  price premiums of 30p/kg for Shorthorn beef and 10p/kg for 
traditional breed beef cuts, and latest figures from the British Cattle Movement Service have 
shown an 18% rise in registrations of Beef Shorthorn calves (Morrisons, 2015).   
 
 While the former suggests a clear dichotomy between private and third sector 
conservation goals that is expressed through interventions that target different elements of 
the TEV spectrum, there are perhaps some overlapping wants and needs that concern the 
creation of markets for rare and traditional breed produce. Forging third and private sector 
partnerships may therefore aid in stimulating niche market development whilst retaining the 
fundamental requisites of conservation. 
2.3.9 National and international ex-situ storage 
 Ex-situ collections complement in-situ approaches and represent a potentially lower 
cost effort to develop stores of diversity offering insurance against future uncertainty. Gene 
banks target protected commercial material for breeding lines and public collections are 
curated more to protect non-market attributes of genetic diversity. Ex-situ programmes for 
farm animals are less common than in-situ approaches (FAO, 2015a) which may represent 
the technological constraints associated with ex-situ storage of genetic material from some 
species (FAO, 2012). Gene banks are advantageous as they offer protection from disease 
epidemics, but a major limitation is the inability of genetic material to adapt and evolve over 
time (Defra, 2006b). Ultimately, ex-situ strategies alone do not solve the conservation 
challenge but do make an important contribution to insuring a back-up for in-situ efforts.  
  
Many genebanks are operated at the national, rather than international, scale (Boettcher 
and Akin, 2010) and collection sizes vary in terms of scope and coverage (Paiva et al., 
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2014). Most develop collections based on rare, native and endangered breeds and are 
currently more active in storage than distribution(Hiemstra, 2015). This means 
characterisation and utilisation of genetic material remains low in contrast to in-situ 
approaches.  
 
 Developing regional or species level core collections of material is an idea supported 
by the FAO (FAO, 2012) and could make an important contribution to the optimisation of 
gene-banking by avoiding costly redundancy in collections. While some overlap is important 
from an insurance perspective (i.e. if one collection fails), reducing inefficiencies through 
greater integration will allow more samples of ‘unique’ material to be stored and 
characterised. New research initiatives are addressing these issues by identifying rational 
approaches for the collection and integration of genetic material (Hiemstra, 2015).  
2.4 Discussion   
 The fate of rare breeds depends increasingly on the effectiveness of institutions to 
correct the fundamental issue of market failures that undervalue or prevent the expression of 
public preferences for rare breeds. This fundamental failure accentuates proximate threats to 
diversity loss including homogenisation of agri-systems, and overarching threats related to 
climate change and emerging disease risks. Proximate threats and their responses are often 
politically driven by societal preferences concerning the management of sovereign resources. 
In the UK, Brexit will impact how NBAR are managed and supported via changing policy 
frameworks and incentives that govern conservation. First, I address SI and two overarching 
threats.  
2.4.1 Sustainable Intensification (SI)    
 The fate of FAnGR and rare breeds is inevitably intertwined with agricultural 
systems in which they have co-evolved, sometimes in completely unsuitable environments 
(Yarwood and Evans, 1998). In the UK and Europe this has inevitably been linked to 
incentives and disincentives inherent in the CAP and more recently the rhetoric of SI. The 
latter is a contested concept (Loos et al., 2014; Rockström et al., 2016) but generally refers to 
resource use efficiency in production combined with modified consumption. The SI 
imperative is a policy and industry response to the ‘perfect storm’ rhetoric, which includes 
population growth, changing consumption preferences and resource scarcities that are 
exacerbated by climate change.  




 Much of the discomfort felt about SI is that it could distract from factors other than 
efficiency gains (Godfray and Garnett, 2014). In this context, the SI literature is unclear on 
the role of cultural and heritage value attributes in farming systems and breeds. Such values 
receive little mention in SI other than signalling their proximate correlation with breeds that 
tend to perform well in marginal environments (Morgan-Davies et al., 2014). These areas are 
the focus of production under some climate scenarios (Pascual et al., 2011). Conway (2012) 
has suggested SI might be decomposed into a series of sub-objectives including genetic 
intensification of plant and animal breeding. Balancing these activities with investments in 
diversity, as a form of breeding option, is gaining importance as the difference between 
intensively and extensively managed breeds becomes more pronounced.   
 
 SI advocates the use of advanced genetic technologies, such as genomic selection 
and gene editing to promote greater production efficiencies. Both are disruptive technologies 
and it is unclear how they will impact breed diversity and conservation going forward 
(Bruford et al., 2015). While it is likely consumer demand will influence how this 
technology is deployed, SI as a paradigm needs to be clear how we consider public and 
private values in advanced livestock breeding. This is particularly important in developing 
economies such as Romania, where the drivers of genetic erosion largely concern 
indiscriminate cross-breeding with a strong focus on productive efficiency but with less 
emphasis on the social and biological value of diversity in livestock systems. 
2.4.2 Climate change   
 The consequences of climate change are likely to feature increased risk to 
geographically restricted or vulnerable rare breed populations more prone to disturbances 
(Hoffmann, 2010). Intensive and housed livestock systems have more potential for 
adaptation through the adoption of technological innovation but with greater reliance on 
external inputs to meet production goals (Berckmans, 2014). For grass fed systems, where 
the rate of technological adoption is considered to be lower, more risk is perceived 
(Anderson, 2004).  
 
 In areas most at risk to climate change (i.e. sub-Saharan Africa) severe 
environmental changes are anticipated (Pachauri et al., 2014) and these will impact agro-
ecological production characteristics including changes to farm animal breed suitability and 
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distribution (FAO, 2017a). The risks are therefore potential yield reductions arising from a 
lack of adaptive capacity due to genetic uniformity in breeding stock. It is therefore 
imperative to consider conservation options that are most appropriate to ensure adaptive 
capacity.  
 
 While ex situ conservation has been suggested as a mitigation measure, there is an 
indication that despite being sheltered from disease epidemics, collections may be 
increasingly vulnerable given the inability of genetic material to adapt and evolve over time. 
Such collections are simply not comprehensive enough to provide adequate safeguards and 
require updating periodically. In contrast, in-situ approaches have the major advantage that 
genetic material can continuously adapt and evolve and is promoted by Thrall et al., (2011) 
as ‘evolutionary agriculture’. Adaptations, such as disease and heat resistance, drought 
tolerance and ability to cope with poor quality feed, are valuable characteristics of a breed 
which, when stored ex-situ, are unlikely to be characterised with the same ease as in-situ 
approaches (Hoffmann, 2010). 
 
 In recognising  the threats arising from climate change, opportunities may emerge to 
develop and promote livestock systems with greater environmental, economic and social 
resilience to risk (Howden et al., 2007). Adaptation requires diversified farming systems and 
local adaptation planning, which are facets of climate smart agriculture (CSA). CSA 
involves three elements: increasing agricultural productivity to support food security; 
improved adaptive capacity at multiple levels and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
and increasing carbon sinks (Campbell et al., 2014). Improving adaptive capacity is largely 
centred on fostering ecosystem services in agri-systems that enhance resilience. Here, 
systems and breed diversity make an important contribution through the adoption of locally 
adapted breeds and husbandry practices (Kantanen et al., 2015). Such responses may 
simultaneously contribute to GHG mitigation since locally adapted breeds often have higher 
feed conversion ratios on marginal grazing land, thus resulting in lower emissions intensities  
per animal in such environments (FAO, 2015b). Adoption of CSA principles may also 
contribute to mitigation measures aimed at reducing risk from disease threats.  
2.4.3 Disease events   
 Climate change is emerging as a key driver of fungal and bacterial pathogens and a 
range of pest species such as ticks, mosquitos and parasites (Kantanen et al., 2014). Pest and 
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disease events are predicted to change as well as increase in geographical range, which may 
have further implications for breed suitability in some areas (Kantanen et al., 2014). Large-
scale industrial production systems may create more enabling environments for disease 
transmission between animals over large distances, further exacerbating these threats (Otte et 
al., 2007).  
 
 Rare or minority breeds in limited geographical ranges are more vulnerable to 
disease events, and the 2001 UK Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic highlighted that 
rare breeds had no particular status in terms of controlled movement or culling policies. In 
response to the outbreak safeguards to protect rare breeds in the event of disease epidemic 
(e.g. Article 15 of Regulation 2003/85/EC) have been incorporated into the new EU Animal 
Health Law (European Comission, 2016). A key argument for preserving rare breeds through 
such laws is the potential benefit of sustaining a diverse number of breeds that could mitigate 
against future pest, parasitic and disease outbreaks via resistance, immunity or tolerance 
attributes (FAO, 2007a). Important examples of resistance or tolerance already documented 
include trypanosomosis, the stomach worm Haemonchus contortus, liver flukes, ticks and 
various tick-borne diseases including anaplasmosis (FAO, 2015b).  
 
Thus, despite the threats arising from climate change, there are also opportunities for 
greater utilisation of breed and genetic diveristy as an adaptive response (Hoffmann, 2010). 
Cross-breeding to introduce beneficial genes into higher yielding breeds from individuals 
with better disease resistance could increase the future value of some rare breeds (Thornton, 
2010).  
2.4.4 Brexit   
 The UK’s formal withdrawal from the EU is currently under negotiation and 
considerable uncertainty surrounds the potential consequences for CAP-related schemes that 
have supported the supply of agricultural public goods. Furthermore the UK’s agricultural 
sector will likely be subject to increased global competition from less regulated, global 
markets, or more subsidised markets of the EU (Berkum et al., 2016). This could impact 
breed conservation if grazing subsides for NBAR are reduced or removed. At the same time, 
EU product designations applied to UK products, such as traditional specialities guaranteed 
(TSG) could be affected if no substitute schemes are forthcoming. Equally unclear is how 
UK FAnGR regulations will be impacted and those relating to NBAR concern ‘exemption 
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from culling’ regulations under the new EU Animal Health Law. Though many such EU 
regulations are adopted voluntarily by national legislation, Brexit implies these regulations 
may be at risk.  
 
 Brexit also offers potential opportunities to shape a new policy concerning the 
allocation of support through a new Agricultural Bill that uses public funds for public goods 
(Defra, 2018). Helm (2016) suggests that a more efficient future Agricultural Bill may 
decentralise the payment mechanism for the provision of public goods. The suggestion is to 
allocate funding to agencies and conservation bodies with a better understanding of the 
supply agents (i.e. land owners and managers). Funding could then be better directed to the 
most efficient suppliers via forms of restricted conservation tender, open to target 
conservation bodies, landowners or groups of farmers to bid for the lowest cost supply of 
specific environmental goods. In such a PACS-like scheme, specialised breed groups (such 
as RBST) may be in a privileged position to supply agri diversity through rare breeds.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 Rare breed conservation has traditionally been motivated by voluntarism and 
stewardship motives unrelated to values commonly transacted by markets, which typically 
fail to enable transaction for all attributes of rare breeds, including diversity and heritage 
values. But research suggests there is a public desire to see future farms that do not solely 
employ intensive systems but supply additional public goods (Weatherell et al., 2003; Adam, 
2004).  
 
The public policy challenge is therefore to balance public demand with the regulation of 
external pressures that reduce the variability of maintaining cultural capitals. These include 
moves toward more globalised and homogenised supply chains and the SI imperative. The 
latter is in danger of prioritising efficiency above all other considerations including the need 
to retain option value. This is of particular importance when considering proximate threats 
such as climate change and disease risk but also disruptive technologies, such as genetic 
engineering. The former may be harnessed to the benefit of conservation through greater 
utilisation of diversity (via gene editing) by procuring traits of market and non-market value 
from across the breed spectrum. But this prospect may only be realised if the policy 
landscape provides adequate scope and guidance on the sustainable use of FAnGR; 
underpinned by an increasingly sophisticated arsenal of biotechnologies.  




 The fundamental failure of markets to reward conservation effort requires 
institutional responses to palliate market failures that include the homogenisation of breeds 
and production systems. Different private and public institutional responses to correct for 
failure target different elements of public good value. On the supply side, the use of PACS 
approaches represent a potential opportunity to improve the efficiency of procurement of 
public goods (Narloch et al., 2011a). However, the use of such extrinsically motivated 
instruments is problematic in potentially crowding out intrinsic behaviours motivated by 
stewardship, actually resulting in lower levels of conservation effort (Frey and Jegen, 2001; 
Lawler, 1998). It is therefore important that responses to address market failure compliment 
voluntary collective effort whilst providing public and private institutions with some control 
over conservation agendas (i.e. which breeds to conserve and in what quantity).  
 
This chapter has demonstrated the fundamental failure of markets to supply farm animal 
diversity that caters to all values of the total economic value (TEV) spectrum and the need 
for various instruments for correct for market failure. The proceeding chapters therefore 
explore some of these instruments through a range of methodological approaches, including 
conservation contracting, competitive tendering and multi-criteria rationalisation. Relevant 
policy implications for the design of agrobiodiveristy conservation programmes are also 
discussed.   











Contracts for supplying Farm Animal Genetic 

















This chapter describes a choice experiment (CE) administered to explore farmer 
preferences for conservation agreements to conserve rare breeds among a sample of 174 
respondents in Transylvania (Romania). The study site was chosen due to the prevalence of 
small-scale and extensive farm systems threatened by a changing policy environment that is 
increasing the scale and intensity of production units. Agreement attributes included length 
of conservation contract (5 or 10 years); scheme structure (community or individual 
managed conservation programme), and scheme support (application assistance or farm 
advisory support). A monetary attribute that reflects compensation for scheme participation 
allows the assessment of farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) for different contracts. 
Results suggest 89% of respondents would be willing to farm with rare breeds; cattle and 
sheep being the most popular livestock option; 40% of farmers were reportedly farming with 
endangered breeds. However, only 8% were likely to qualify for funding support under 





respectively, for bovine and ovine farmers to consider enrolling in a 
contract. These values are comparable to Romanian Rural Development Programme (RDP) 
support offered to farmers keeping rare breeds of € 200
 
and € 10 per year for bovine and 
ovine farmers respectively. My estimates of scheme uptake, calculated with coefficient 
values derived from the CE, suggest rare breed conservation contracts are considered 
attractive by Romanian farmers. Analysis suggests meeting farmer preferences for non-
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3.1 Introduction  
FAnGR diversity underpins resilient agricultural systems and  need to be part of any SI 
strategy to meet rising demand for livestock products (Eisler et al., 2014). However, 
concentration on elite breeding lines has reduced genetic variation in many commercial 
breeds whilst marginalising traditional breeds whose value is often poorly understood 
(Ahtiainen and Pouta, 2011; FAO, 2015a).  
 
SI strategies should include investments to maintain genetic variation across a range of 
breeds (including rare breeds) to ensure adaptive capacity in livestock systems (refer to 
Section 2.4.1 for more detail). This is particularly important when considering profound 
demographic and environmental changes facing the agri-food sector including population 
growth, land scarcity and climate change (FAO, 2017b). Equally important, but less often 
articulated in decision making, are the cultural and heritage attributes embodied in rare 
breeds (Gandini and Villa, 2003b; Zander et al., 2013). Markets often fail to reflect these 
values, which can be substantial but difficult to measure (as discussed in Section 2.3.2). 
Breed genetic diversity is therefore undersupplied by markets and there is a need to explore 
policy interventions to counter market failure.  
 
While contractual schemes for rare breed conservation are present in Europe, many are 
often poorly targeted (Kompan et al., 2014; Bojkovski et al., 2015). Targeting incentives 
towards small-holder and extensive farm systems may improve scheme efficiency and 
uptake, given their lower opportunity cost of conservation (Naidoo et al., 2006). This chapter 
explores rare breed conservation contracts in Transylvania (Romania), where the average 
farm size is only 3.4 ha and the economic efficiency per farm (as measured by standard 
monetary output of agri-products per holding) is significantly lower than the EU average 
(Popescu et al., 2016).  
 
Traditional farm systems in Transylvania are under pressure from development of more 
intensive farm systems that are changing the scale and nature of practices (Sutcliffe et al., 
2013, 2015). A focus on improved efficiency is at the expense of the supply of public goods, 
including breed diversity. Some 42% of livestock breeds in Romania are classified as ‘at-
risk’
8
 (Draganescu, 2003). This figure may be an underestimate since population estimates 
                                                     
8
 Corresponding to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) definition of an 
‘at-risk’ breed.  
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for many Romanian breeds are unknown (FAO, 2018). There is therefore a need to develop 
targeted policy responses that aid conservation by balancing an intensification agenda with 
incentives for the supply of other non-market goods and services.  
 
Farm scale drivers of diversity loss are often assumed to relate solely to the lower 
productivity of traditional livestock breeds (Cicia et al., 2003). While income forgone is a 
key factor to establish the cost of incentive-based schemes, other factors also motivate farm 
business decisions, and may be particularly relevant in a semi-subsistence farming context 
(see Section 1.2). Such non-financial motives may include  tradition, community relations, 
professional pride and independence (Gasson, 1973; Ilbery, 1983; Burton et al., 2008). It is 
therefore necessary to identify how such attributes might influence the design of 
conservation programmes and farmer willingness to supply diversity. Other potential 
technical and institutional barriers-to-entry (i.e. requirements for breed genealogical records) 
also warrant exploration in this context.  
 
I used a CE survey to elicit farmer preferences for supplying (rare breed) conservation 
under alternative contracts forms. CEs are a SP technique where individual preferences for 
attributes of a good or service are elicited using surveys that mimic hypothetical scenarios – 
in this case conservation contracts (Louviere et al., 2000). The methodological approach is 
most suitable given CE’s mimic real-life trade-offs and choices between alternate 
products/services with varying levels of attribute provision. While the approach is rooted in 
behavioural economics, it has been widely applied across the social sciences to measure 
consumer preferences particularly in the field of health, environmental and transport 
economics (Holmes et al., 2017).   
 
The chapter adds to the literature on farmers’ willingness to participate in incentive-based 
schemes (Ducos et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Broch and Vedel, 2010; Espinosa‐
Goded et al., 2010; Greiner, 2015; Lienhoop and Brouwer, 2015) but focuses on the 
neglected issue of the cost of conserving FAnGR in small-holder and extensive farm 
systems. The chapter aims to explore the factors motivating farmer decisions for 
participating in a rare breed conservation scheme and to measure farmer WTA for enrolling 
in a rare bred conservation programme under alternative payment and attribute scenarios 
using a CE. The overarching research question is: what are farmer preferences for the design 
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of rare breed conservation contracts and what is their minimum WTA a conservation subsidy 
under alternate contractual scenarios?  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background to the CE design and 
case study site. Section 3 reports the analysis of choice data. Section 4 provides discussion of 
the design of rare breed conservation programmes, and Section 5 provides conclusions.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Case study: Romania 
As an EU member state, Romania’s agricultural policy is structured and supported in an 
agreed RDP (2014-2020), which includes a support measure (M10.2, art 28) for rearing 
endangered livestock breeds under EU Regulation 1305/2013 (MARD, 2014). Uptake for 
this RDP option is anticipated to be low due to farmer difficulties in meeting EU standards to 
qualify for subsidy payments (Page, 2015, personal communication). Data on uptake rates 
are not yet available, but previous work has found that 70% of Romanian farmers 
experienced difficulties meeting EU environmental standards for payments under the CAP 
(Fischer et al., 2012). It is therefore important to explore whether such barriers persist for 
farmers in small-scale and extensive systems, as this could reduce participation. Equally 
important is to measure whether voluntary AES measures, specifically M10.2, match farmer 
preferences and expectations for scheme design and rewards.  
 
Much of the study site (Figure 3.1) is situated in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains 
and features an undulating topography with low nutritional pastures (Mikulcak et al., 2013). 
Part of the area (Tarnava Mare) is classified as high nature value (HNV) farmland. 
Traditional agricultural practices are common in this area, as is the presence of many small 
scale and semi-subsistence farms (Page et al., 2011). Mechanised systems are the mainstay 
for medium to large farms, though are much less common. The site is characterised by high 
levels of rural poverty, with average household incomes below the national average 
(Gherghinescu, 2008). 
 
I surveyed livestock keepers across 5 counties (Sibiu, Brasov, Mures, Cluj and Alba). The 
sampling frame was based on local farmer information held by village mayors, with further 
random sampling of farms. The survey was administered from June to August (2015).  





Figure 3.1: Land cover map of the survey area with inset map of Romania. Sampling 
locations are shown by yellow stars. 
3.2.2 Questionnaire design and administration 
The survey consisted of four sections (provided in Appendix 1). The first asked about the 
farm business including livestock species and breeds, farm size, and traits farmers deem 
most important when considering choice of breed. In the second, respondents were asked if 
they receive AES payments and whether they were aware of financial support for rare breeds 
and ever considered applying for this support. The third part of the questionnaire included 
the CE. Two CE versions were created - one for ovines and one for bovines. Farmers 
answered either one or both depending on whether they were keeping ovines, bovines, or 
both. After the CE tasks were completed, respondents were asked to state their motivations 
for their choices in the CE, and this information was used to identify genuine choices from 
protest bids; the latter subsequently being removed from the analysis. Respondents were also 
asked about their preference concerning scheme remittance (i.e. individual or community 
payment). The fourth section collected socio-economic information including respondent 
age, gender, educational attainment and household income. The survey material was printed 
in Romanian and was also administered in Romanian by a trained translator. This included 
discussing the choice tasks with respondents.  
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3.2.3 Choice experiment design 
In CEs, respondents are asked to repeatedly choose from a number of options that differ 
in their attributes or characteristics following an experimental design. The CE elicited 
individual preferences using hypothetical contract choice sets requiring farmers to upkeep 
rare breeds from a list of breeds proposed by the Romanian Government for support under 
the 2014-2020 RDP measure (see Appendix 2 for list of eligible breeds). Farmers were 
advised that the breeding of animals must be pedigree to qualify for further subsides on 
offspring (i.e. non-random mating). Each choice task consisted of two alternative contracts 
and a ‘none’ option to embody the voluntary nature of the conservation scheme. Attributes 
and their levels used to describe the conservation contract were determined in a multi-stage 
process involving literature review, expert consultations and pilot testing. 
 
Each contract option consisted of four attributes (Table 3.1). The first three attributes 
described contract length (CL); scheme support (SS); and structure of scheme (SOS). Choice 
of attributes drew  on empirical work suggesting their importance in AES scheme design 
(Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Christensen et al., 2011; Greiner, 2015). A final monetary attribute 
(COS) represented an annual payment to farmers (per animal) and took four different levels. 
The monetary attribute in local currency (Lei per year) was based on a percentage (10%, 
30%, 60% and 100%) of the proposed monetary reward outlined in the RDP; the premise 
being that some farmers may be WTA a lower reward, depending on contract design. The 
choice tasks were differentiated based on the livestock species. For bovine (cattle, horses and 
buffalo) and ovine farmers (sheep and goats) the choice tasks were similar except for the 
value of the monetary attribute, which reflected the relative support normally given to 
different species under current RDP conditions. 
 
Table 3.1: Attributes and attribute levels used in the CE including relevant coding and a 











- 5 years 






- Basic assistance to complete the scheme 
application form  
+ Additional advisory support throughout the 
scheme (e.g. additional training for animal 
+ 








- Individually managed  conservation scheme  





Discrete - Bovines = 90; 270; 530; 890 Lei / year 
+ 
Discrete - Ovines = 5; 15; 25; 45 Lei / year 
  
Choice set design was optimised according to prior information on the distribution of 
random parameters to improve statistical efficiency - i.e. reduction in sample size needed to 
achieve statistical significance (Crabbe and Vandebroek, 2011). Prior information 
concerning the parameter coefficients was estimated from results of the pilot data that was 
collected in situ to ensure the attributes were relevant to participants. A D-efficient 
experimental design optimised for the random parameter logit (RPL) model was formulated 
using NGene (Metrics, 2012). The final CE comprised 16 choice sets which were blocked 
into 4 blocks of four choice tasks each in a bid to reduce the cognitive burden for 
respondents (Hensher, 2006). Figure 3.2 shows a typical choice task presented to 
respondents. 
 
 Option A  Option B  No contract 





























 (per animal / per year) 
Lei 90 Lei 270 Lei 0 
 
I prefer:   Option A   Option B   Nothing 
                     
Figure 3.2: A typical choice task shown to respondents 
3.2.4 Econometric specification of choice models 
Respondent choices in a CE can be modelled with reference to Lancaster's theory of value 
(Lancaster, 1966) and Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 1973; Luce, 2005). For a general 
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description see (Holmes et al., 2017). The standard choice mode is the multinomial logit 
(MNL) model (McFadden, 1973) which assumes the random component of the utility of the 
alternatives is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). A key limitation of the MNL is 
that preferences for attributes of different alternatives are assumed to be homogenous across 
individuals. The RPL model for choice data analysis is more advanced and takes into 
account heterogeneity of the parameter values among respondents and relaxes key 
assumptions that constrain the use of conditional logit models, namely independence of 
irrelevant alternatives - iia (Hensher et al., 2005). Under a RPL specification, the utility a 
respondent i derives from an alternative j in each choice situation t is given by: 
 𝑼𝒊𝒋𝒕 =  𝜷𝒊𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 +  𝝐𝒊𝒋𝒕 ( 3.1) 
Where Uijt is a utility maximising individual, Xijt is a vector of observed attributes 
associated with each contract option (i.e. contract length, scheme support, structure of 
scheme and price) plus the socio-economic characteristics of respondents, and εijt is the 
random component of the utility that is assumed to have an iid value distribution. 
Conditional on the individual specific parameters βi and error components εi the probability 
that individual i chooses alternative j in a particular choice task n is represented as: 
 
𝑷𝒓(𝒋|𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝜷𝒊𝒕 , 𝜺𝒊𝒕) =
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝒊 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊)





Choices for bovine and ovine farmers were modelled separately to explore preference 
heterogeneity between both groups. The unconditional choice probability is the expected 
value of the logit probability over all possible values of β weighted by the density of β. The 
marginal probability of choice can be derived from integrating the distribution functions for 
the random parameters β. The probability of choosing alternative j over N observed choices 
is: 
 
𝑷𝒓(𝒋|𝑿𝒊𝒕) = ∫ (∏ [
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝒊 𝑿𝒊𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊)






) 𝒇 (𝜷|𝛉)𝒅𝜷  
(3.3) 
Where f (β|θ) is the density function for β with a mean b and covariance W.  This 
equation does not have a closed form and so we rely on simulation methods (for details 
see Train (2009)). Draws of values of 𝛽 are drawn from 𝑓 (𝛽𝑖|𝜃) for r=1,…, R. The 
probabilities are approximated by drawing the values from the density function and averaged 
to estimate the simulated probability. Random parameters were estimated using 1000 Halton 
draws which take into account the heterogeneity of parameter values sampled from the 
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distribution of respondent’s choice (Mariel et al., 2013; Greiner, 2015). A normal distribution 
is assigned to the all random parameters (accept subsidy) to allow respondents to have either 
positive or negative marginal utility for the contract attributes (Christie et al., 2015). A 
triangular distribution was assigned to the subsidy attribute to ensure the parameter does not 
change sign over its range.  
 








 where k is the attribute coefficient and c is the cost coefficient as outlined by Bech 
and Gyrd‐Hansen (2005). Confidence intervals were estimated using the Delta method. 
Individual specific parameters (Table 3.2) for individual i were dummy coded and interacted 
with random parameters to determine policy relevant factors influencing contract 
preferences. Contract probabilities of enrolment were calculated under alternative payment 
scenarios to determine how probability of uptake varied according to contract attributes and 
payment rates, following a similar method to Adams et al, (2014). Based on the CE, the 
probability of an individual i choosing a contract alternative j is given by: 
 
𝑷𝒓(𝒋|𝒙𝒊, 𝒛𝒊) =  




(𝒛𝒊𝒌𝜸 +  𝒙𝒊𝜷𝒌)
 
(3.4) 
whereby alternative specific variables (i.e. contract options) for individual i and 
alternative j are given by 𝑧𝑖𝑗 whilst coefficients are denoted by γ. Case specific variables for 
individual i are given by xi whilst coefficients are denoted by β. I estimated the probability of 
participation for case specific contracts under two scenarios– ‘optimal’ and ‘non-optimal’ 
contracts. ‘Optimal’ refers to contract attributes (excluding subsidy) that meet the 
preferences of agents while ‘non-optimal’ contracts do not. This was relative to a non-
enrolment option. The empirical model was estimated using the econometric software 
NLOGIT 5.0.  
3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Respondent characteristics  
A total 174 respondents were surveyed - 116 were bovine farmers and 81 were ovine 
farmers (note 45 respondents kept both ovines and bovines). The means and standard 
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deviation of multiple individual specific variables is outlined in Table 3.2. There were later 
used as interaction terms in the choice model to determine significant covariates that help to 
explain respondent choice. The mean age of participants was from 40-49 years, with highest 
education levels of either secondary school or college. Fewer female respondents featured in 
my sample as more males are employed in agriculture (European Commission, 2012).  
 
 Average monthly household income was  reported to be in the range of €181 to 
€362; lower than the national average but anticipated at the sample site (Page et al., 2011). 
The primary income for most farmers was EU subsides, while sale of milk and meat 
products were generally secondary and tertiary sources, respectively. Some 40% of farmers 
claimed to be farming with a rare breed from a list of ‘at risk’ breeds, while 32% were 
enrolled in AES measures. Only 21% of respondents were aware of RDP support for rare 
breeds whilst only 8% actually met the EU’s criteria to qualify for payments.  
 
Table 3.2: Summary of individual specific variables (with means) and relevant 
interpretation  
Variable Interpretation Mean Std. Dev 
National 
mean 
Gender 1, if male, 0 otherwise 0.83 0.91 49% male
a 
Age 
Categorical (1=<20, 2=20-29, 3=30-39, 4=40-49, 















Categorical (1=<€45, 2=€45-€90, 3=€91-€181, 
4=€181-€362, 5=€362-€678, 6=>€679) 
3.8 1.45 € 566
b 
Size 
Categorical (1=1-2 ha, 2=3-6 ha, 3=7-20 ha, 4=>20 
ha) 
2.59 1.05 3.6 ha
c 
FRB 1, if farming with rare breeds, 0 otherwise 0.4 0.49 - 
CON 
1, if farmer would consider farming with rare breed 
in the future, 0 otherwise 
0.89 0.32 - 
AES 
1, if farmer is currently enrolled in an agri-
environment scheme (AES), 0 otherwise 
0.32 0.47 - 
RDP 
1, if farmer aware of RDP support for rare breeds, 0 
otherwise 
0.21 0.41 - 
BEN 
Categorical (1=if farmer prefers 100% individual 
cash benefits from a conservation programme, 
2=50% cash benefit, 50% community in-kind 
benefit, 3=100% community in-kind benefit) 
1.39 0.71 - 
REG 
1, if farmer is registering livestock in a genealogic 
register, 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.27 - 




1, if farmer is keeping cross breeds for yield 
improvement, 0 otherwise 
0.47 0.5 - 
References:  a(National Institute of Statistics, 2013) b(National Institute of Statistics, 2015) c(Popescu et al., 
2016) 
3.3.2 Farm characteristics  
To determine how intensification may threaten traditional farming systems and breed 
diversity, respondents were asked to detail how their farming practices have changed over 
the preceding 10 years (Figure 3.3). Increases to dairy cattle herd size were reported by 52% 
of respondents. Of the 20% of my sample that reported manual hay cutting, 74% reported 
this to be either stable or increasing; a clear response to EU incentives that reward small-
holders for the activity. Mechanical hay cutting was reported to be increasing (67% of 
respondents) and some 54% of farmers also stated their sheep herd size was increasing.  
 
Figure 3.3: Reported change in farming practices over the last 10 years from 
respondents.  
 
To investigate whether willingness to participate in a (rare breed) conservation 
programme was linked to preferences for farm animal species, respondents were asked both 
livestock species kept and their interest in joining a conservation scheme. Pigs were the most 
frequently kept farm animal followed by cattle and sheep (Table 3.3). The highest number of 
breeds reported was for pigs, while buffalo had the least. The prevalence of breed diversity 
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83% (Romanian Buffalo) to 37% (Large White pig). Across the sample, 89% of farmers 
registered interest in joining a rare breed conservation programme, of which cattle (52%) and 
sheep (39%) were the most popular species. Least popular species were goats (11%); horses 
(13%) and buffalo (14%). Of interest is the low preference for conserving rare horse breeds 
given their popularity in the Romanian farming context. This may suggest rare horse breeds 
do not match farmer preferences for horse breed characteristics and hence are undersupplied.  
 
Table 3.3: Summary of farm animal and breed characteristics across my sample. 
Species  
Incidence of 





Most popular breed   
(% abundance)* 
Farmers stating 
interest in farming 
with rare breed (%) 
Sheep 61 8 Tsurcana (47%) 39 
Goats 24 4 Unknown (56%) 11 
Pigs 84 13 Large White (37%) - 
Buffalo 10 3 Romanian Buffalo (83%) 14 
Cattle 73 9 Baltata Romanesca (61%) 52 
Horses 51 8 Unknown mix (51%) 13 
* Percentage abundance was calculated as the number of farm animals in my sample that correspond to a 
specific breed 
 
 Livestock-keepers in different countries prefer different breed attributes (Simm, 
1998). Respondents were asked to rank livestock attributes by importance for breed 
selection. In Figure 3.4 radar charts indicate different preferences between rare breed and 
commercial breed keepers for some attributes. Yield was the most important attribute for 
both. Adaptability (of the breed to different terrain and aspects) was ranked 2
nd
 for farmers 
keeping rare breeds, while disease and parasitic resistance was ranked 3
rd
. For commercial 




. This suggests productive traits 
are considered most important by both farmer groups, but they differ in perceived 
importance of non-productive traits. This supports work suggesting rare breed adaptability 
characteristics play an important role within the livestock sector not matched by commercial 
breeds (Leroy et al., 2018).  
 





Figure 3.4: Radar charts showing ranked importance of livestock attributes according to 







 rank. Note, CT = cultural tradition; DPR = disease and parasitic resistance; VB 
= veterinary bills; MH = management and handling; PQ = product quality.  
3.3.3 Choice Models 
The choice models explore the hypothetical contract choices made by respondents that 
are dependent on information concerning contract attributes and respondent/farm 
characteristics. The models seek to explain farmers’ choices of contract options depending 
on the values that the attributes take in each contract option. This provides information on 
the relative importance of each attribute for selecting a contract option and the overall 
compensation needed by farmers to enrol, which may be heterogeneous across farmers. The 
model investigates if some of this heterogeneity is systematically associated with farm or 
farmer characteristics. 




Initial results from the MNL are provided in Appendix 3 to offer an overview of the basic 
model estimation. Results from the more sophisticated RPL model for bovine and ovine 
farmers are reported separately in Table 3.4. Both models delivered a good statistical fit (i.e. 





 of 0.33 (bovines) and 0.38 (ovines).  
  
Table 3.4: RPL model output for estimated marginal utilities for both ovine and bovine 
models for the CE attributes including interaction terms 
Attribute  
Bovines Ovines 
Coefficient  SE Coefficient  SE 
Random parameters 
    
[CL] Contract Length  -0.829*** 0.175 -0.984*** 0.213 
[SS] Scheme Support  0.147 0.230 0.618 0.259 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme -0.554** 0.221 1.499*** 0.466 
[COS] Subsidy 0.022*** 0.003 0.594*** 0.108 
[N0] Nothing option 1.90*** 0.516 2.301*** 0.492 
Standard deviations of random parameters  
[CL] Contract Length  0.501 0.311 0.652** 0.291 
[SS] Scheme Support  1.022*** 0.261 0.297 0.495 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme 1.689*** 0.324 1.223*** 0.279 
[COS] Subsidy 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.282 
[N0] Nothing option 1.675*** 0.358 1.112*** 0.378 
Covariates (socio-economic variables) 
COS:AES -0.981***        0.374  
COS:BEN 0.016***       0.006  
N0:AES 1.681*** 0.509   
SOS:BEN   -2.506***       0.565 
COS:AES   -0.110*        0.062 
COS:BEN   -0.188**       0.077 
Model summary     
No of observations 464    324  
Log likelihood -344.089 
  
-222.246 










 0.325     0.376 
 
Note: ***; ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% respectively.  SE=standard error 
 
                                                     
9
 Note the McFadden pseudo R
2 
can be interpreted very much like a regression R
2
 value but the 
goodness of fit will always be much lower in CE modelling (typically between 0.2 to 0.4).  




The N0 is positive and significant in both models meaning most farmers have preferences 
for the status quo option which follows economic theory (Greiner, 2015). This is perhaps 
because there are some variables, not included in the model, which induce farmers to prefer 
to not join the offered contract alternatives. The COS attribute is positive in both models 
meaning higher conservation payments increased likelihood of enrolment. CL (bovines and 
ovines) is significant and negative meaning respondents prefer a shorter contract. SS was not 
significant for both bovine and ovine farmers. SOS was negative and significant for bovine 
farmers meaning they prefer individually managed conservation schemes. For ovine farmers 
structure of scheme is positive and significant, suggesting they prefer community managed 
conservation programmes. 
 
Significant standard deviations of the normally distributed coefficients indicate there is 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for some attributes. The standard deviations were 
significant for all attributes accept contract length and subsidy (bovines only) and scheme 
support and subsidy (ovines only). This heterogeneity can complicate interpretation of the 
parameter estimates. 
 
Additionally, I also tested for significant relationships between respondent preferences for 
different contract attributes and various individual specific covariates. The significant 
covariate interactions for both models are listed in Table 3.4. For both models, a negative, 
significant relationship was obtained by interacting farmers currently enrolled in AES 
schemes with COS suggesting farmers enrolled in AES measures require less subsidy 
support. Conversely, farmers not enrolled in AES schemes demanded higher subsidy 
payments. The N0 interacted with AES was positive and significant suggesting farmers 
currently enrolled in AES schemes were more likely to select the non-contract option. 
Education level did not influence likelihood of enrolling into a contract and farmer age did 
not affect preferences for contract length (both non-significant).  
 
For bovine farmers, interacting respondents wishing to receive community benefits from 
the scheme (BEN) with COS was significant and positive, indicating farmers looking to 
receive community based (in-kind) rewards require a higher equivalent subsidy reward. For 
ovine farmers, interacting BEN with SOS is negative and significant meaning farmers 
preferring individual benefit schemes also prefer individually managed conservation 
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programmes (i.e. consistency in my results). Interacting BEN with COS was also negative 
and significant suggesting ovine farmers preferring individual payment schemes are WTA 
lower subsidy premiums. 
3.3.4 Willingness to accept estimates 





bovine and ovine farmers, respectively, can be interpreted as the starting value needed for 
farmer participation in the contractual scheme relative to the baseline contract (Christensen 
et al., 2011); where baseline refers to a shorter contract length, scheme application support 
only and an individually managed conservation breeding programme. Changing from a 5 to 




for bovines and ovines 
respectively. To move from an individual to a community managed conservation scheme 
would cost an additional €48.6 
year-1 
for bovine farmers while conversely for ovine farmers it 
would cost an additional €5 
year-1 
to enrol them in an individual scheme.  
 
Table 3.5: WTA results (€  
year-1












[CL] Contract Length -72.8*** -33.1 to -144.7 -3.3*** -1.4 to -7.3 
[SS] Scheme Support 12.9 40.7 to -37.6 -0.2 1.4 to -2.3 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme -48.6** -8.3 to -121.8 5.0*** 6.0 to 3.1 
[COS] Subsidy - - - - 
[N0] Nothing option 166.9*** 198.3 to 109.8 7.0*** 67.6 to 5.9 
Note, ***; ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% respectively 
3.3.5 Estimating contract participation 
Contract participation was estimated according to different payment and contract 
scenarios to determine how projected uptake by farmers varied according to contract 
attributes. Coefficient means from the RPL model were used for calculating probabilities 
under two alternative scenarios; optimal and non-optimal contracts, where optimal refers to 
contract attributes that meet farmer preferences elicited in the CE while ‘non-optimal’ 
contracts do not. For instance, for bovines this would be a 5 year contract that is individually 
managed. The subsidy premium took consistent values across both scenarios, ranging from 
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10% to 100% of remuneration offered in the RDP scheme option. This allowed exploration 
of how scheme uptake might vary with different contract options to gauge the importance of 
monetary and non-monetary attributes in farmer decision making. 
 
As expected, non-optimal contracts were estimated to receive lower participation relative 
to optimal contracts (Figure 3.5). Participation estimates ranged from 4% (€20 
year-1
) to 70% 
(€200
 year-1
) for bovines and 2% (€1 
year-1
) to 78% (€10 
year-1
) for ovine farmers under the non-
optimal scenario. Conversely, in the optimal scenario participation estimates ranged from 
38% (€20 
year-1
) to 97% (€200
 year-1
) for bovines and 71% (€1 
year-1
) to 99% (€10 
year-1
) for 
ovine farmers. Recalling that subsidy premiums are comparable across both contract 
scenarios, my estimates show the difference in participation between the two scenarios 
ranges from 27% to 58% for bovine farmers and 22% to 84% for ovine farmers. 
 
I find a non-linear relationship between participation and financial reward, suggesting a 
one unit change in subsidy does not necessarily equate to a mirrored change in participation 
(i.e. there are other factors exogenous to my model influencing farmers willingness to 
participate). Respondents presented with optimal contract designs were much more likely to 
enrol in a conservation programme even at lower premiums. Ovine farmers were less likely 
to enrol in a contract that did not match their preferences for non-monetary attributes at 
lower subsidy premiums (though this was not the case with higher premiums).  
 
Figure 3.5: Probability of contract participation according to ‘non-optimal’ and ‘optimal’ 
contract scenarios for different subsidy premiums (bovine and ovine farmers). ‘Optimal’ 
refers to contract attributes that meet the preferences of agents. 
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3.4 Discussion  
3.4.1 Contract preferences  
Results suggest farmers demonstrate a clear willingness to participate in conservation 
programmes for rare breeds. Participation may be reduced by up to 84% if farmer 
preferences for non-financial attributes are not taken into consideration. Within the model, 
the N0 may capture the dis-utility of enrolling in a voluntary subsidy scheme that is not 
linked to contract attributes, but potentially other factors not included in my model (e.g. 
family tradition or mistrust in authorities). It may also reflect a general reluctance to join a 
voluntary incentive scheme (Christensen et al., 2011). However, heterogeneity across 
farmers in my sample (as shown by significant standard deviation of non-random 
parameters) complicates interpretation of the N0.  
 
 Farmers revealed a tendency to value flexibility in contracts as demonstrated through 
a preference for shorter contract durations, a common finding in similar studies (Christensen 
et al., 2011; Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012; Santos et al., 2015). While bovine farmers 
preferred individually managed conservation programmes ovine farmers preferred 
community managed schemes. This seems logical in post-communist Romania, which has 
seen a shift from collective to individual ownership rights across agriculture (Tudor and 
Alexandri, 2015). On the other hand an enduring communal herd grazing regime among 
sheep farmers may explain the alternative preference. The significance of the standard 
deviation for this attribute further complicates interpretation. Although scheme support for a 
conservation programme was not considered important by both farmer groups similar 
attributes were significant in other studies (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). For instance, work by 
Christensen et al. (2011) has shown farmers are able to place a monetary value on being 
released from certain administrative burdens and that the use of farm advisors for schemes 
might make farmers willing to accept a lower payment for enrolling in a scheme. In 
developing countries like Romania, where rural populations are generally less educated than 
the wider population (FAO, 2001) application support for schemes may in-fact be paramount 
to securing farmer participation.  
 
A number of covariates help explain heterogeneity in both models. I did not find that 
farmers keeping rare breeds were WTA less for supplying conservation services, perhaps 
suggesting other non-monetary motives were driving their decisions regarding the contract 
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options. Both farmer groups enrolled in AES schemes were WTA less compensation for 
supplying conservation services, thus providing a means for conservation agencies to target 
least cost service providers. However, farmers enrolled in AES schemes were also more 
likely not to select a contract option, suggesting overlap with existing contractual schemes 
may deter farmers from participating. In addition, farmers already enrolled on AES 
programmes are more likely to harbour pro-environmental attitudes (Heyman and Ariely, 
2004) that may improve compliance with contractual schemes.  
 
In both models community (in-kind) based support is associated with higher cost than 
those preferring cash based payments; implying the use of in-kind rewards will increase 
overall scheme cost. However, in-kind payments have been shown to be more effective than 
cash payments in stimulating conservation effort (Gorton et al., 2009) and may provide 
longer term infrastructure benefits to communities supplying public goods. In addition, 
Narloch et al. (2017) argue collective payments to community groups may effectively 
‘crowd-in’ compliance, thus reducing monitoring costs and improving conservation 
outcomes. The additional costs of community schemes must therefore be weighed against 
(potentially) improved social and farm animal diversity outcomes. 
3.4.2 Contract participation 
Contract participation estimates reveal a trade-off between non-monetary attributes and 
financial incentives. For instance, if RDP subsidies paid € 120/ animal 
year-1 
and € 6/ animal 
year-1 
for bovine and ovine farmers in an ‘optimal’ contract scenario then uptake rates could be 
as high as 86% and 98%, respectively. This contrasts with enrolment of just 28% and 25% 
for identical price premiums but with ‘non-optimal’ contracts for bovine and ovine farmers, 
respectively. The higher uptake rates associated with ovine farmers in optimal contracts may 
reflect that performance differences between rare and commercial breeds are larger for 
bovines than ovines, though this supposition requires further evidence.  
 
These participation estimates are still well above actual participation rates of 15% for an 
AES scheme in Northern Italy (Defrancesco et al., 2008). Empirical work by Wossink and 
van Wenum, (2003) suggests participation of up to 60% might be achieved in a hypothetical 
Dutch field margin programme, suggesting the scheme proposed here is indeed considered 
attractive by farmers. However, while strategies were employed to prevent hypothetical bias 
(e.g. cheap talk statement) it nonetheless must be considered that the high participation rates 
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found in my work may be exaggerated by such bias (i.e. the hypothetical nature of a CE may 
induce respondents to overstate their desire to enrol in a contract option). That said, farmers 
in my sample were generally poorer than the national average which may be an underlying 
factor driving an increased desire to participate.  
 
Contrary to expectations, farm size, education level and age did not have a significant 
effect on participation. These findings confirm conflicting results found in the literature 
concerning the influence of education (Dupraz et al., 2002; Defrancesco et al., 2008; 
Greiner, 2015), age (Wossink and van Wenum, 2003) and farm size (Christensen et al., 
2011; Adams et al., 2014) on participation in contractual conservation schemes. The 
hypothesis that farmers keeping rare breeds would be more likely to participate in a 
conservation scheme was not supported. This may be because a high number of farmers were 
keen to participate in the scheme, irrespective of whether they were currently farming with a 
rare breed. Although few studies have directly assessed farmer willingness to participate in 
rare breed conservation programmes, work by Pattison et al. (2007) suggests that farmers 
keeping rare breed pigs in Mexico were willing to participate in a community conservation 
breeding programme even without financial incentives.  
3.4.3 Barriers to uptake 
Some have been critical of RDP approaches to rural policy (Shortall, 2008; Milcu et al., 
2014). This study suggests there are clear barriers to entry for smallholder farmers wishing to 
participate in some RDP options. This is apparent where RDP eligibility requires a minimum 
parcel size of 0.3 ha to be entered into agreements and a cumulative field size of 1 ha or 
more (Mikulcak et al., 2013). The average farm size in my sample was 3-6 ha and discussion 
by Page et al. (2011) stresses this is a major obstacle for small-scale farmers in Eastern 
Europe wishing to enrol land into incentive schemes (Gorton et al., 2009). Herd or flock-
book registration of livestock is a requirement to qualify for RDP support for rearing local 
livestock breeds in danger of extinction (MARD, 2014) yet only 8% of farmers in my sample 
reported having animals registered in this way revealing a major barrier-to-uptake. 
Implementing alternative mechanisms, or proxies, to identify the genetic merit of farm 
animals has been identified as an important consideration by Pattison et al. (2007) and novel 
approaches developed by Bhatia et al. (2010) may serve as a way to surpass such barriers 
through phenotypic identification of breeds.  
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EU rural development policy needs be more clearly communicated. In my sample, only 
21% of farmers were aware of RDP funding support for farmers rearing endangered breeds. 
Surveys by Mikulcak et al. (2013) suggest funding measures are often poorly communicated 
to small-scale farmers and local mayors in Transylvania, emphasising the importance of 
using local communication channels. In Transylvania, Fundatia ADEPT (a local 
conservation NGO) are meeting this need by helping small scale farmers through workshops 
on the CAP and RDP measures; developing milk collection points in local villages and 
facilitating cooperative bids for farm applications to AES options where, individually, 
farmers would be ineligible to apply (Fundatia ADEPT, 2014). These factors have 
culminated in better support for small-scale farm incomes in Transylvania while maintaining 
the high levels of public goods that arise from these production systems.   
3.5 Conclusion 
This work has provided an application of choice modelling to explore farmer preferences 
for rare breed conservation contracts. The findings suggests farmers do have heterogeneous 
preferences for contractual attributes and that considering these attributes in the design of 
contracts may improve uptake rates, even at lower subsidy levels. 
 
Farm intensification is a trend across Romania and Central and Eastern Europe (Henle et 
al., 2008; Popescu et al., 2016) threatening breed diversity. Sustaining this diversity makes 
an important contribution to the delivery of SI objectives given the high option value that 
arises from breed diversity, through greater adaptive capacity (Hoffmann et al., 2014). This 
adaptability, in addition to breed cultural heritage, is considered important by farmers in 
Transylvania, particularly those keeping rare breeds. Ensuing farm animal diversity is 
sustained in perpetuity is particularly important for climate change adaptation, where more 
extreme weather patterns in Transylvania could impact the suitability and available yield of 
certain breeds (FAO, 2017a).   
 
This analysis supports the findings of other work (e.g. Greiner, 2015; Permadi et al., 
2018) that suggest contract length and the structure of schemes, in addition to monetary 
rewards, are important determinants of participation rates in conservation programmes. But I 
also acknowledge that the monetary values farmers place on accepting specific contractual 
schemes are case specific (Christensen et al., 2011). As a consequence, the robustness of 
these results needs to be addressed in further work exploring cost-effectiveness of FAnGR 
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conservation programmes in similar contexts. Moreover, this work has not explored how 
farmer WTA a contract might vary depending on breed options as part of the scheme. 
Indeed, work by Zander and Drucker, (2008) suggests farmer do possess heterogeneous 
preferences for breed attributes and breeds themselves. Exploring the importance of 
alternative breed and attribute combinations in contracts appears warranted and may further 
affect farmer willingness to participate in schemes and their WTA a conservation contract.  
 
Aside these limitations, further design and administration related factors may also 
undermine the validity of CE studies. Most notably, multiple potential bias (e.g. hypothetical 
bias, strategic bias and warm glow effect) can undermine the validity of the results including. 
This has been mitigated by following clear guidance concerning the design and 
administration of choice experiments (Ryan et al., 2012). Additionally, the econometric 
analysis of CE data also requires fairly advanced statistical methods and there is no 
consensus in the literature at present on the best models to use (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). 
While this work applied the RPL model, a further iteration in WTA space may have 
improved approximation of farmer’s WTA estimates (to enrol in a contact) and likewise 
contract specific attributional factors impacting WTA estimates (Akaichi et al., 2016).   
I found that the average bovine farmer (in Transylvania) needs to be paid €122 per annum 
per animal extra in order to enrol in a 10 year community managed conservation contract. 
For ovines, an additional price incentive of €8.3 would be required for farmers to enrol in a 
10 year individually managed conservation contract. A key question is whether the 
conservation and genetic diversity benefit of a longer contract that either includes a 
collectively or individually managed conservation breeding scheme will exceed the 
additional costs. Building on the importance of contractual attributes identified in this 
chapter, the next chapter will address how competitive tendering can be employed to identify 
least cost providers of conservation services.  
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Crop wild relatives (CWR) are a globally threatened group of plants that may harbour 
genes that could be used in commercial crops varieties with important implications for 
improved food security. Current CWR conservation strategies are inadequate and there is a 
need to improve conservation efforts, particularly in situ. To understand the costs of in situ 
conservation efforts this chapter uses a payment for agrobiodiversity conservation services 
(PACS) approach to estimate in situ costs of conserving CWR in Zambia, where 30 CWR 
have been prioritised for conservation (of which nine are present in my sample). The method 
works by seeking competitive tender applications from farmers willing to accept 
compensation for conservation effort. Using data from 26 communities I determined the cost 
of conserving CWR on-farm, specifically in field margins/borders. Selection of bid offers 
under four different conservation goals using a binary linear programming (BLP) model 
reveals the mean cost of conservation ranging from US$2391/ha. Heterogeneity was 
evident in farmer bid offers, meaning discriminatory price mechanisms can potentially 
deliver cost savings over uniform payment rules. Supply costs increased where other criteria 
were added to the BLP model constraints including social equity and diversity goals. I 
demonstrate how wild relative diversity conserved might vary with changing conservation 
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4.1 Introduction  
 Population growth and changing diets are expected to increase food demand above 
projected crop yield gains (Ray et al., 2013; Seto and Ramankutty, 2016). Climate change 
may reduce agricultural production by 2% each decade (Pachauri et al., 2014), yet demand 
for agricultural products is expected to increase by 50% between 2012 and 2050 (FAO, 
2017b). Advances in genotyping technologies and plant breeding to meet yield improvement 
goals offers one approach to increase global production using fewer inputs (Tester and 
Langridge, 2010). Such advances have increased the potential for using exotic genetic 
material, thereby heightening the importance of conserving and using CWR to deliver yield 
improvements, whilst also enhancing adaptive traits in crops (Dhariwal and Laroche, 2017). 
In this context, CWR, that is, the wild plant species that are genetically closely related to 
cultivated crops (Maxted et al., 2006)  are an increasingly important genetic resource (Zhang 
et al., 2017). They have for example provided cultivars with pest and disease resistance, heat 
and drought tolerance, tolerance of salinity and abiotic stresses, and enhanced nutritional 
quality (Hajjar and Hodgkin, 2007; Maxted and Kell, 2009; Dempewolf et al., 2014).  
 
 Wild relatives are estimated to contribute US$ 120 billion to increased crop 
productivity per annum (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013). Despite their importance, CWR 
have been depleted by agricultural intensification and habitat destruction and a range of other 
threats and are known to be a globally threatened group of plant species (Kell et al., 2011). 
Efforts to improve conservation of CWR are therefore warranted to reduce further loss of 
diversity(Castañeda-Álvarez et al., 2016). 
 
 CWR resources are sometimes found in disturbed anthropogenic habitats, e.g. 
around farms, which should be the focus of some conservation effort (see Jarvis et al., 2015). 
Moreover, there is limited information on the costs of in situ CWR conservation at multiple 
scales, including the farm level (see Section 1.3 for further detail). This constrains our 
understanding of farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) conservation incentives and 
ultimately appreciation for heterogeneity in the per unit cost of selecting conservation 
service providers. This study seeks to demonstrate how the costs of conserving CWR in situ 
(through a measure that restricts farm activities in field margins) can be measured and 
analysed using a Zambian case study. Note, this is different to conservation of landraces, 
where cultivation is actively required. The chapter adds to the literature on the economics of 
in situ CWR conservation and to the growing body of work addressing development of 
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payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes in developing countries, particularly 
payment for agrobiodiversity conservation services (PACS) (Narloch et al., 2011a, 2011b, 
2013; Krishna et al., 2013). It makes a further contribution by considering distributional 
aspects of PES (e.g. social equity). 
 
 The chapter aims to explore cost heterogeneity for supplying PGR conservation 
services using a competitive tender mechanism. A second aim is to assess how different site 
selection goals impact the cost of establishing an incentive scheme for PGR conservation in 
Zambia. The overarching research question is: how do the costs of conserving CWR on 
farmers lands in Zambia vary under alternative conservation goals and selection constraints? 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides background relating to CWR in 
Zambia, the use of incentives, conservation tenders and site selection models. Section three 
describes the research sites and outlines the methodological and modelling approach used. 
Section four provides an overview of the results and a discussion of these follows in section 
five, with the identification of further work necessary to improve future cost estimates. 
Section six presents conclusions. 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 CWR conservation in Zambia 
Zambia is signatory to various agreements that contribute to strengthening the 
conservation and use of PGR, including CWR. These include the CBD whose updated 
strategic plan for biodiversity conservation addresses CWRs and is specifically referred to in 
Target 13: “By 2020, the genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated 
animals and of wild relatives, including other socio-economically as well as culturally 
valuable species, is maintained, and strategies have been developed and implemented for 
minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding their genetic diversity.” Zambia has also 
endorsed the FAO’s Second Global Plan of Action for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (FAO, 2011) whose priority activities make special reference to the conservation 
and sustainable use of CWR. There are 459 CWR documented in Zambia.  Nationally, the 
National Plant Genetic Resource Centre (NPGRC) shoulders the responsibility of conserving 
locally available PGR for food and agriculture (including crop wild relatives). However, 
while the NPGRC focuses on characterisation and sustainable use of CWR there are 
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currently no policies in place that promote in situ conservation around farmed lands 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2016). This is a major limitation of current policy approaches to 
promote conservation activities. 
 
In Zambia there are 107 different crops that are cultivated in the country and a total of 
3,671 wild relatives of these crops have been identified (Ministry of Agriculture, 2016). 
However, little is known about their current conservation status or trends. Protected areas in 
Zambia were established with little specific concern for the conservation of CWRs. 
Management plans for protected areas are not usually broad enough to conserve genetic 
diversity for these species to complement other conservation approaches (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2016). It is therefore necessary to complement the conservation in protected 
areas with measures aimed at conserving genetic diversity which lies outside such areas, 
including around farmed lands. 
  
Zambia was the case study given its participation within a wider project in the South 
African Development Community (SADC) addressing in situ conservation and use of CWR 
(http://www.cropwildrelatives.org/sadc-cwr-project/). A previous exercise (see Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2016) identified 30 priority CWR species in Zambia for conservation to address 
food security. Using a sub-set of this priority list (see Appendix 4 for case study CWR 
species), I examine the cost of selecting farmer managed sites for conservation containing 
priority CWR. The nine CWR species were selected based on their verified presence in the 
sampling frame for the economic surveys. The need to conserve is driven by threats posed to 
CWR in sub-Saharan Africa primarily from climate change (Jarvis et al., 2008) and land use 
change, including intensification of farming practices and alien invasive species (Burgess et 
al., 2006). 
4.2.2 Payment for ecosystem services and competitive tender auctions 
 PES has emerged as a key voluntary incentive mechanism to reduce biodiversity loss 
by paying landowners for actions that sustain or enhance ecosystems (Börner et al., 2017). 
The introduction of PES type schemes for agrobiodiversity conservation (otherwise termed 
PACS) has been limited but a growing body of work suggests this is becoming more widely 
applied, including in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and India (Narloch et al., 2011a, 
2011b; Krishna et al., 2013; Midler et al., 2015; Drucker et al., 2017). This work provides an 
application of PACS that compensates farmers for conserving CWR in field borders. A 
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hypothetical CT auction measured farmer WTA monetary rewards for conservation effort. 
CTs are a reverse auction mechanism, whereby agents submit a bid offer for a pre-defined 
conservation contract supplying, in this instance, CWR conservation services.  
 
The methodological approach is particularly well suited to the Zambian context given 
many farmers already actively negotiate and bid when selling/buying produce at local 
markets. The competitive bid vehicle therefore resembles real life trading activities. Relative 
to fixed price approaches CTs are incentive compatible in allowing participants to reveal 
their true opportunity costs (which include both market and non-market values and 
preferences). This allows identification of least-cost suppliers through the formulation of 
cost curves that reveal differences in agents’ opportunity costs. CT mechanisms have been 
used to determine the costs of agrobiodiversity conservation (Bertke and Marggraf, 2005; 
Narloch et al., 2011a), though none have been applied to the case of CWR. 
 
4.2.3 Binary linear programming (BLP) 
 This work combines CT cost elicitation with BLP modelling to optimise selection of 
farmer sites for CWR conservation under alternative conservation goals. BLP is a calculation 
process that finds the optimal solution to a problem with multiple attributes and constraints 
using a branch and bound algorithm (Messer, 2006). Many reserve selection problems are 
formulated as BLP problems because site selection decisions can be modelled with binary 
variables [0,1] which reflects the yes/no decision-making context associated with site 
selection (Beyer et al., 2016). Much previous work in reserve site selection has sought to 
solve the problem of maximising the expected number of species included in a reserve 
network subject to a restriction on network size or cost (Donaldson et al., 2017). BLP takes 
into account the benefits and costs of each site and evaluates all possible purchase 
combinations of sites, selecting sites that yield the highest possible aggregate conservation 
value (Williams et al., 2005). BLP thus facilitates determination of least-cost suppliers of 
conservation services under various objective functions (Haight and Snyder, 2009). 




4.3.1 The study sites 
 The study regions were selected based on a review of records of populations for all 
30 priority CWR species (held by the Zambia Agriculture Research Institute (ZARI)) 
(Ng’uni et al., 2016). After assessment of occurrence records I identified two study areas 
likely to contain the highest distribution of priority CWR species; Eastern Province and 
Northern Province (Figure 4.1). Historical records (obtained from herbarium collections 
varying in date) in these areas included wild relatives of melon and cucumber (Cucumis 
spp.), yams (Dioscorea spp.), millets (Echinochloa spp., Eleusine spp., Pennisetum spp.), 
sweet potato (Ipomoea spp.), rice (Oryza spp.), eggplant (Solanum spp.), sorghum (Sorghum 
spp.), and cowpea (Vigna spp.) (Ng’uni et al., 2017). 
 
Eastern province (herein referred to as Ecoregion 1
10
) has a population of 1.3 million 
and a land area of 51,476 km
2
 (Ministry of Local Government and Housing, 2017). The 
province houses Zambia’s most fertile land and consequently the majority of the country’s 
large-scale commercial farms (Chikowo, 2018). The province has higher human population 
and lower land availability than other areas in Zambia resulting in the application of more 
intensive farming practices that are impacting biodiversity (Eroarome, 2009). Northern 
province (herein referred to as Ecoregion 2) occupies a land area of 87,806 km
2 
and with a 
population of 712,000 people is sparsely populated (Zamstats, 2010). The province sits on 
the Muchinga Escarpment and is characterised by large tracts of miombo woodland with 
predominantly small-scale agriculture. Land is relatively abundant and shifting cultivation 
(slash and burn) was widespread until recently (Grogan et al., 2013). 
 
 The areas selected for the CT exercise (within the study regions) were communities 
far from Game Management Areas
11
 (herein referred to as ‘non-GMA’ sites) and 
communities adjacent to Game Management Areas (herein referred to as ‘GMA’ sites). 
People in GMAs are generally poorer and less educated than the national average, and these 
areas are associated with lower agricultural potential and fewer alternative livelihood 
opportunities (Manning, 2011). By contrast, non-GMA sites were considered better-off, with 
improved access to economic infrastructure. In both areas, agricultural production plays a 
                                                     
10
 Ecoregions were subsequently used in the site selection model outlined further in Section 4.3.6. 
11 Game management areas are transitional zones that serve as protected areas (Pas) for the management of 
wildlife adjacent to national parks. 
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crucial role in farmer livelihoods. An optimal conservation strategy may specify a 
combination of sites across both areas to ensure a diverse ecogeographic range of plant 
populations (e.g. those with restricted ranges and sub-populations) are captured for 
conservation (Rodrigues et al., 2004). Additionally, conservation in GMAs may enhance 
gene flow and dispersal from protected areas (PAs) whilst non-GMA sites may provide 
sanctuaries for species establishment outside formal designations. Both areas are therefore 
desirable for CWR conservation. 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of sample sites detailing protected areas (PAs). Inset map shows the 
location of the sample area (red hatch) and species richness of 30 priority CWRs (red areas 
are CWR hotspots). Source CWR richness data (Ng’uni et al., 2016). 
 
4.3.2 Focus group discussions 
 Focus group discussions (FGDs) were held in selected farming communities and 
participants were invited by agricultural extension officers that regularly engage with 
community groups. The FGD’s were conducted in the native language of the communities 
and were facilitated by a ZARI member of staff. Five FGDs were conducted with 1015 
participants in each; encompassing a mix of genders, age groups, and wealth status. FGDs 
sought to understand the degree of recognition of CWR within communities, CWR status 
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and conservation management and community farm management practices. Additionally, the 
FGDs discussed current uses of CWR by communities, an area poorly documented in the 
empirical literature (Heywood et al., 2007). Specific activities (and associated costs, as 
perceived by community members) that would need to be implemented in order to attain a 
desirable (as determined by a conservation programme) level of CWR conservation 
management were discussed. Further qualitative information concerning the FGDs is 
documented in Appendix 5. 
4.3.3 Competitive tender design 
 Data from the FGDs and expert consultation informed the design of the area 
management option that would underpin the hypothetical tender. Expert consultation 
suggested that the tender should support CWR interventions through habitat-based 
conservation measures in field borders/margins  a habitat that has been shown to support 
CWR (Jarvis et al., 2015). The requirement was for conservation to be undertaken on 
individual farmer lands, as previous work has shown regular habitat disturbance regimes, 
through practices such as agriculture, are favourable for some CWR (Maxted et al., 2008; 
Padulosi et al., 2012). 
 
 The area management option prohibited application of herbicides within 3m of the 
field perimeter or on the field border, and the field border was to be left undisturbed for the 
duration of the scheme. These activities are most likely to benefit CWR that may inhabit 
field borders as weeds. In addition, bids were also accepted for conservation in crop fields 
and on communal land areas but are beyond the scope of analysis of the current chapter. The 
tender required farmers to detail the number of land plots and total area (in local land units) 
that they would be willing to enrol in the conservation programme, along with a monetary 
bid for providing the associated conservation service per annum. Additional information 
collected included gender, age and farm size (a proxy for wealth). 
4.3.4 Competitive tender workshops 
 Farmers were invited to take part in the tenders by agricultural extension officers. 
Tender workshops were held at 26 different communities between April and May 2016, with 
a total attendance of 358 participants. This corresponded to 11 community GMA sites and 15 
community non-GMA sites. The workshops used a format similar to the FGDs.  
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 The first section of the workshop ‘Existence and Management’ prompted farmers to 
consider where CWR occur on their communal and farmed lands. Participants were asked to 
identify a set of CWR from photographs and describe where these occurred (if at all) on 
communal or farmed land. Respondents were then asked to consider how these might be 
managed and the implications of this management. The next section ‘Conservation 
Management’ asked farmers what activities might be required (on an annual basis) to 
maintain CWR on farmed lands, such as seed collecting, late burning of fields, selective 
weeding and training. The cost implications of these activities were discussed. 
 
 Next, a CT training exercise facilitated discussion and learning among the farmer 
groups regarding how a CT works in practice and what the rules and selection criteria of this 
particular tender were. For instance, the competitive nature of the tender was emphasised 
alongside other variables (not conveyed to participants) that would be considered in the 
selection process. All farmers were encouraged to participate in the exercise, including those 
not present at the workshops. An example of the CT bid offer form was then completed with 
participants, after which the actual bid offer forms were distributed and collected some days 
later to allow farmers time to deliberate. The bid offer form can be found in Appendix 6. 
4.3.5 CWR surveys 
 Alongside the CT workshops, 26 simple line transect surveys (Buckland et al., 2007) 
were undertaken at randomly selected communities in both Eastern and Northern Province. 
The aim was to develop a better understanding of CWR abundance and diversity across 
different community and farmer sites. A 100 meter line walking transect was undertaken 
through different habitats at selected communities. The habitats consisted of field borders, 
croplands and communal bush land. A ZARI staff member walking the transects identified 
most of the CWR found. Any CWR not identified on-site were photographed and reviewed 
later. This survey data was subsequently used, in conjunction with occurrence data obtained 
from Dickson et al. (2016) in the site selection model. 
4.3.6 Site selection model 
 The model focuses on optimizing decisions for CWR conservation site selection 
while minimising cost subject to area, diversity and social equity constraints. The model 
accounts for a basic requirement to conserve at least 50 ha of field borders in each ecoregion 
where CT data were acquired because areas of this size are capable of capturing safe 
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minimum populations for a range of CWR diversity (Maxted et al., 2008b). Effectively, 
increasing the area constraint may result in an additional area cost with limited benefit for 
CWR diversity. The model was implemented in OpenSolver for MS Excel 2010 using a 
branch-and-bound procedure with the Simplex algorithm (Mason, 2012). 
 
 Initially, an untargeted area goal was developed to represent a simple method of site 
selection, based on procuring conservation sites at minimum cost, subject to the minimum 
area requirement per ecoregion. Three further conservation goals (different versions of the 
model) were then constructed: (i) a targeted area goal that uses a minimum CWR selection 
constraint
12
 (ii) a social equity goal that ensures socially vulnerable groups are well 
represented and; (iii) a diversity goal that maximises the likelihood of capturing greater 
CWR diversity (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram of the different model goals  
 
 Bid offer data in the untargeted area conservation goal were selected using a 
discriminatory payment rule (Wünscher and Wunder, 2017). In discriminatory price 
                                                     
12
 The minimum CWR selection constrain ensures that each CWR is conserved in at least three different community sites 
per ecoregion and 5 farmer sub-sites per community, wherever possible. 
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auctions, bidders are paid their winning offer price while in a uniform payment rule all are 
paid the same. Discriminatory approaches can therefore improve cost effectiveness (Windle 
and Rolfe, 2008). 
 
 For the untargeted area goal, the objective function (4.1) was to minimise the cost of 
selecting farmer sites for conservation, subject to a constraint (4.2) concerning the minimum 
area (50 ha) to be procured for conservation services from each ecoregion.  
 
The model notation is: 
 










 𝒙𝒊  ∈  {𝟎, 𝟏}        𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐢 ∈ 𝐈    ( 4.3) 
 
 Where ai refers to the conservation area associated with site i, where i ϵ I = 
{1,2…,429}, ei is a binary variable that indicates whether site i is located in either ecoregion 
1 or 2. The ecoregions were categorised based on a data set obtained from WWF (2004) and 
original work by Olson et al., (2001). The binary decision variable Xi = {0,1} is used to 
determine selection of the parcels; 1 if the ith parcel is selected, 0 otherwise.  
 
 A set of additional constraints in the targeted goal (4.5) ensures that each priority 
CWR
13
 is conserved in at least three different community sites per ecoregion and 5 farmer 
sub-sites per community, wherever possible
14
. Ideally, this genetic reserve design structure 
would be replicated across five distinct ecogeographic zones (Maxted et al., 2008b) although 
                                                     
13 A list of the priority CWR verified to be present at the sample sites and used in the modelling exercise is 
provided in Appendix 5. 
14 The proposed conservation design structure ensures CWR are conserved at different sub-plots per 
community (i.e. different farmers lands in each community) and per ecoregion, to capture different meta-
populations and changes in local ecological conditions. Given limitations concerning the extent of the tender 
surveys, conservation to these requirements was not feasible for all CWR in the model.  
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data were only available for two (Ecoregion 1 and 2). The additional constraints are 
summarised below: 
 for all n ∈ N    ∑ 𝑛𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝑑𝑖  𝑥𝑖  ≥ 3
𝑖 ∈𝐼
𝑑𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 5 𝑓𝑖 𝑥𝑖  
( 4.5) 
   
 ∑ 𝒎𝒊 𝒙𝒊  ≥ 𝟎. 𝟒 ∑𝒙𝒊
𝒊 ∈𝑰
     ( 4.6) 
 
 ∑ 𝒑𝒊 𝒙𝒊  ≥ 𝟎. 𝟑 ∑𝒙𝒊
𝒊 ∈𝑰
     ( 4.7) 
 
 ∑ 𝒗𝒊 𝒙𝒊 =  ∑𝒙𝒊 
𝒊 ∈𝑰
     ( 4.8) 
 
 ∑ 𝒒𝒊 𝒔𝒊 𝒚𝒊 𝒈𝒊 𝒙𝒊 ≥  𝟎. 𝟓 ∑𝒙𝒊
𝒊 ∈𝑰
    ( 4.9) 
 
 The diversity goal (equations 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8) employs the same constraints as the 
targeted area goal plus ensures CWR should be conserved in GMA sites at least 40% of the 
time. This is to facilitate active management of CWR in areas close to PAs. An additional 
constraint (4.7) specifies at least 30 % of sites selected contain plots that are ≥ 0.8 ha in size 
(based on an assumption that larger sites are better suited to maintaining species and 
population genetic diversity) (Lindenmayer and Burgman, 2005). All sites selected (4.8) 




 The social equity goal (equation 4.9) employs the same constraints as the targeted 
area goal plus ensures that vulnerable groups, such as women, younger farmers and the poor 
have a minimum representation of 50% across the total selected conservation area. The 
social equity parameters specifically relate to the following: 
 
 Number of female farmers, recognising the important role women play in the 
management of genetic resources (Escobar et al., 2017) as well as women’s 
                                                     
15
 Note, the presence of CWR at all farmer sites had not been directly verified by botanical surveys or species 
occurrence records held by ZARI. Thus, procuring conservation sites solely based on farmer identification of 
CWR provides less certainty of ensuing the presence of CWR, despite training received at the project workshops.  
Chapter 4: Zambia BLP model 
70 
 
empowerment being considered a prerequisite for global food security (Quisumbing 
et al., 2014). 
 Number of farmers aged ≤ 35 years of age. This contributes to the objective of 
motivating younger farmers to remain in farming – where the average age of 
farmers in Zambia is increasing (Brooks et al., 2013). 
 Number of farms ≤ 2 hectares in size (a proxy for poorer farmers). 
 Number of sites that are located in GMA areas, where the population may be up to 
30% poorer than the national average (World Bank, 2007). 
 
A description of the decision variables and parameters is provided in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Description of model parameters and associated notation used for different 
model goals  
Notation Parameter description 
Decision variable 
xi [0,1] variable, 1 if site i is selected for conservation services from I index of all 
sites, 0 otherwise (unknown)   
Untargeted area model 
ai area (ha) associated with site i from index I of potential sites for conservation 
services 
ci the cost of selecting site i for conservation services  
ei [0,1] parameter: 1 if site i is located in ecoregion 1, 0 otherwise  
Z objective function value (unknown) 
Targeted area goal 
di community corresponding to farmer f at site i from index D of all communities   
fi farmer f corresponding to site i from index F of all farmers  
ni [0,1] parameter: 1 if site i is associated with species n from index N of all species, 0 
otherwise  
Social equity goal  
gi [0,1] parameter: 1 if site i is located in a GMA area 1, 0 otherwise  
qi [0,1] parameter: 1 if farmer f is female, 0 otherwise 
si [0,1] parameter: 1 if the size of farm i is ≥ 2 hectares, 0 otherwise 
vi [0,1] parameter: 1 if farmer f is  <35 years old, 0 otherwise 
Diversity goal   
mi [0,1] parameter: 1 if site i is located in a GMA area 1, 0 otherwise  
pi [0,1] parameter: 1 if plot p associated with site i is >0.8 ha in size, 0 otherwise  
vi [0,1] parameter: 1 if site i contains verified priority CWR, 0 otherwise 
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4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Summary statistics and bid offers  
A total of 132 male and 88 female farmers submitted bid offers at non-GMA sites; whilst 
170 male and 58 female farmers submitted offers at GMA sites across the 26 communities 
visited. Bid offers totalled $110,154 (USD) and encompassed 632 hectares. A significant 
difference between GMA and non-GMA sites was found for a range of variables, using a 
two sample t-test (Table 4.2). The GMA sites had smaller farms and their socio-economic 
status index score
16
 was lower, suggesting this group of farmers are indeed generally poorer. 
Mean number of plots included in bid offers at GMA sites and the mean size of plots was 
higher than non-GMA sites, suggesting such farmers were willing to enrol significantly more 
land. Bid offers at GMA sites were significantly higher in total, as well as per ha and per 
plot. No significant differences were found for age of famers and the proportion of lands 
enrolled. Additionally, bid offers were disaggregated by gender and age. Analysis by gender 
reveals a significant difference for total bid offer and bid offer per plot but not for bid offer 
per ha. For age, no significant differences were noted. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of descriptive statistics and t-tests for multiple parameters 
associated with farmer bid offers from GMA and non-GMA sites plus disaggregation by 
farmer gender and age. 
Variables  
Mean  Std Mean  Std 
Two sample t-
test 
GMA non-GMA Obs P value  
Socio-economic status 
index
7 4.4 1.0 4.9 0.8 427 *** 
Farm size (ha) 4.0 4.1 9.9 21.7 211 *** 
Age  42.4 12.0 43.2 12.5 422 ns 
Number of plots bid 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.7 394 ** 
Average size of plot (ha) 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.3 216 *** 
Area bid (ha) 2.2 2.8 0.7 0.6 252 *** 
Proportion of land (%) 30.9 20.7 28.8 18.9 420 ns 
Bid offer (USD) 396.7 560.1 96.5 73.3 237 *** 
Bid offer (USD per ha) 304.5 360.4 193.5 144.9 308 *** 
Bid offer (USD per plot) 213.0 205.3 64.2 56.1 223 *** 
  Male Female     
Bid offer (USD) 302.6 506.3 160.1 209.0 421 *** 
                                                     
16
 This refers to the FAO Richness Index (UN FAO, 2010) and represents the level of economic wellbeing associated with 
regions across Africa in 2010.   This is measured from categories one (poorest areas) to six (wealthiest areas). 
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Bid offer (USD per ha) 261.5 307.5 234.3 235.7 427 ns 
Bid offer (USD per plot) 152.2 180.0 105.4 129.3 312 ** 
  Older farmers 
Younger 
farmers     
Bid offer (USD) 263 475.3 240.1 320.6 427 ns 
Bid offer (USD per ha) 241.8 268.3 282 329.5 177 ns 
Bid offer (USD per plot) 129 158.2 163.3 188.8 155 ns 
Note: ‘Std’ = standard deviation, ‘Obs’ = observations. *** = P<0.01, ** = P<0.05, NS = not 
significant. Welch’s t-test was used where Fisher’s F-test indicated heteroscedasticity (unequal 
variance). 
 
 A correlation matrix reports the strength and direction of relationships between 
variables that may explain bid offer characteristics (Figure 4.3). Price/ha is negatively 
correlated with plots, area (ha) and proportion of land enrolled in the tender, suggesting as 
area, plots and the proportion of farmer lands enrolled in bid offers increases, so the price/ha 
of bid offers decreases. Bid offer is positively correlated with area and, to a lesser extent 
plots, suggesting higher bid offers are likely to contain more area and plots. Price is 
positively correlated with GMA, suggesting GMA areas resulted in higher bid offers. The 
proportion of land enrolled was negatively correlated (albeit weakly) with age, suggesting 
older farmers were willing to enrol proportionately less of their farms. Farm size was 
negatively correlated with GMA and ecoregion 1, as might be expected given that these 
areas house smaller farms. Finally, plots were positively correlated with area, suggesting as 
the number of plots included increases, so the area enrolled also increases. 
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Figure 4.3: Correlation matrix demonstrating strength and direction of correlation for 
multiple explanatory variables for farmer bid offers. All populated variable cells were 
significant (P <0.05) in the analysis. Positive correlations are displayed in red, negative in 
blue. Colour intensity and the size of the circle are proportional to the correlation 
coefficients. 
4.4.2 Site selection under multiple conservation goals  
 The construction of a supply curve allows the marginal cost for procuring an 
additional unit of conservation area to be estimated (Figure 4.4). The different model goals 
are shown through the varying supply curves, all of which are non-linear (i.e. price 
increments to procure more area vary along the curves). The supply curves show the 
minimum bid offer values to achieve a desired conservation area under the different selection 
goals. The untargeted area goal provided least-cost selection of conservation sites, followed 
by the targeted area and equity goals while the diversity goal was most expensive. The trade-
offs between the different goals become more pronounced as selection of bid offers 
continues up the supply curve. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Supply curve of farmer bid offers (USD per annum) and area (ha) procured 
for conservation under the different conservation goals. 
 
 A range of diversity and social equity parameters varied depending on the goal 
employed (i.e. no. of younger farmers, no. larger plots, no. of female farmers, no. of GMA 
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sites, no. of small farms and no. of communities). The untargeted area goal includes the 
highest proportion of larger plots of any goal, suggesting some farms with larger plots also 
sell cheapest (Figure 4.5). The targeted area goal selects more communities, verified CWR 
sites and female farmers relative to the untargeted goal. The diversity goal selected the 
highest proportion of sites with verified CWR records though not the highest number of 
larger plots. The social equity goal selected a higher proportion of younger farmers, female 




Figure 4.5: Panel of radar plots corresponding to farmer selection under the ‘untargeted 
area’, ‘targeted area’, ‘diversity’ and ‘equity’ goals. The 0100 scale shows the proportion 
(%) of each parameter in site selection under the different goals. 
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 Overall, the untargeted area goal provided least-cost procurement of conservation 
services ($2.3 k), followed by targeted area ($5.9 k), social equity ($6.4k) and diversity ($ 
9.2k) goals (Table 4.3). Compared to using a uniform payment rule
17
, the various model 
goals provided cost reductions of 87%, 66%, 63% and 48% cheaper per hectare, 
respectively; although these cost reductions would be reduced the further along the supply 
curve bid offers were selected. The equity goal selected the most GMA sites (45), female 
farmers (44), smaller farms (45) and young farmers (44) of all the model goals. The social 
equity goal therefore provides a basis to improve social equity outcomes but also has the 
second highest cost. Compared to the most expensive goal (diversity), social equity costs 
$27/ha or $2.8k per annum less. The diversity goal selected the largest farms and had a mean 
species richness of 2.66  the highest species richness of any model goal. The cost per unit 
species richness
18
 ranged from between $3k (untargeted area) to $4.4 k (targeted area) under 
all model goals. In terms of per unit of species richness, the diversity goal was 18% cheaper 
than the equity goal. 
 
 The targeted area goal selected the most non-GMA and ecoregion 1 sites. Non-GMA 
sites are associated with lower bid offers (on average) than GMA sites; hence their selection. 
In addition, the targeted area goal procured more plots than any other selection goal (192) 
and these plots were on-average 17% smaller than for the untargeted and social equity goal – 
reporting the highest mean plot size. The untargeted area goal was 75% cheaper on a per 
hectare basis than the most expensive goal (diversity). If expenditure under the targeted area 
goal mirrored that of the social equity goal then a further 20% of conservation area, or 17% 
more sites, could be procured. Similarly, trade-offs between the diversity and equity goal 
suggest the latter could conserve an additional 50% more conservation area or 40% more 
sites (with mirrored budgets) but with a 48% reduction in species richness across sites. 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of parameters associated with individual farmer bid offer selection 
under different model goals. 
Parameter Untargeted Targeted Equity Diversity  
Mean cost per ha (USD) 23 58 64 91 
Total GMA sites 38 40 45 27 
Total non-GMA sites 31 56 43 59 
                                                     
17 The uniform payment was calculated as the average price per hectare across all bid offers. 
18
 A unit of species richness is taken by dividing the mean species richness (i.e. mean number of priority CWR from the 
sub-list present at each site)  by the total cost for each selection goal. 
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Total ecoregion 1 sites 23 59 50 44 
Total ecoregion 2 sites 46 37 38 42 
Total farmers  69 96 88 86 
Total female farmers 24 33 44 26 
Total young farmers 17 26 44 25 
Mean farm size (ha) 5 8 8 11 
Total smaller farms (< 2 ha) 31 43 45 27 
Total number of plots 156 192 166 162 
Mean plot size (ha) 0.64 0.53 0.64 0.62 
Total large plots (≥ 0.8 ha) 30 24 25 26 
Total communities  13 15 18 12 
Mean CWR species richness
1 
0.77 1.34 1.51 2.66 
Cost per unit species richness $ 3,022 $ 4,398 $ 4,232 $ 3,461 
Total area (ha)
2 100 101 100 101 
Total Cost (USD) $ 2,327 $ 5,893 $ 6,390 $ 9,206 
1
Mean species richness was calculated based on the number of verified CWR species records 
(from the sub-set list of nine CWR species) associated with each site selected under that specific 
selection goal.
2 
The model goals were constrained to select between 50 and 51 ha per ecoregion, to 
allow adequate flexibility to meet all other constraints in the model. 
4.4.3 CWR conservation outcomes 
 An upward sloping supply curve reveals different cost estimates for procuring 
conservation land for each of the nine priority CWR
19
 (Figure 4.6). While the supply curve 
does not consider overlap in species richness, it is clear sites with higher wild relative 
diversity would result in lower cost per CWR. Five wild relatives have relatively comparable 
supply curves; Vigna dekindtiana, Sorghum bicolor, Eleusine indica; Eleusine coracana and 
Solanum incanum. The most abundantly conserved CWR by area was E. coracana (54 ha) 
and the least conserved CWR was Cucumis zeyheri (3 ha). The rarer CWR tend to feature in 
less conservation sites and are therefore conserved across less area, suggesting the need for a 
more targeted approach to capture rare species adequately. 
 
                                                     
19 Although 30 CWR were prioritised for conservation in Zambia, only nine priority CWR were verified to be 
present at the sample sites. 




Figure 4.6: Supply curve revealing the cost of procuring conservation area (ha) thought 
to be inhabited by specific CWR in the diversity goal.  
Key: VUD (Vigna unguiculata subsp. dekindtiana), VJ (Vigna juncea), EC (Eleusine coracana), SB 
(Sorghum bicolor), SI (Solanum incanum), EI (Eleusine indica), PP (Pennisetum purpureum), CZ 
(Cucumis zeyheri), OL (Oryza longistaminata).  
 Only four priority CWR were found across both ecoregions surveyed (Table 4.4) 
suggesting the need for more wide-ranging CT surveys. The two most expensive CWR to 
conserve (under the diversity goal) were C. zeyheri ($550 per ha) and V. juncea ($148 per 
ha). Both C. zeyheri and V. juncea were also the rarest CWR in my sample. The cheapest 
CWR were S. bicolor ($56 per ha) and V. unguiculata subsp. dekindtiana ($65 per ha). 
However, these were not the most abundant CWR across my sample, suggesting other 
factors (beyond rarity) are also driving changes in cost. 
 
 The most prolifically conserved CWR for the diversity goal (by number of sites) was 
E. indica (43) while the most sparsely conserved was C. zeyheri (5). These correspond to the 
most, and least, prolific CWR across all farmer sites featuring in the sample, respectively. E. 
indica was conserved across more plots than any other CWR but not the highest area. E. 
coracana was conserved across the highest area (54 hectares) of any wild relative but not the 
most farmers or plots (this being E. indica). This suggests a further potential trade-off 
between conserving across larger geographical ranges (using farmer numbers as a proxy) and 
ensuring a greater extent of hectares. Decision makers should be aware of such potential 
trade-offs when setting conservation goals. 























Oryza longistaminata 1 1 10 10.2 17 80 817 
Cucumis zeyheri 1 1 5 3 5 550 1,651 
Pennisetum 
purpureum 1 3 24 17.9 38 111 1,981 
Vigna juncea 1 2 16 14.3 28 148 2,109 
Vigna unguiculata 
subsp. dekindtiana 1 3 26 35.1 59 65 2,275 
Sorghum bicolor 2 4 28 42 63 56 2,340 
Eleusine indica 2 5 43 52.1 85 67 3,466 
Eleusine coracana 2 5 38 53.5 68 76 4,078 
Solanum incanum 2 4 38 47.3 78 88 4,172 
 
 Compared to using a uniform payment rule, the diversity goal resulted in mean cost 
improvements of 120% per hectare across each CWR, excluding C. zeyheri where a uniform 
payment rule would actually result in a cost reduction of 68%. Cost improvements ranged 
from 18% for V. juncea to 213% for S. bicolor, although these cost reductions may be lower 
if the area goal was increased (i.e. as the model moves up the supply curve). 
4.5 Discussion  
4.5.1 Working with different types of farmer  
 The cost-effectiveness gains from optimised site selection reflect the heterogeneity 
in opportunity costs of different farmers, as revealed in bid offers (Engel, 2016). While 
selecting at the lower end of the supply curve may reduce cost, the advantages must be 
weighed against increased transaction costs associated with differentiating payments, as well 
as fairness and welfare implications (Börner et al., 2017). 
 
 Bid offers in GMAs were higher in absolute terms as well as per ha and per plot, 
suggesting poorer members of society do not necessarily “sell cheapest” (Pascual et al., 
2014; Narloch et al., 2017). Importantly, these cost differences were not driven by changes 
in sample sizes between GMA and non-GMA sites, suggesting farmers from GMAs face 
higher shadow opportunity costs, possibly as a result of greater reliance on agri-production 
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for livelihoods and survival. Additionally, these farmer groups may be aware of the financial 
benefits that can arise from working with conservationists. Despite the potentially higher 
cost of working with poorer farmers it may nonetheless be desirable to engage poorer actors 
in conservation activities. Working with GMA farmers may strengthen existing relationships 
between farmers and concurrent conservation programmes (Lindsey et al., 2014). 
Additionally, farmers living in the GMA may harbour pro-environmental attitudes given 
their proximity to protected areas (Allendorf et al., 2006) and these benefits may offset the 
additional cost of working with these groups. 
 
Despite the potentially higher cost of working with poorer farmers it may nonetheless be 
desirable to engage poorer actors in conservation activities. Working with GMA farmers 
may strengthen existing relationships between farmers and concurrent conservation 
programmes (Lindsey et al., 2014). Indeed, farmers living in the GMA may harbour pro-
environmental attitudes given their proximity to protected areas (Allendorf et al., 2006) and 
these benefits may offset the additional cost of working with these groups. 
 
 Paying farmers for environmental services provision can itself either reinforce or 
erode pre-existing intrinsic motivation for conservation (often termed ‘‘crowding-in” and 
‘‘crowding-out”, respectively) (Narloch et al., 2013; Midler et al., 2015; Börner et al., 2017). 
There are many reasons for crowding-in or out, including satisfaction or demotivation with a 
contractual scheme (Nordén et al., 2013). Consideration regarding such potential impacts 
should be undertaken with a view to considering how crowding-in positive behaviours could 
be actively encouraged through scheme design and targeting. A complimentary approach 
may be to reward farmers by forging public private breeding initiatives to improve their crop 
landraces and ultimately farmer yields. 
4.5.2 Trade-offs in PES 
 The mean cost of site selection ranged from $23/ha to $91/ha across all selection 
goals. Similar work on conservation tenders for the maintenance of landraces has obtained 
mean estimates of US $300/ha to $400/ha in Ecuador and $835/ha in Guatemala (Drucker et 
al., 2017), $1,228/ha in Bolivia and $3,667/ha in Peru (Narloch et al., 2017). The lower 
Zambia costs may reflect the reduced opportunity costs associated with conservation in field 
margins and lower labour costs (Rapsomanikis, 2015). 
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 Using a discriminatory payment rule to select bid offers yielded cost-effectiveness 
improvements of 87% to 48% per hectare across the various model iterations, compared to a 
uniform payment rule. Sensitivity analysis indicates these gains in cost-effectiveness persist, 
albeit at a somewhat reduce level, even when procuring larger conservation areas (i.e. 100 
ha. per ecoregion, rather than just 50 ha.) suggesting these findings are robust with regard to 
the area constraint imposed. The different constraints employed also impact cost 
effectiveness. The diversity goal yielded the best ecological performance (a 76% increase in 
mean species richness, compared to the equity goal) but the social equity goal resulted in 
69% more female farmers, 76% more younger farmers and 67% more smaller farmers being 
selected in bid offers. These factors suggest a trade-off between cost-effectiveness, diversity 
and other socially desirable attributes. Similar work has found comparable trade-offs persist 
for landrace conservation (Narloch et al., 2011b) and biodiversity conservation in the tropics 
(Calvet-Mir et al., 2015). 
 
 It is therefore of interest to explore the relationship between social equity and the 
cost-effectiveness of conservation schemes. Factors such as perceived distributional fairness 
may influence an individual’s motivation to engage in conservation programmes (Vatn, 
2010; Narloch et al., 2013; Midler et al., 2015) and perceptions of unfairness can undermine 
the effectiveness of incentives (Sommerville et al., 2010). Debate in the literature has raised 
questions regarding the appropriateness of using PES programmes to tackle factors such as 
poverty reduction at the expense of ecological outcomes (Kinzig et al., 2011; Jack et al., 
2008). While there are strong arguments for including equity considerations in PES 
(Wunder, 2007), it can be argued that allocating funds to service providers that are not the 
most competitive may undermine conservation effort (Börner et al., 2017). 
 
 My work demonstrates imposing fairness considerations would result in additional 
scheme cost of a relatively modest 8% when compared to the targeted area goal. Although 
the diversity goal cost an additional 44% more to procure land than the social equity, it was 
actually cheaper per unit of species richness than the equity and targeted area goal. In other 
words, the diversity goal is the cheapest approach to maximising species richness out of the 
selection goals where a minimum diversity constraint is imposed. Multi-criteria approaches 
may be required to balance environmental effectiveness and fairness considerations and there 
are strong arguments for not treating environmental and social equity goals as fully separate 
objectives in PES schemes (Pascual et al., 2014). Good conservation outcomes are often 
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contingent on developing positive local attitudes (Struhsaker et al., 2005) and pro-social 
behaviour that can improve compliance (Narloch et al., 2017). My results show it is possible 
to combine social equity and diversity criteria and the cost implications resulted in a 15% 
increase. Ultimately, there is a need for such considerations to form part of the establishment 
of a consensus around the definition of conservation goals and how trade-offs are considered 
(Zumaran, 2018). 
4.5.3 National scale CWR conservation  
 Establishment of national and global genetic reserves has been identified as a key 
policy challenge for CWR conservation (Maxted et al., 1997, 2010). Maxted (2015, 
unpublished) suggests a fully integrated national and global CWR conservation network is 
required and this Zambia case study reveals maximising diversity may be at odds with 
conservation area. My findings therefore support work by Naidoo et al. (2006) that identify 
trade-offs between obtaining higher levels of a conservation target (i.e. biodiversity) and the 
increase in cost (or decrease in area) as a result. 
 
 Costs for establishing an on-farm conservation site for CWR have been estimated by 
Maxted (2015, unpublished) at $10k per ecoregion per year. While the total cost of 
conservation under the diversity maximising goal was estimated at $9.2k p.a. across two 
ecoregions, if this estimate were extrapolated to cover all ten ecoregions in Zambia (upper 
bound) or five ecoregions (lower bound) then the costs for establishing a national 
conservation network would range from $41,250 to $82,500 p.a.
20
. The latter is likely an 
overestimate since Brown and Briggs (1991) and Fielder et al. (2016) note conserving each 
CWR at a minimum of five different ecoregions should suffice. In any case I suggest this is a 
relatively modest sum as it only amounts to between 0.5% and 0.9% of income generated by 
the Zambian Wildlife Authority (Lindsey et al., 2014). 
 
 Eight of the nine priority CWR modelled in this exercise were present in existing 
PAs. Yet, many populations in PAs receive no active management highlighting the need to 
establish their management on-farm (Maxted et al., 1997; Lawson et al., 2014). While only 
C. zeyheri was not present within existing PAs, Sorghum bicolor and Solanum incanum were 
found to be present in only 20% and 25% of PA sites, respectively (see Appendix 7). In 
                                                     
20 Based on procuring 50 hectares per ecoregion at the mean cost of $150/ha (this cost is based on the mean 
price/ha of individual farmer bid offers in the diversity goal). The cost estimate includes an additional 10% 
monitoring and management cost (as per Lindenmayer et al., 2012).  
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addition, C. zeyheri was not present in any ex situ collections while Sol. incanum and S. 
bicolor was scarcely stored ex situ. This suggests rationalisation is needed and raises broader 
questions concerning how best to allocate funds across integrated in situ and ex situ 
strategies. The high cost of conserving C. zeyheri, suggests it may be more cost-effective to 
prioritise ex situ approaches to enable a higher proportion of funds to be allocated to the in 
situ management of other CWR where the cost of conserving is much lower. Alternative in 
situ strategies (e.g. genetic reserves) may also be more appropriate where farmer led 
conservation is cost prohibitive. 
4.5.4 Limitations and further work  
 In this study, agricultural extension officers were used to promote the conservation 
tender and recruit workshop participants, with bid offers ultimately being received from a 
wider range of community members. However this approach could potentially introduce a 
self-selection bias that lowers the bid costs we observed relative to the mean of the broader 
population. This tendency is however potentially offset by another possible bias that can 
arise from the use of an open-ended tender question, which in some circumstance has been 
shown to lead to higher WTP estimates relative to a closed format. There is an extensive 
debate regarding the use of open versus closed formats, which is arguably unresolved. In this 
particular context the open-ended format was considered to be appropriate given the unusual 
nature of the conservation service contract being solicited.  
 
 Nevertheless, the cost figures generated are likely to reflect only a lower-bound 
estimate of the total costs, given that a range of transaction costs have not been accounted 
for, falling outside of the scope of this study. Such additional costs would include farmer 
CWR management training, as well as the administration costs of the scheme and associated 
monitoring and verification. In other studies, such transaction costs have been found to range 
from 6% to 87% of total costs paid to landholders (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005); 
while monitoring necessary to ensure site management is maintaining or enhancing target 
CWR populations (Maxted et al., 1997, 2008b) may be differentiated based on demographic 
counting with costs in the range of CWR (US$1 k per monitoring event) and genetic 
characterisation (required every 2530 years costing ~ $50 k per monitoring event) per 
ecoregion (Maxted, 2017, personal communication). 
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 An additional constraint was my reliance on CWR records that varied in date, raising 
questions over their reliability and the potential need for additional field surveying to 
establish renewed population baselines. Furthermore, the limited number of CWR species 
used to inform the site selection model may have affected outcomes under each selection 
goal. Further validation of the results could be achieved through applying the approach 
developed at the national scale (with associated sample sizes). Ecological metrics such as 
habitat connectivity and sub-populations were not considered but have been shown to be 
important in other work (Beyer et al., 2016) and incorporating such metrics into future model 
iterations may lead to more integrated conservation approaches. 
Finally, the implications of climate change need to be made more explicit in decisions 
concerning optimal site selection given range shifts that are likely to occur (Phillips et al., 
2017). Such range shifts may change the distribution of CWR in protected areas, ultimately 
reducing the protection afforded to some CWR. Site selection decisions should therefore 
target populations that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts.   
4.6 Conclusion 
 
 Advances in genotyping technologies and plant breeding to meet yield improvement 
goals have increased the potential for using exotic genetic material, thereby increasing the 
importance of conserving and using CWR. In the Zambian context, we demonstrated that in 
situ conservation costs ranges from $23-$91/ha. Including social equity goals in site 
selection results in a cost increase of 8% relative to the targeted area goal. The diversity goal 
was most expensive, with an additional 42% cost per ha compared to the social equity goal, 
but 18% cheaper per unit species richness. This implies a potential trade-off between 
conservation area, species richness and more equitable distribution of conservation funds to 
disadvantaged groups. Any such trade-offs should be made transparent and brought to the 
attention of the relevant decision-makers responsible for CWR conservation strategies; as 
should the fact that the inclusion of some rare CWR were found to disproportionately 
increase on farm conservation costs, suggesting alternative conservation approaches (e.g. ex 
situ or in situ within protected areas) may be more appropriate in some cases.  
 
 Despite data gaps, these findings reveal clear opportunities to improve the cost-
effectiveness of incipient conservation approaches based on existing data and the use of 
tender instruments that are capable of identifying least-cost conservation service providers. 
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Although this work has focused on CWR conservation in Zambia, the selection model 
developed could be applied more widely, thereby supporting national and global CWR 
conservation strategy design and implementation. Building on work in this chapter to 
identify least cost suppliers of conservation services, the next chapter will outline how 
multiple criteria can be formulated and weighted in a framework seeking to rationalise 
investments in diversity that considers both breed status and the full TEV value spectrum.      
 










Prioritising support for rare breed conservation 




















Farm Animal Genetic Resources (FAnGR) are threatened by breed homogenisation. Rare 
breeds may carry important genes that allow breeders to respond to global production 
challenges including climate change and emerging disease risk. Yet, exploration of 
approaches to improve cost-effectiveness of investments in farm animal genetic diversity has 
been limited. I employ multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) to investigate how rare 
breed incentive schemes can be rationalised. A performance matrix was used to score 19 UK 
cattle native breeds at risk, in terms of diversity, marketability and endangerment criteria, 
and an expert workshop was used to assign weights for prioritisation. The workshop 
suggested that criteria pertaining to diversity, marketability and endangerment should be 
weighted 30%, 20% and 50% respectively. A principal component analysis (PCA) on the 
criteria suggested that fewer criteria could be used to characterise breed status but that each 
criteria node contributed effectively in explaining variation in breed scores. Modelling the 
allocation of a hypothetical breed improvement fund (BIF) revealed the greatest variation in 
the allocation of incentives occurred when marketability was weighted highest, while least 
variation occurred when endangerment received the highest weight. I suggest MCDA can 
support more targeted investments in diversity by considering the multiple factors that may 















Chapter 5: UK MCDA 
87 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 FAnGR make an important contribution to food security by ensuring greater 
adaptive capacity to global production challenges including climate change, emerging 
disease risk and changing consumption patterns (Eisler et al., 2014; FAO, 2017b). Rare 
breeds supply option value via the possibility to incorporate new traits into future breeding 
programmes, in addition to cultural and heritage attributes (Drucker et al., 2001; Dulloo et 
al., 2017). The failure of markets to reward some of  these values has meant breed diversity 
is often undervalued and is now globally threatened (FAO, 2015a). Policy interventions are 
needed to correct for market failure, and incentive instruments to reward producers 
supplying diversity are common in some European countries (Bojkovski et al., 2015). For an 
overview of measures to combat market failure, see Section 2.3). 
 
 While incentive schemes are an improvement on the status quo (i.e. do nothing), 
they are prone to cost inefficiencies (Pascual and Perrings, 2007). Numerous approaches 
may be employed to improve scheme effectiveness including better targeting (Naidoo et al., 
2006); collective bonuses (Kuhfuss et al., 2015); results-based approaches (Herzon et al., 
2018) and improved monitoring (Lindenmayer et al., 2012). This chapter focuses on 
developing more targeted conservation approaches, a key policy goal of the Global Plan of 
Action (GPA) for FAnGR that stresses the need to construct indicators to better monitor 
breed attributes and develop more systematic conservation responses (FAO, 2007b). 
 
 Few advances in indicators have arisen since the GPA with the exception of works 
using diversity and endangerment metrics (Defra, 2015a; Verrier et al., 2015), and a novel 
geographical information system (GIS) platform for monitoring FAnGR (Duruz et al., 2017).  
Earlier work has focused on methodological adaptations of the Weitzman approach (1993) – 
a methodological framework employing phylogenetics to rationalise investments in diversity 
(Reist‐Marti et al., 2003; Simianer et al., 2003; Zander et al., 2009). While such approaches 
are useful, there has been limited policy uptake, reflecting the tensions between scientific 
rigour and practicality. It is therefore important to develop more pragmatic approaches to 
guide investments (see Section 2.5 for further discussion). 
 
 Here, I develop an indicator detailing breed status by employing MCDA to construct 
a performance matrix detailing rare breed attributes that are weighted to derive preference 
scores concerning multiple endangerment and benefit criteria. Breed scores are subsequently 
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used to allocate a hypothetical breed improvement fund (BIF) across breed societies. The 
fund aims to improve the status of at-risk breeds through more targeted conservation 
investments.  
 
 As a methodological approach, MCDA improves decision making power since it can 
combine technical information and stakeholder preferences to score alternative options, in 
this instance breeds (Huang et al., 2011). Existing applications of MCDA in the conservation 
literature have focused on site selection decisions (e.g. Phua and Minowa, 2005; Regan et al., 
2007; Strager and Rosenberger, 2006) and there have been few applications to 
agrobiodiversity conservation problems. This study therefore fills two literature gaps. First, 
the construction of a composite indicator to monitor breed status and second, the application 
of MCDA to prioritise incentive support for rare breeds through the allocation of the BIF, 
using the UK as a case study.  
  
 The UK is currently exploring a range of policy options for future agricultural and 
environmental support following withdrawal from the EU (Defra, 2018). The state of UK 
FAnGR is particularly concerning, where 80% of native breeds are now classified as at risk 
(Defra, 2017a). Exploring cost effective breed conservation policies is therefore important 
and consistent with the UK Government strategy of  providing ‘public funds for public 
goods’ from agriculture (Defra, 2018).  
 
 The chapter aims to develop a decision analysis framework using MCDA to 
prioritise investments in rare breeds according to multiple criteria that can also be used to 
monitor breed status. The overarching research question is: how can investments in FAnGR 
conservation be rationalised through the application of a multi-criteria monitoring and 
assessment framework to report breed status? The chapter is structured as follows. Section 
two details the MCDA approach and methods. Section three presents results of the MCDA 
application and the implications for resource allocation. Section four discusses criteria to 
monitor breeds, breed indicators and approaches to differentiate breed support. Section five 
presents conclusions.  
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5.2 Methods  
5.2.1 The case study 
 The UK harbours over 700 breeds spanning sheep, goats, pigs, horses, ponies, cattle 
and poultry (Defra, 2013); equating to approximately 9% of global livestock breeds. Some 
133 of these are native to the UK, of which 80% are classified as a native breed at risk 
(NBAR) (Defra, 2016). A breed may be classified as NBAR if it satisfies both genealogical 
and heritage attributes
21
 pertaining to origin and numerical population thresholds (Defra, 
2013). I used a case study of 19 NBAR cattle across the UK; their geographical origins are 
noted in Appendix 8. The breeds were selected based on data availability relating to the 
criteria that would be used in the MCDA model.  
 
The UK has international commitments to conserving its FAnGR, through the CBD and 
its signature to the Interlaken Declaration for the conservation and sustainable use of FAnGR 
(FAO, 2007b). In the UK, in situ conservation is the favoured overall strategy with ex situ 
conservation being seen as a supplement, not an alternative (Hall, 2013). FAnGR 
conservation in England is administered through conservation grazing subsides that pay 
farmers (£94/ha) for grazing with a NBAR (Natural England, 2017). From 2006 to 2015, 
scheme uptake included 1,468 agreements covering 59,244 ha with a total spend of £30.5 
million (Natural England, 2016). While such agreements have been beneficial for cattle and 
sheep they have proved largely ineffective for horses and pigs, where the number of NBAR 
with decreasing populations is above the national average (Defra, 2017a). Across Europe, on 
average 84% of breeds enrolled in a conservation programme are reported to be increasing or 
stable in population size (Kompan et al., 2014). In the UK, this average is just 55%, (in 
2016) suggesting a need to explore alternative policy approaches.  
 
5.2.2 Multi criteria decision analysis  
 MCDA relies on the integration of attribute measures for criteria relevant to decision 
makers’ objectives and preferences (Strager and Rosenberger, 2006). At its most basic level, 
an alternatives performance relative to certain criteria can be reported in a table, known as a 
“performance matrix”. Usually, MCDA follows a formal modelling approach, and there are 
                                                     
21 A breed may be classified as NBAR if it satisfies both genealogical and heritage attributes pertaining to 
origin and numerical population size associated with at-risk thresholds (Defra, 2013).   
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three main methods; outranking, goal-based techniques and weighted linear combinations 
(see Marsh et al., 2017 for a review).  
 
 This study uses a weighted linear combinations approach, which usually combines 
preference weights (wi) and criterion scores for alternatives (xi) in a suitability index S. The 
method is appropriate because MCDA provides a structured framework that combines 
technical information and stakeholder preferences to score alternative options. This is 
important because little information is currently documented concerning the characteristics 
of many rare breeds, meaning stakeholder expertise is needed to inform conservation 
strategies. The weighted linear combinations approach is recommended by the UK 
Government, hence is employed here.    
 
For such an approach, the criteria should exhibit mutual independence of preference 
(Adem Esmail and Geneletti, 2018). This means the judged strength of preference for an 
alternative on one criterion will be independent of its judged strength of preference on 
another (Dodgson et al., 2009). The criteria themselves must also be orthogonal (i.e. no 
double counting). The MCDA decision-making problem can be formulated through multiple, 
ordinal tasks with different research inputs (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Formulation of the MCDA problem through ordinal steps (left) and research 
inputs (right) used in this work. 
5.2.3 Identifying the criteria  
 Initially, a set of criteria was formulated based on literature reviews and stakeholder 
consultations. A requirement of all criteria is that the data were readily available and they 
were relatively simple to calculate, to ensure the method may be applied to other livestock 
species in future applications with relative ease. A workshop held with 10 expert 
stakeholders spanning academia, industry and NGOs then refined this initial criteria list (see 
Appendix 9 for delegate information). Discussions concerned the ‘practicality’, ‘suitability’ 
and ‘data availability’ associated with each criterion, which was scored (1-10) relative to 
these factors. It was therefore possible to determine both the highest scoring criteria and the 
level of agreement amongst stakeholders. A final set of criteria were then structured into a 
hierarchical value tree (Figure 5.2). For further information concerning the qualitative 
findings of the workshops, refer to Appendix 10.  
  
 
Figure 5.2: A hierarchical value tree of criteria and sub-criteria 
 
 The criteria were grouped by diversity, marketability and endangerment nodes and a 
performance matrix was populated containing breed performance data for each criterion. A 
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detailed description of the criteria is provided in Appendix 11. The criteria nodes were 
developed to show what actions breed societies could implement to improve breed scores. 
For instance, if a breed scored low in diversity, then a society might respond by 
implementing a new breeding programme to increase diversity (Pattison et al., 2007). 
 
 Diversity criteria were selected to represent both within and between breed diversity. 
Rege and Okeyo (2006) suggest around 50% of farm species diversity arises from within 
breeds and a further 50% between breeds. Ne was used to measure within breed diversity; 
recalling that Ne is a metric that accounts for the total number of animals in a population, but 
also their breeding structure. A low Ne signifies a greater risk of declining genetic diversity 
within populations (Falconer and Mackay, 1996). Ne was calculated from a formula 
proposed by Wright (1931) using numerical population data. In addition, geographic origin 
of breeds was used as a proxy for between breed diversity (Lenstra et al., 2017; Parker et al., 
2017). 
 
 Marketability approximates the use and non-use values of breeds and is clustered 
under two nodes: ‘utility’ and ‘traits’. Utility suggests how well a breed fits current market 
requirements, and traits refer to the characteristics that a breed may possess for it to become 
valued by markets. Note, the traits identified in this study are not definitive, but data 
constraints restricted the number of traits it was possible to evaluate.  
 
 Endangerment criteria were split between two nodes, in situ and ex situ. The sub-
criteria I consider relate to ex situ storage of genetic material in the UK Heritage Genebank, 
and multiple in situ population metrics (e.g. number of pedigree breeding females). 
Appreciating the severity of threats posed to breeds through in situ and ex situ endangerment 
criteria means conservation responses can be focussed accordingly. 
5.2.4 Scoring the alternatives 
 A final workshop, held with FAnGR experts in April 2018, scored the alternative 
breeds (see Appendix 9 for delegate information). Their experience with breed conservation 
spanned both technical and policy aspects of conservation. A decision conference format was 
employed to generate shared understanding of the criteria and open discussion (Phillips and 
Stock, 2003). The group reviewed the performance matrix and discussed the suitability of 
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each criterion and their definitions. The criteria were deemed preferentially independent of 
each other, thus permitting the use of a weighted linear model (Dodgson et al., 2009). 
 
 The breeds were scored (Table 5.1) relative to the criteria based on three approaches, 
direct linear scoring, categorical scoring, and a preference value function (Mendoza and 
Martins, 2006). The scoring approach adopted differed depending on the criteria being 
assessed (see Appendix 11). Across all approaches, breeds were allotted a value score out of 
100 points, with 100 assigned to the breed with the best level of performance on a specific 
criterion and 0 to breeds with the lowest performance.  
 
Table 5.1: Value functions used in the MCDA study 
Value Function  Description 
Linear Normalises continuous data input in the performance matrix for a specific 
criterion into the 0-100 scale that is directly proportional to their values. 
Categorical Normalises discrete data, to generate a discrete value function. 
Preference 
A non-linear scoring technique formulated graphs that reflected participant 
preferences concerning the normalisation of continuous data for each criterion. 
 
 All scoring methods employed a relative scale, meaning the differences in scores 
have consistency within each criterion. Since it is a relative scale, it is important to 
acknowledge only relative differences in value can be compared (Greco et al., 2016). Thus, 
if a breed is scored 25, then its performance preference should be half that to a breed scoring 
50. Scoring was checked for consistency to ensure values were plausible. This took the form 
of a question to participants, asking “based on these scores, you should be equally happy 
with the difference between breed x and y (scoring 30 and 50, respectively) as the difference 
between breed y and z (scoring 50 and 70, respectively)”. If there was disagreement, further 
discussion was facilitated. This  helped reduce any bias and ensured realism in scoring (Nutt 
et al., 2010).   
 
 An evaluation matrix P was then constructed consisting of standardised alternative 
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The matrix was populated such that breeds with the highest diversity received the highest 
score in each criterion (assuming more diversity is a public benefit). For marketability, 
breeds that were most marketable received the highest score (assuming such breeds possess a 
higher utility value). For endangerment, breeds most endangered received the highest score 
to ensure scoring reflected extinction risk.  
5.2.5 Weighting the criteria  
 Weighting ensures the units of criteria on the different value scales are equivalent, 
thus enabling scores for breeds to be compared and combined across criteria (Nutt et al., 
2010). Criteria were weighted using swing weights, a method recommended by UK 
Government (Dodgson et al., 2009). The swing method is an algebraic, decomposed direct 
procedure where participants evaluate the ‘swing’ in breed performance in each criterion 
based on the range of values, and assign a weight to indicate the relative strength of 
preference (Wang et al., 2009). The weight on a criterion therefore reflects both the range of 
difference of the breeds, and how much that difference matters (Vollmer et al., 2016).  
  
 Workshop participants assigned weights to criteria within each node of the value 
tree. The criterion within a node that had the biggest swing and was considered most 
important was assigned an arbitrary value of 100. Thereafter, additional criteria were judged 
against the top scoring criterion, and were correspondingly scored to reflect the perceived 
difference in importance. The weights were then normalised to sum to 100. 
 
 A vector of weights W consisting of preference weights w for each criteria i 
(Jankowski and Richard, 1994) was then constructed:  
 





Consistency checks on the weights were undertaken to help improve their validity. These 
involved comparing similar scoring criterion weights, relative to the swing in performance of 
the breeds. Scores and weights were input to the Hiview 3 software, which calculated the 
final weighted scores of each breed (Catalyze, 2018). The total breed weighted sum S was 
calculated by the followed linear additive model: 




𝐒 =  ∑ 𝒙𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒘𝒊𝒚,   𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … 𝟏𝟕 
( 5.3) 
where xi refers to the breed score for the i-th criterion and wiy refers to the swing weight 
associated with the i-th criterion and the y-th node. A final grouped decision matrix for m 
breeds across n criteria was expressed as:  
 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑐1 𝑐2 ⋯ 𝑐17
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑤1 𝑤2 ⋯ 𝑤𝑛
    𝐴𝑙𝑡. 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 − − − − −
𝐴1





  ( 5.4) 
where xmn is the performance of the m-th alternative breed for the n-th criteria and wn is 
the n-th weight applied to the criteria (Wang et al., 2009). Sensitivity analysis was employed 
to test the stability of the results with regard to variations in the preference scores and criteria 
weights (Ferretti and Comino, 2015). This allowed uncertainty in the performance matrix 
and criteria weights to be contextualised. 
 
 In addition to using expert derived weights, I considered three additional weighting 
scenarios to contrast different conservation priorities. Firstly, the weights for the criteria 
nodes were held equal. In a second scenario, the diversity node was weighted 50 while 
endangerment and marketability were each weighted 25. The third scenario ensured 
marketability was favoured (50) while diversity and endangerment were each weighted 25.  
5.2.6 Differentiating breed support 
 One option for future breed support is to establish a central fund to support the 
initiatives of breed societies to improve the status of rare breeds. A hypothetical £10 million 
(5-year duration) BIF was allocated across the 19 case study breeds based on the breed 
indicator scores. The budget represents 33% of NBAR conservation grazing subsidies 
allocated to farmers by Natural England between 2006 and 2015 (Natural England, 2016). 
Breed societies were nominated as the beneficiary given their important institutional role for 
breed management and priority setting (Lauvie et al., 2014). Funding allocations were 
calculated by: 
[
𝑥11 𝑥12 ⋯ 𝑥1𝑛
𝑥21 𝑥22 ⋯ 𝑥2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑥𝑚1 𝑥𝑚2 ⋯ 𝑥𝑚𝑛
] 















)  ≤ £𝟐𝟎𝟎 
( 5.6) 
Where V refers to the allocation of a hypothetical BIF across each breed v, Zi is the total 
of all breed scores from index I of all breeds and q is the overall improvement fund budget. 
In (6) this is subject to a constraint where vi refers to the funding allocation for breed k and 
mi and fi refer to the estimated number of pedigree breeding males and females respectively. 
The constraint ensures the pro-rata BIF doesn’t exceed £200 per animal
year-1
 and is therefore 
similar to mean subsidy allocations for rare breed conservation schemes across Europe 
(Kompan et al., 2014). The BIF was allocated according to the four weighting scenarios 
formerly noted, to reveal how a change in conservation priorities could impact funding 
distribution.  
5.2.7 Principal component analysis  
 Principal component analysis (PCA) was employed to analyse the variance of the 
criteria and criteria nodes used in the MCDA model. PCA is a multivariate technique that 
analyses a data table representing observations described by several dependant variables that 
are generally inter-correlated (Abdi and Williams, 2010). The goal is to express information 
in the data table as a new set of orthogonal variables, called principal components (PC). The 
principal components are a linear combination of variables that can be used to reduce the 
original set of variables (Ayyadevara, 2018). 
 
 The aim was to determine which criteria and criteria nodes explained most of the 
variation in breed scores, as indicated by a value of > 1 for the eigenvalues that accord to the 
different PCs. The unweighted variables were scaled to have standardized unit variance and 
were mean centred prior to analysis. The calculation was done using a correlation matrix. 
The first two PCs were plotted using a bi-plot for all the criteria and the criteria nodes. The 
analysis was conducted using R v.3.5.0. For further background on PCA see (Jolliffe, 2011)  
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5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Criteria and weights  
 This study used MCDA to score a selection of case study breeds relative to multiple 
criteria clustered under three nodes (diversity, marketability and endangerment). The weights 
assigned to the criteria are presented in Appendix 12 for both local and global weight scaling 
(local referring to the weight under each node, global being the overall weight). As expected, 
endangerment received the highest weight (50), followed by diversity (30) and marketability 
(20). Note that diversity encompasses the least sub-criteria of all nodes while endangerment 
includes the most.  
 
 In the marketability node, equal weight was assigned to the ‘utility’ and ‘trait’ nodes 
as experts suggested both contributed equally to the value of breeds. For endangerment, the 
ex situ node received much less weight (15) than in situ (85) because experts suggested 
genebank storage was effectively insurance to in situ conservation and therefore is less 
important than ensuring viability of actual breeding populations. The sub-criteria receiving 
the highest global weight overall were Ne (12) and percentage change to Ne over last 5 years 
(12) while all criteria relating to ex situ storage (no. of embryos, semen straws stored and 
males collected from) scored least (2.5 each).  
5.3.2 Breed scores 
 Figure 5.3 shows the total weighted breed scores for the 17 criteria based on the 
three criteria nodes. As formerly, noted, high scores in diversity and marketability nodes are 
desirable while for endangerment low scores indicate a lower extinction risk. The highest 
scoring breeds for diversity were the Luing (18), Red Ruby Devon (17) and Dexter (14). For 
marketability, the Highland (18), British White (14) and Red Poll (14) scored highest. The 
most endangered breeds were the Vaynol (46), Whitebred Shorthorn (44) and Gloucester 
(42). Across all nodes the Whitebred Shorthorn (67), Red Poll (61) and Vaynol (61) scored 
highest. The difference between the highest and lowest scoring breed was 31, while the 
standard deviation across the total scores was 8. This deviation was least in the marketability 
node (3.6) and highest for endangerment (8.2). A sensitivity analysis demonstrated the model 
is structurally stable (see Appendix 13 for results). 
 




Figure 5.3: Breeds ordered by globally weighted scores for diversity, endangerment and 
marketability criteria. Note the Y axis scale is 0-80.  
 
 The contributions of mean part scores associated with each criterion suggests 
number of active herds (7.8) and percentage change to number of pedigree breeding females 
over the last 5 years (6.4) were the highest contributors to breed scores (Figure 5.4). Criteria 
with the lowest mean part score were product designations (0.1) and number of males’ 
semen was collected from (1.3). The difference between the mean highest and lowest 
contributing criteria was 7.7.  
 
 The highest scoring breed for Ne was the Red Ruby Devon while the Luing scored 
most for percentage change to Ne over the last 5 years. Multiple breeds scored the same for 
geographic origin. Three breeds scored highest for product branding (Gloucester, Guernsey 
and Highland) whilst only one breed scored highest for product designations (Gloucester). 
Several breeds scored the same for conservation grazing demand, adaptability and hardiness, 
ability to graze wet sites, heat stress tolerance or susceptibility and number of embryo 
collections stored. Breeds scoring highly for adaptability and hardiness tended to score 
highly for conservation grazing demand. 
 
 The highest scoring breed for number of semen straws stored was the Luing, 
followed by the Dexter. The Luing also scored highest for number of males semen collected 
from, followed by the Belted Galloway. For geographical concentration, the Gloucester, 
Vaynol and Whitebred Shorthorn scored highest. The Northern Dairy Shorthorn, Dairy 
Chapter 5: UK MCDA 
99 
 
Shorthorn and Vaynol all scored highest for number of pedigree breeding females while the 
Vaynol and Gloucester scored highest for number of pedigree breeding males. For 
percentage change to female pedigree breeding population during last 5 years, the Highland 
and White Park scored highest. Lastly, the Vaynol and Northern Dairy Shorthorn scored 
highest for number of active herds registering offspring during the last three years.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Global weighted scores for each breed ordered by the criteria nodes. The 
dashed red line indicates the mean breed score. Note (OP) refers to original breeding 
population. 
  
 The relationship between endangerment and marketability is plotted in Figure 5.5. 
The Highland and Dexter breeds effectively resemble the ‘efficient frontier’ i.e. breeds with 
least endangerment and highest marketability scores. The breed with the least marketability 
was the Dairy Shorthorn. There was no relationship between endangerment and 
marketability scores (r
2
 = 0.0) suggesting other factors may be driving endangerment status. 
Conversely, breed diversity was (weakly) negatively correlated with endangerment (r
2
 = 
0.3), suggesting as endangerment increases so diversity decreases, or vice versa.  
 




Figure 5.5: Scatter plots showing breed endangerment and marketability (left) and 




5.3.3 Principle component analysis  
 The relationship between the different criteria used for scoring breeds is explored 
using PCA and is plotted using a bi-plot in Figure 5.6. In this plot, the variables are plotted 
as vectors and the observations (i.e. breeds) are plotted as points (or scores) that correspond 
to the different principal components. The closer the points are to one another the more 
similar they are in terms of variable scores. The relative importance of the variables in 
explaining variation in breed scores is shown based on their distance to the origin, the point 
where the two axes cross at zero. The cosine of the arrows is directly proportional to the 
correlation between the variables and their length corresponds to the strength of that effect.  
  
 For Plot A, the first and second principle components (PC1 and PC2) accounted for 
31% and 16% of the variation in breed scores, respectively. Out of the 17 PCs, five had 
eigenvalues >1 suggesting these five PCs explain most of the variation in the variables (see 
Appendix 14 for summary statistics). The loadings (see Appendix 15) for PC1 show three 
variables positively correlated with PC1; pedigree breeding females (PBF); number of active 
herds (NAH) and pedigree breeding males (PBM). This suggests breeds scores situated in 
the positive spectrum of PC1 tend to be those most endangered in situ. For PC2, Ne; breed 
branded products (BP) and product designations (PD) are all positively correlated with PC2. 
Breed scores situated in the positive spectrum here tended to have a higher utility benefit, 
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although the interpretation is complicated since this PC only explains 16% of the variation in 
scores.  
 
 The variable vectors show PBM, PBF and NAH are strongly negatively correlated 
with number semen straws stored (NSS) and Ne, suggesting diversity and ex situ storage 
decrease as factors pertaining to in situ endangerment increase. Additionally, a number of 
variables are strongly positively correlated, including PBM and PBF; NAH and PBM; 
number of males semen collected from (NMSC) and percentage change to number of 
pedigree breeding females during last 5 years (CPBF); geographic origin (GO) and CPBF. 
This suggests the number of criteria employed in the indicator to explain breed status could 
be reduced in future iterations. Additionally, some variables trend together including 
adaptability and hardiness (AH) and conservation grazing demand (CG), demonstrating more 
hardy/adaptable breeds are indeed preferred for conservation grazing. 
 
 For Plot B, PC1 accounts for 48% of the variance while PC2 explains 24% of 
variance in breed scores. Of the five PCs, two had eigenvalues >1 (see Appendix 14). The 
loadings for PC1 (see Appendix 15) show three variables are positively correlated with PC1; 
diversity, ex situ and traits. Breed scores in the positive spectrum of PC1 therefore scored 
higher for these factors and were generally less endangered. For PC2, utility and traits had 
the highest loadings, suggesting they were positively correlated with PC2. Breeds scoring 
positively for PC2 can generally be considered more marketable and the top right hand 
quadrant of Plot B reflects this.  
 
 The variable vectors show in situ and diversity are fairly strongly negatively 
correlated. This suggests breeds with a high diversity score were generally less threatened in 
situ – a logical finding given a reduction in population size can cause genetic erosion. 
Additionally, in situ and ex situ are also negatively correlated, suggesting breeds most at risk 
ex situ (i.e. least genetic material stored) were also at lower risk of extinction in situ, 
demonstrating collection of genetic material is indeed rationalised by in situ extinction risk. 
None of the criteria nodes were correlated, suggesting these five factors are important 
determinants of breed status.  
 






Figure 5.6: A bi-plot showing principle components one and two for unweighted breed 
scores based on the 17 different criteria (Plot A) and the 6 different criteria nodes (Plot B). 
Key: Ne = effective population size; ChangeNe = percentage change to Ne; GO = geographic origin; 
BP = breed branded products; CG = conservation grazing demand; PD = product designations; AH = 
adaptability and hardiness; GWS = ability to graze wet sites; HS = heat stress tolerance or 
susceptibility; NEC = number of embryo collections stored; NSS = number of semen straws stored; 
NMSC = number of males semen collected from; GC = geographical concentration; PBF = number of 
pedigree breeding females in 2016; PBM = number of pedigree breeding males registering offspring 
in most recent year; CPBF = percentage change to number of pedigree breeding females during last 5 
years; NAH = number of active herds contributing offspring in any of the last three years. 
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5.3.4 Allocation of a ‘breed improvement fund’ 
 Funds to support the initiatives of breed societies were allocated based on a basic 
formula that considers the breed indicator scores and constraints relating to breed population 
size. The hypothetical BIF was allocated according the four weighting scenarios outlined in 
Section 5.2.5. In Figure 5.7, I present results from two of these scenarios (‘equal weight’ and 
‘expert weight’). A summary of results from all scenarios are presented in Appendix 16. The 
pro rata budget constraint (per animal equivalent) meant the full budget could not be 
allocated and total spend was therefore £8.4 million; £8.5 million; £8.5 million and £8.2 
million across the four scenarios.  
  
 For the total budget allocation under equal weight (Plot A), the Red Poll (£651 k) 
and Luing (£619 k) received the most funding while the Vaynol (£10 k), and Dairy 
Shorthorn (£54 k) received the least funding. The standard deviation of payments around the 
mean is £101 k. For expert weight (Plot B), the Red Poll (£631 k) and Irish Moiled (£611 k) 
received the highest budget allocation. Likewise, the Vaynol (£10 k), and Dairy Shorthorn 
(£54 k) received the least funding. The standard deviation of payment allocations was 
highest in the expert scenario (£185 k). Across both scenarios, the breeds with the highest 
budget allocation range were the Dexter (£ 84 k) and the Highland (£ 80 k).  
 
 For the pro rata allocation, under equal weight (Plot C) the Dairy Shorthorn, 
Northern Dairy Shorthorn, Gloucester, Vaynol and Whitebred Shorthorn all received the 
maximum budget allocation (£1 k 
animal year-5
) while the Dexter (£58 
animal year-5
) and Red Ruby 
Devon (£70 
animal year-5
) received the least. For expert weight (Plot D), the same breeds 
received the maximum budget allocation and likewise the Dexter (£48 
animal year-5
) and Red 
Ruby Devon (£66 
animal year-5
) received the least. The results demonstrate the different 
weighting scenarios have subtle differences on budget allocation, suggesting structural 
stability in the model. Moreover, the BIF allocation demonstrates the importance of applying 
a pro rata budget constraint; highlighting the sensitivity of the model to breed population 
estimates.  





Figure 5.7: Radar chart showing the allocation of a £10 million ‘breed improvement 
fund’ to breed societies based on breed scores under two alternative weighting scenarios. 
Plots A and B show the total budget allocation while plots C and D show the pro rata budget 
allocation based on a population constraint. For plots A and B the axes are in ‘£ 0000 k’. 
5.4 Discussion  
5.4.1 Criteria to monitor rare breeds  
 Criteria to monitor breed status can be extensive (Eaton et al., 2006). During expert 
workshops a clear trade-off emerged between the desired scientific rigour of approaches to 
monitor breed status and the need for more realistic, often proximate measures. Perhaps most 
complex to measure is diversity. The variation that exists within and between breeds can be 
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captured through different metrics including measures of inbreeding (usually to monitor 
genetic drift), introgression (to monitor genetic purity) and genetic difference (through 
phylogeny or genomics).  
 
 Simplistic measures of diversity assessment have been employed by Defra (2017b, 
2015a) to calculate Ne based on Wright's (1931) formula using numerical population data. 
However, the Wright equation assumes random selection and Poisson distributed progeny 
sizes, which are unlikely assumptions for most livestock populations (Gandini et al., 2004). 
This means it can produce an estimate of Ne that is higher than would be produced by a 
calculation using pedigree data (Hall, 2016). However, such data are not readily available for 
many native breeds and Verrier et al., (2015) found only 56% of native breeds had enough 
pedigree information to allow Ne to be calculated based on coancestry records. Thus, Defra 
data using Wright's formula (2017b, 2015a) were employed for this application but this is a 
limitation of the analysis.  
 
 Moving to genetic difference, work by Blott et al., (1998) and Lenstra et al., (2017) 
among European cattle and goat breeds shows genetic relationships between breeds does 
reflect their geographic origin and common ancestry. No studies have yet employed genetic 
techniques (e.g. phylogenetic analysis) to measure difference across all UK native cattle 
breeds, with the exception of smaller case studies (e.g. Wiener et al., 2004). Consequently, I 
used origin as a proxy to estimate the genetic difference across breeds but I acknowledge the 
limitations inherent in such an approach.  
 
 The two nodes of marketability (utility and traits) received lowest weight by experts, 
partly reflecting limitations of the input data. Additional criteria contributing to utility could 
include a variable denoting the presence of a rare breed in farm parks to capture cultural 
value as proximate to public demand for seeing a rare breed. Such cultural and heritage 
attributes may be at odds with maximising diversity (Lenstra et al., 2017) suggesting a need 
to consider these criteria in conservation and monitoring strategies seeking to supply the 
range of different value attributes that rare breeds encode, situated on the TEV spectrum. 
Aside non-use values, criteria to measure direct use-value associated with marketability and 
consumption can be approximated through product branding and designations, including 
geographical indicators - e.g. PDO. The latter may act in perverse ways to concentrate 
breeding stock if a geographical production constraint is imposed (e.g. Single Gloucester 
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PDO) thus undermining conservation effort. There is therefore an explicit need to consider 
such criteria in a broader framework, as demonstrated here.  
 
 While option value is promoted for conservation (Drucker, 2010; Hoffmann, 2011) 
the characterisation of productive and adaptive traits in native breeds are often poorly 
documented (Bowles, 2015). The limited number of breed traits reported in this work reflects 
this knowledge gap, suggesting more work is needed to characterise breeds through the 
application of genotyping technologies, including whole genome sequencing (Tixier-
Boichard et al., 2015).  
 
 Turning to endangerment, although ex situ conservation was considered least 
important by stakeholders, it nonetheless serves as an important risk reduction strategy 
(Hiemstra, 2015). Yet, our understanding of the legitimacy of current accessions is poor and 
the criteria I employ merely quantify the material stored, rather than providing broader 
analytics concerning quality attributes. Developing proxies pertaining to the efficacy of 
material stored in genebanks would provide more accurate assessment of germplasm 
safeguards. For in situ populations, this assessment was limited to breed data reported to 
Defra and stored in their breed inventory.
22
 But a range of additional parameters may also 
reveal risk, including global breed population estimates and demographic trends concerning 
breeders – e.g. number of young entrants to a breed (Alderson, 2010). Further exploration of 
these factors is needed in future prioritisation models.  
5.4.2 Breed indicators  
 Multiple indicators have been constructed for diversity (DEFRA, 2015b; European 
Environment Agency, 2007; Villanueva et al., 2010) and endangerment (Gandini et al., 
2004; Eaton et al., 2006; Alderson, 2009, 2010; Verrier et al., 2015) but few have combined 
factors spanning diversity, marketability and endangerment to more holistically measure 
status. This is perhaps related to the incommensurability of many biological criteria which 
makes them difficult to compare on common scales without the use of analytical frameworks 
like MCDA.  
 
                                                     
22
 For the breed inventory see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-farm-animal-genetic-resources-
fangr-breed-inventory-results 
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 Although endangerment received the highest overall weight in this indicator, my 
results demonstrate the inclusion of other criteria nodes is equally important for decision 
making. This is highlighted where the Vaynol received the highest endangerment score but 
was ranked 3
rd
 overall because the total benefit of conservation was considered less. 
Alternative weighting scenarios reveal how these conservation priorities may change through 
a focus on different value attributes. This raises broader questions concerning who should 
assign criteria weights and how periodically they should be reviewed for composite 
indicators to be robust.  
 
 To develop this indicator, multiple expert discussions were needed to systematically 
construct a list of criteria that could be used to measure and report breed status. However, the 
PCA suggests some criteria could be omitted in future iterations due to correlation (e.g. 
number of pedigree breeding females / males and number of active herds) that would 
simplify future assessment. Yet, data concerning these criteria are readily available in the 
UK suggesting little benefit in dropping them from the indicator. Of more value, would be 
the identification of correlation in “hard to measure” criteria to reduce the monitoring burden 
providing reporting accuracy is retained.  
 
 The PCA also shows that each criteria node contributes differently to explaining the 
variance in overall breed scores, suggesting these criteria nodes are actively important for 
determining breed status. Construction of composite indicators can also reveal relationships 
between criteria that can be used to test the validity of the results. For instance, the PCA 
shows conservation grazing demand for cattle is indeed linked to the traits of grazing 
animals (i.e. breeds with greater adaptability are used more by grazers). This demonstrates 
the value of a rare breed is indeed partially linked to their adaptability and hardiness 
characteristics, a finding often promoted in the literature (e.g. Leroy et al., 2018) but with 
little empirical basis. Additionally, I show the collection and storage of germplasm in 
genebanks is rationalised by in situ endangerment risk (both via population metrics and 
geographical concentration) suggesting recommendations outlined by the FAO (2012) 
concerning rationalisation of ex situ collections are indeed being implemented by 
conservationists. 
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5.4.3 Differentiating breed support   
 The preservation of biodiversity, including breed diversity, is hindered by the 
absence of a workable, cost effective model for determining preservation priorities (Metrick 
and Weitzman, 1998). The defining limitation is the lack of an overarching objective to 
guide investments that has led to untargeted policy interventions seeking to preserve 
diversity indiscriminately. While empirical work has explored prioritisation, both for 
FAnGR (Reist‐Marti et al., 2003; Simianer et al., 2003; Zander et al., 2009) and PGR 
conservation (Maxted et al., 2012; Vincent et al., 2013) the policy landscape is still 
dominated by uniform payment mechanisms that incentivise conservation actions.  
 
 Conceptually, this MCDA model suggests differentiated breed support could 
improve the cost effectiveness of conservation strategies through the distribution of a BIF 
prioritised by breed indicator scores. Approaches in the UK currently preserve rare breeds 
through conservation grazing subsidies (Natural England, 2017) but breeds or species that 
are not employed for conservation grazing are ultimately under-supplied through such 
initiatives. Broader support measures are therefore necessary to supply more diversity.  
 
 Differentiated support can also facilitate more targeted interventions, which my 
results suggest are necessary given that the contribution of each breed to the criteria nodes is 
heterogeneous. For instance, the Red Ruby Devon scored high in diversity but relatively low 
in marketability, suggesting investments in breed promotion may be more effective at 
improving breed status (rather than collecting germplasm, for instance). Differentiation may 
also target breeds with specific attributes that are related to climate change adaptation, for 
instance hardier breeds with a greater adaptability to marginal upland environments (Rojas-
Downing et al., 2017). Such adaptive responses are likely to be particularly valuable given 
the range of adaptation interventions is constrained in more marginal production 
environments, unlike intensive lowland systems. 
 
 Although the important role of breed societies has been acknowledged in previous 
work (e.g. Felius et al., 2015; Ramsay et al., 2003) I am the first (to my knowledge) to 
promote the allocation of conservation funds across societies. Importantly, the BIF ensures 
all breeds receive some proportion of funding. While the proposed BIF can differentiate well 
between breeds with similar population sizes, it is less effective for breeds with particularly 
small populations because the pro rata allocation constraint means final funding allocations 
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are very low Alternative approaches to the to the prioritisation of breeds for conservation 
(e.g. Simianer et al., 2003) suggest only breeds where the conservation potential is greatest 
(i.e. where the product of extinction probability and marginal diversity is maximum) should 
receive support. I argue such approaches are perhaps defeatist and is an ethically pernicious 
approach to decision making (see Noss, 1996 and Vucetich et al., 2017 for broader 
discussion concerning triage). 
 
While prioritisation focusing solely on phenotype or genotype “uniqueness” is too limited 
in scope, this study addresses such limitations through the inclusion of a marketability node 
that attempts to capture option and cultural value in addition to diversity and endangerment 
characteristics. Beyond these factors, this MCDA model does not imply abolishing support 
for redundant or overlapping diversity; it simply suggests a step change on the supply-side 
that prioritises preferences exhibited on the demand side. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 This study aimed to outline a new methodological framework for monitoring and 
allocating conservation investments across rare breeds, through a multi criteria approach. 
The findings suggest multiple criteria can be employed to rationalise investments in FAnGR 
and that such investment can supply the different facets of value that are linked to diversity.  
   
 This is important because financial resources for species and livestock conservation 
remain significantly below what would be required to meet the Aichi biodiversity targets 
(McCarthy et al., 2012). The opportunity cost of conservation (i.e. what else could be 
achieved with the same funding resources) is rarely reported or evaluated, yet potential 
reductions in UK conservation funding as a result of Brexit mean such trade-offs are likely to 
become more explicit. However, Brexit also creates an opportunity to adjust how the UK 
Government supports the public good properties of rare breeds that span the TEV 
framework. 
 
 Better informed decision-making should consider information on the values of 
breeds held by stakeholders, the expected benefit to diversity from investments, and the cost 
of action. Considering these factors through the prioritised allocation of a BIF to breed 
societies could better guide investments in FAnGR that promote the longer-term 
sustainability of breeds. The former relies on empowering breed societies to selectively fund 
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initiatives aimed at improving breed status relative to the multiple values that rare breeds 
encode. Prioritising conservation activities is important because extinction risk may take a 
number of different forms, including introgression, inbreeding depression and genetic drift 
(Berthouly‐Salazar et al., 2012).  
 
A key feature of MCDA is its emphasis on the judgement of the decision-making team 
and the subjectivity that pervades this can be a matter of concern. While we have attempted 
to account for such limitations through multiple stakeholder workshops and sensitivity 
analysis, it should be appreciated that different stakeholder views may produce conflicting 
results. Employing different stakeholder groups (e.g. farmers) for formulating and weighting 
the criteria used in the analysis may have equated to different outcomes concerning the final 
breed scores and conservation priorities. For instance, farmers may value cultural and 
heritage attributes of breed diversity more than those relating to ex situ storage and diversity 
factors (Daugstad et al., 2006). Indeed we acknowledge this limitation but stress that 
participants contributing to this analytical exercise represented a broad spectrum of interests 
across the FAnGR community.  This range of interests, coupled with the expertise of 
stakeholders, is a key strength of MCDA approaches (Dodgson et al., 2009).  
 
The way in which questions are posed to elicit criteria weights may also affect outcomes 
(Choo et al., 1999) and I have mitigated such concerns by following the recommended 
methodological approach for MCDA by the UK Government (Dodgson et al., 2009). The 
sample size in this application is small (19 breeds) and I appreciate that further piloting is 
needed to validate this approach across different species. The criteria employed in this study 
reflect circumstances in the UK and different criteria may be needed for application in other 
regions and especially developing countries, where the available information and primary 
causes of genetic erosion vary (Verrier et al., 2015). For instance, indiscriminate cross 
breeding tends to be a major issue in Sub-Saharan Africa but is less of an issue in Europe 
and particularly the UK (FAO, 2015a).   
 
 Lastly, this work shows large gaps in information persist for rare and native breeds 
which impedes characterisation of FAnGR. There is a need to define key phenotypic traits 
and characteristics (particularly those involved in local adaptation) so FAnGR can be 
evaluated through comparable data sets, which is important for climate change adaptation 
(Irene Hoffmann, 2010; Bruford et al., 2015). A growing arsenal of increasingly 
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sophisticated genetic technologies (see Section 2.5 for broader discussion) are now falling in 
price (e.g. DNA sequencing) and there is a clear need to apply such approaches to better 
appreciate locally adapted breed traits for conservation and sustainable use.  
 






























This thesis has made a broad contribution to the agrobiodiveristy conservation literature 
through valuation and preference elicitation in an area where there has been limited previous 
evidence. The modelling approaches provide empirical assessment of different scheme 
designs and costs to meet demand for diversity attributes that include use and non-use 
values. The former suggests supply and demand side aspects of conservation could be 
optimised as a function of biological, genetic and economic factors. This includes exposing 
incentive schemes to competition (through tendering) and discriminatory selection 
techniques that reflect agent based costs for supplying conservation services and broader 
genetic and cultural factors that denote (economic) value from interventions.  
 
Chapter Two provided a review of institutions and instruments to supply diversity 
alongside discussion of the different economic values that rare breeds encode. A growing 
need to more explicitly supply the different value attributes of breed diversity has emerged, 
and reflects the broad range of ecosystem services provided by farm animal diversity (Leroy 
et al., 2018). By considering how institutions mediate or respond to wider societal 
preferences for conservation, the chapter reveals how different forms of market failure 
appear to be exacerbating breed status. I suggest that policy instruments and the SI agenda 
should better consider the range of use and non-use values associated with breed diversity.  
 
Chapter Three employed a survey and CE to explore farmer motivations for keeping rare 
breeds and preferences for the design of conservation contracts, including assessment of 
farmer WTA to participate in a contractual scheme. Results suggest farmers in Transylvania 
are intensifying farming practices and this may be accelerating reductions in farm animal 
diversity. Increasing farmer awareness and removing barriers to entry for RDP schemes is 
key to increasing farmer participation in rare breed conservation. The choice model indicated 
farmers have heterogeneous preferences for contract attributes and these vary depending on 
farm species kept. Considering these preferences could improve the design of schemes and 
reduce the cost of conservation.  
 
Chapter Four considered PGR by measuring the costs of conserving CWR through a 
hypothetical on-farm conservation programme that could form part of a NSAP for CWR 
conservation and sustainable use in Zambia (Ministry of Agriculture, 2016). Bid offers from 
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the conservation auction were selected based on alternative conservation goals. The former 
suggested a potential trade-off between maximising area or diversity in site selection 
decisions. Additionally, I show the inclusion of a social equity goal in site selection 
decisions may compromise ecological effectiveness. While the literature provides some 
guidance on such trade-offs, more empirical work is needed to quantify the socio-economic 
and ecological implications of employing alternate selection goals in programmes (Engel, 
2016). Calculating the mean cost of site selection relative to each CWR, I showed 
considerable cost heterogeneity persisted, raising broader questions concerning appropriate 
forms of conservation intervention when costs are prohibitive.  
 
Chapter Five presented an application of MCDA to explore how breed incentive support 
can be better targeted towards specific value attributes of diversity. Weights derived from 
stakeholder workshops suggested endangerment was considered most important when 
considering conservation interventions, followed by diversity and marketability attributes. 
Breed part scores across the criteria exhibited high levels of heterogeneity and a PCA 
showed the multiple criteria nodes explain different aspects of variation in breed scores. 
Such information may offer insights for more targeted priority setting and rationalisation of 
investments in diversity, particularly where (breed) vulnerabilities persist. Allocating a 
hypothetical BIF across breed societies, this work identifies a potential framework for 
differentiating incentive support for rare breeds. I suggest breed societies are ideally placed 
to guide such investments, given their instrumental role in breed management and promotion 
(Felius et al., 2015).  
 
The overarching findings from the thesis there is a need for more targeted conservation 
policies that (on the supply side) exploit the power of market competition to facilitate 
identification of least-cost conservation providers through auctions and discriminatory 
contract mechanisms. More targeted investments in FAnGR and PGR diversity would also 
increase the benefits obtained from conservation interventions. On the demand side, the 
thesis suggests a need to better consider private and public values for diversity that can be 
appropriated through targeted investments that consider the TEV conceptual framework. The 
supply of genetic resources needs to be monitored regionally and nationally through multi-
criteria frameworks that consider risks and opportunities. Applying these factors in different 
country contexts, where the drivers of genetic erosion may vary, may increase the 
conservation benefit of investments in FAnGR and PGR. 
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6.2 Conclusions and recommendations  
There is a need to consider the full range of ecosystem services in the SI agenda, 
including cultural heritage. The origins of SI focus discussion on increasing yield in the 
face of resource scarcity and environmental challenges (Garnett et al., 2013). Yet, while the 
SI paradigm has evolved, I show there is a conspicuous absence of cultural and heritage 
values in agenda setting. Ignoring such values is risky and more guidance is needed on the 
multiple policy fronts of SI to include these value attributes, many of which complement 
improved food security through the addition of option value. The definition of SI should 
more clearly address these values that span the TEV spectrum and are denoted in Chapter 
Two. 
 
Agrobiodiveristy conservation strategies should be complemented by consistent 
monitoring and priority making frameworks. This work suggests monitoring of 
agrobiodiversity is inconsistent across European countries and globally. This is detrimental 
to the allocation of conservation priorities and accompanying incentives to conserve rare 
breeds. The establishment of a distinct framework for monitoring and rationalising incentive 
support for PGR and FAnGR is necessary and may follow the similar broad value 
components (e.g. diversity, marketability and endangerment) identified in Chapter Five Such 
a framework could be hosted on the FAO’s global DAD-IS platform to promote more 
systematic conservation responses regionally and nationally.   
 
Incentive schemes are needed to increase in situ (on-farm) conservation of CWR in 
response to land use changes and climate change threats. Aside in situ conservation in 
genetic reserves and protected areas, on-farm conservation of CWR has been neglected, 
despite growing concerns surrounding range shifts of wild relatives in response to climate 
change that exceeds current geographical coverage of protected areas (Aguirre‐Gutiérrez et 
al., 2017; van Treuren et al., 2017). This work suggests land use changes (e.g. agricultural 
intensification) threaten many wild relative populations that persist outside protected areas 
making them increasingly vulnerable. On-farm conservation strategies are needed via 
incentive schemes that pay farmers for supplying conservation services.  Construction of site 
selection models that optimise selection decisions under different climatic and species 
distribution scenarios are needed in further work to compliment the basic site selection 
model proposed in Chapter Four.  
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Using conservation auctions enables identification of least cost conservation service 
providers. Buyers can identify least cost providers, whilst suppliers with a comparative 
advantage can secure contracts by revealing their true opportunity cost. The cost 
effectiveness improvements associated with auctions over fixed priced schemes has been 
documented here in Chapter Four and in other work (Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann, 2007; 
Windle and Rolfe, 2008; Stoneham et al., 2010; Rolfe et al., 2017). I show there are potential 
cost improvements of 120% compared to using fixed price approaches. Importantly, this 
work also demonstrates tenders allow flexibility in site selection decisions that may prioritise 
different goals, including social equity and diversity considerations. I recommend such 
tender mechanisms are formally developed for national agrobiodiveristy conservation 
programmes in countries where protected areas and existing policies fail to capture sufficient 
diversity, including Zambia. 
 
Identifying farmer preferences for conservation contracts may increase uptake and 
reduce cost. Work in Chapter Three suggests extensive and low-input systems, often 
characteristic of smallholder and semi-subsistence farms, are likely to have a comparative 
advantage when supplying agrobiodiveristy conservation services due to topographical and 
ecological characteristics that constrain land use (e.g. Transylvania). Constructing 
contractual schemes for conservation services in these areas will be important and should 
reflect farmer preferences for the design of contracts which I show are species and 
potentially regionally specific. A better designed contractual scheme that reflects the local 
context is likely to reduce non-compliance and increase uptake among farmers. Further work 
to measure farmer preferences for scheme design in other country contexts is necessary to 
compliment my findings in Romania. 
 
Balancing pro-social and pro-environmental goals in PES site selection decisions 
may be at-odds with cost effectiveness. Employing different selection goals in PES has 
been a controversial topic but there are good arguments for not treating environmental and 
social equity goals as separate objectives (as noted in Section 4.5.2). Yet, I show that 
combining the two may result in a reduction of ecological effectiveness (e.g. diversity 
captured, land area conserved) or increased cost. At the same time, reduced social and 
poverty focus may undermine the effectiveness of PES schemes through negative behaviours 
due to perceptions of unfairness that can lead to crowding-out, non-compliance and negative 
spill overs/indirect effects (Hanley and White, 2014; Pascual et al., 2014). There is a need to 
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establish guidance around how such trade-offs are managed and this can be reflected in bid 
offer selection approaches. 
6.3 Limitations and further work  
Much of this thesis has focused on country-specific case studies. There is a need to 
extrapolate these findings to other country contexts, where differences between developed 
and developing countries may impact the effectiveness of different policy approaches (FAO, 
2015b). For instance, the drivers of genetic erosion may vary across regions meaning 
alternate interventions are necessary. While this thesis explores agrobiodiveristy 
conservation in the context of PGR and FAnGR, insights may be acquired by exploring 
potential synergies between PGR and FAnGR conservatism approaches (Gollin and 
Evenson, 2003). For instance, gap analysis (Maxted et al., 2008) and systematic priority 
setting (Maxted et al., 2012; Reinecke and Kilham, 2015) employed to establish PGR 
conservation priorities may provide a useful framing for FAnGR priority setting.  
 
Preference elicitation is challenging and capturing these differences relies on a range of 
stated preference methods, including CE’s and tender mechanisms. However these 
approaches could potentially introduce a warm glow bias that lowers the bid costs we 
observed relative to the mean of the broader population. This tendency is however 
potentially offset by another possible bias that can arise from the use of an open-ended 
tender question, which in some circumstance has been shown to lead to higher WTA 
estimates relative to a closed format through strategic bidding. There is an extensive debate 
regarding the use of open versus closed formats, which is arguably unresolved. In this 
particular context the open-ended format was considered to be appropriate given the unusual 
nature of the conservation service contract being solicited. More work to establish the 
optimum tender mechanism design for agrobiodiveristy conservation auctions may further 
improve the cost effectiveness of schemes.  
 
The use of close-ended questions (that are inherent in CE’s) is limited because the analyst 
needs to pre-determine the bid vector, which brings its own problems that can outweigh the 
incentive compatibility advantage. However, advances in design optimisation now allow 
prior information concerning the parameter coefficients to be estimated from results of the 
pilot data. In addition, advances to the preference modelling (i.e. through the RPL model) 
now takes into account heterogeneity of the parameter values among respondents and relaxes 
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key assumptions that constrain the use of conditional logit models, namely independence of 
irrelevant alternatives – iia. These factors are driving the use of more sophisticated valuation 
approaches that employ both closed and open bid formats to more accurately elicit 
respondent preferences for various contractual schemes. Constructing more advanced CE 
models to estimate farmer preferences for a greater range of contractual attributes and 
payment rates in different country contexts would provide further evidence as to the 
appropriate design of agrobiodiveristy conservation contracts.    
 
Decision analysis techniques are limited by the subjectivity that pervades reliance on a 
handful of expert stakeholders (as opposed to a representative sample of the population). 
Research on human judgements and decision making shows that the simplifications made to 
deal with complex problems can result in various forms of bias (Bazerman and Moore, 
2008). For instance, people are inclined to be biased in assessments of alternatives that can 
more readily be linked to what is familiar (the ‘representativeness heuristic’), and to be 
unduly influenced by recent, memorable, or successful experience (the ‘availability 
heuristic’) (Dodgson et al., 2009). MCDA techniques are designed to help overcome these 
limitations by imposing a formalised framework for evaluating criteria to inform decision 
making. To further account for decision maker uncertainty, this thesis has employed multiple 
stakeholder workshops and sensitivity analysis for appraising breed conservation scores and 
criteria weights. Methodological variations of MCDA have attempted to further account for 
these uncertainties through different mathematical techniques that elicit stakeholder 
preferences for multiple criteria and options. This thesis has followed the UK Government 
guidance for conducing MCDA for options appraisal through the application of a linear 
additive model to score options (Dodgson et al., 2009).   
 
This work has largely focused on in situ conservation measures, whilst acknowledging 
the important role of ex situ approaches as an insurance mechanism. While a combination of 
both approaches is recommended in early work (e.g. Lömker and Simon, 1994) more 
advanced modelling has shown a clear trade-off emerges between conservation strategy 
employed, efficacy of gametes stored, extinction risk and cost (Boettcher et al., 2005).  
Further exploration of the optimal contributions associated with in situ and ex situ 
approaches under varying cost and benefit functions may improve the cost effectiveness of 
interventions.  
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The GPA for FAnGR has stressed the need to construct indicators to better monitor breed 
attributes and, crucially, develop more systematic conservation responses. The conservation 
community currently lacks a harmonised approach to document changes in the status of 
breed diversity that can be used to inform conservation policies. This thesis present a 
framework that at the core considers multiple attributes as a function of conservation need 
and utilitarian benefit. While the specific sub-criteria to document breed status may require 
adapting to country-specific circumstances and data provision (Porter et al., 2016), the 
overarching framework provides a necessary approach to contrast national genetic resource 
stocks in different country contexts and improve regional monitoring.  
A growing battery of genetic technologies (e.g. genomic selection) are changing breed 
characteristics more rapidly than ever before. Indeed, technological progress has improved 
our ability to select for novel traits and reduce generation intervals in plant and crop breeding 
(Hickey et al., 2017). Yet, these technologies are seldom applied to “unimproved” genetic 
resources, which constrains interpretation of option value in traditional breeds/varieties 
(Bowles, 2015). Better characterisation of (rare) genetic resources is therefore needed 
through selective sampling of specific populations. In addition, it is unclear how disruptive 
technologies, such as gene editing, will affect the future utilisation of genetic resources for 
agriculture. Fostering harmonised applications of GE that compliment conservation through 
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Location & GPS: ___________________________________________ 
 
Section A: About you & your farm 
1. Which livestock species do you currently farm with?  













Other      
 
2. How big is your farm?  
1-2 hectares  3-6 hectares   7-20 hectares   >20 hectares   
3. Do you currently farm with rare or traditional native breeds (not cross breeds)?  
Yes     No   
4. If answered YES to question 3, which rare or traditional breeds do you keep?  
 
 
5. If you keep rare breeds, why do you maintain them?  
 
Cultural significance     Quality of products    
Level of endangerment     Ease of management    
Level of hardiness     Adaptability    




6. If you now keep cross breeds instead of rare / traditional breeds then why is this?  
 
Better yields     Better quality products    
Perceived reputation     Social status    
 
7. If you do not currently farm with rare / traditional breeds, would you consider doing so in the future 
if conservation subsides were in place?  
 
Yes     No   
8. If you answered YES, which species would you consider keeping?   
 
 Sheep    Buffalo   Cows   Goat  
  Horses   Pigs      
9. Which traits do you consider most important when deciding which breed to farm? Please rank these 
statements (1=most important, 8= least important) according to how important they are to you.  
 
Rank 
Cultural tradition associated with the breed       _______________ 
Level of yield (e.g. milk)      _______________ 
Fertility and ease of breeding     _______________ 
Adaptability to terrain      _______________ 
Resistance to disease and parasites     _______________ 
Low veterinary bills      _______________ 
Ease of management & handling     _______________ 
Quality of products  produced    _______________ 
10. If you farm or would consider farming with rare breeds, we want to know which factors you think 
are most important for ensuring their continued preservation.  Please rank the following statements 
(1=most important, 6= least important) according to how important they are to you.  
 
Rank 
Maintaining traditional farming practices       ________________ 
Cultural and historic factors associated with the breed   ________________ 
Ensuing continued supply of genetic material   ________________ 
Potential contribution of breed to tourism    ________________ 
Maintain adaptive traits for future breeding programmes   ________________ 
Continued production of traditional, local products   ________________ 
 
Section B: Rare breeds and conservation support measures 
11. Do you currently receive Romanian agri-environment support payments on your farm?  
 
Yes     No   






13. Did you know there is currently support available for farming with rare breeds under Romania’s 
Rural Development Programme (RDP)?  
 
Yes     No   
14. Would you consider applying for this support in the future if you decide to / are farming with rare 
breeds?  
Yes     No   
If no, why not?   
1)_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section C: Future Options for conservation schemes 
Choice set: ____ 
Choice Task 1:   
 I prefer: Option A Option B Nothing    
       
Choice Task 2:   
 I prefer: Option A Option B Nothing   
       
Choice Task 3:   
 I prefer: Option A Option B Nothing   
       
Choice Task 4:   
 I prefer: Option A Option B Nothing   
       
 
15. Which statement best describes how you made your choice of Option? 
 
I chose randomly          
I chose the ‘Nothing’ plan because I wouldn’t benefit from conserving rare breeds   
I never chose the ‘Nothing’ plan because I don’t want to see breed diversity decline   
I chose the most expensive option         
    I chose the plan which provided the greatest overall benefits relative to my opportunity cost  
I chose the plan which provided greatest overall benefits irrespective of my opportunity cost  
Other (Please specify)……………………………………………………………………    
 
Section D: About you 
16. Gender  
Male  Female  
17. Please tell us which age group you are in 
Under 20  50 - 59  
20 - 29  60 - 69  




40 - 49    
    
18. What is the highest level of education you have attained? 
Secondary  University degree  
Foundation degree/HND  Professional qualification  
19. Please indicate your main sources of household income.  Please rank your income sources from a 
scale of most to least (1=most) 
EU support payments      Off farm income  
Sale of milk   Sale of meat products   
           Sale of local food products  Government subsides  
 
Other, please state: ______________________________________ 
 
20. Please indicate your monthly household income (Lei / month) 
Less than 200      201-400  
401 - $800   801-1,600  






















Appendix 2: Background information concerning rare breeds supported in the 
Romanian RDP.  
Breed Risk Status  Estimated Population 
Support level  
(per annum) 
Bovine 
Steppe Grey  In danger of extinction 312 heads € 200 / head 
Romanian Buffalo In danger of extinction 289 heads € 200 / head 
Ovine 
Merinos of Suseni In danger of extinction 300 heads € 13 / head 
Transylvanian Merinos In danger of extinction 268 heads € 13 / head 
Merino of Cluj In danger of extinction 203 heads € 13 / head 
Ţigaie –ferruginous 
variety 
Vulnerable 1120 heads € 13 / head 
Raţca Vulnerable 3888 heads € 13 / head 
Karakul of Botoşani Vulnerable 2694 heads € 13 / head 
Merinos of Palas Vulnerable 4364 heads € 13 / head 
Ţigaie with black 
Teleorman head 
Vulnerable 2988 heads € 13 / head 
Caprine 
Banat White In danger of extinction 972 heads € 6 / head 
Carpatina Vulnerable 1492 heads € 6 / head 
Equidae 
Lipizzan In danger of extinction 350 heads € 200 / head 
Arabian Shagya In danger of extinction 111 heads € 200 / head 
Furioso North Star In critical condition 47 heads € 200 / head 
Huțul In critical condition 88 heads € 200 / head 
Gidran In critical condition 36 heads € 200 / head 
Nonius In critical condition 45 heads € 200 / head 
Romanian semi-heavy In critical condition 91 heads € 200 / head 
Pigs 
Bazna In critical condition 22 cap € 88 / head 
Mangalița In critical condition 50 cap € 88 / head 







Appendix 3: Results summary from the multinomial logit models for bovine and 
ovine farmers  
Attribute  
Bovines Ovines 
Coefficient  SE Coefficient  SE 
[CL] Contract Length  -0.279*** 0.067 -0.453*** 0.090 
[SS] Scheme Support  0.060 0.079 -0.224** 0.111 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme -0.426*** 0.079 -0.311*** 0.106 
[COS] Subsidy 0.013*** 0.001 0.245*** 0.030 
[N0] Nothing option 1.090*** 0.177 0.092*** 0.222 
Model summary     
No of observations 464    324  





 0.193     0.217 
 




Appendix 4: List of priority CWR used in the modelling exercise and distribution 
across community and farmer sites. 
CWR Related crop 
No. of community 
locations 
No. of sites 
Cucumis zeyheri Cucumber 1 20 
Eleusine coracana Finger millet 5 78 
Eleusine indica Finger millet 5 87 
Oryza longistaminata Rice 1 30 
Pennisetum purpureum Pearl millet 4 65 
Solanum incanum Egg plant 4 80 
Sorghum bicolor Sorghum 2 50 
Vigna juncea Cowpea 2 20 
Vigna unguiculata subsp. 
dekindtiana 





Appendix 5: Information arising from focus group discussions (FGDs) with 
Zambian farmers concerning CWR conservation and local farming practices 
 Five FGDs were undertaken across Northern and Eastern province with a total of 55 
participants. On average, 61% of CWR from a picture list of CWR shown to participants (though to 
inhabit the region) were identified. A range of other plant species thought to be wild relatives were 
also mentioned by participants and a small number of species thought to be CWR but now extinct 
were also noted.     
 
 Multiple uses of CWR were identified by participants including animal feed, medicine, thatch 
and human food (particularly when crop harvests are poor). Wild relatives were identified as 
occupying a range of different habitat types including adjacent to water sources (i.e. streams and 
marshland); adjacent to dwellings; roadside verges; field margins; in croplands; hilly ground and near 
termite mounds. 
 
 Participants were also asked whether the CWR identified had either declined, remained 
stable, or increased over time. Some 35% of wild relatives were identified as declining; 54% had 
remained the same and 11% had increased. The decline of some CWR populations had largely been 
attributed to over-harvesting, human induced bush fires, weeding and increased pressure from game 
animals (at GMA sites). In contrast, increases of some CWR noted by communities had been driven 
by an increase in farm animals that resulted in greater seed dispersal.  Most CWR populations were 
unmanaged by communities, although some were harvested if edible by farm animals or humans.  
Those growing on crop lands were managed as weeds unless edible.        
 
 Community participants identified a number of activities they believe would enhance CWR 
populations including wild seed harvesting; selective weeding in crop lands; increased provision of 
fallow lands; reduced fire burning (particularly early in agricultural season to allow plants to seed) 
and creating awareness as to the importance of CWR.  Resources required for these activities included 
agricultural tools; subsides; access to transport and training.   
 
 Farmers were also asked questions concerning activities required for cultivating a hectare of 
land and the estimated costs associated with these activities. Additionally, they were asked the 
estimated costs for sympathetically managing a hectare of land to not de-weed CWR. An example of 
the activities and associated costs mentioned are given below. These figures compare well to cost per 






Activity Estimated cost (US$ per hectare) 
Ploughing and land preparation 15 – 55 
Planting 16 – 37 
Weeding* 22 – 73 
Harvesting 18 – 138 
Sympathetic weeding (i.e. not removing weed 
CWR from croplands) 
37 – 110 
Average value of crop yield per ha** 344 – 688 
* Usually smallholder farmers, who account for large number of farmers in the two regions, do not use 
herbicides in their farming activities. In most cases, it is either they use hand hoe or ox drawn implements to 
control weeds in their fields. However, if herbicides are used, which normally is sourced through farmer input 
subsidies, they normally use pre emergence herbicides before planting of their main crop such as maize.  ** The 
average farmer yield per ha for a maize crop in Northern and Eastern Provinces ranges from 1.95 - 2.2 tons/ha 


























Appendix 6: Competitive tender bid offer form 
 
Competitive Tender Bid Offer Sheet 
Internal information (ZARI only) 
Team members present………………………………………………Date………… 
Province ……………………………… District …………………………………... 
Community …………………………..No. of participants …….……………........... 
GPS (N)………………………………(E)……………………………............. 
 
Instructions for participants – group tender on individual lands containing CWR: 
1. Please write your name, age, gender and farm size in the table provided  
2. Specify the area of land to be included for each conservation activity in the Area 
Management Options (AMO’s)  
3. Specify the number of land plots proposed under each AMO scenario  

















Table 1: Individual tender bid offers  
No Name  Age 
Total Farm 
size 
Gender Area Management Option (AMO) 
M F A (field border) B (within crops) 












































No Name Age 
Total Farm 
size 
Gender Area Management Option (AMO) 
M F A (field border) B (within crops) 











































Instructions for participants – group tender on communal lands containing CWR: 
1. Please specify the area of land to be included for the communal land conservation activity 
(AMO D) 
2. Specify the distance of communal lands from communities, the location characteristics and 
number of participants to be enrolled in this AMO 
3. Document the total community rewards required in Kwacha for this AMO 
Table 2: Bid offer on communal lands 
Information 
Area Management Option (AMO) 
C (community conservation area) 
Total area proposed Lima 
Distance from community centre km 
Current use of land (please specify) …………………………………………………………………………. 
Type of area management 








Location characteristics                         (please 
tick) 
   Flat land                             
 
  Hilly land  
  
  Near water source (i.e. stream, river) 
 
  Far from water source  
  
  Land is grazed by farm animals  
 
  Not grazed by farm animals  
 
  Could be used for farming  
 
  Could not be used for farming  
 
Total number of participants to be involved   











Instructions for participants - Communal and individual lands total summary:   
1. Please total up the area of land to be included for conservation on the individual and 
community lands (Tables 1 and 2) within each AMO 
2. Total up the number of participants to be enrolled in each AMO (Tables 1 and 2) 
3. Total up the individual and community land rewards required in Kwacha for each AMO 
(Tables 1 and 2) 
Table 3: Summation of bid offers 
Information 
Area Management Option (AMO) 
A B C 
Total area proposed Lima Lima Lima 
Total number of participants       
Level of reward required (Kwacha)       
Grand total Kw Kw Kw 
 
 
Training for CWR conservation – please specify and rank preferred type of training   
No Information related to rewards of CWR's 
Which three among the listed 
types of support would be most 
helpful?                               
 [A=highly preferred, B=2nd 
most preferred, C=3rd most 
preferred] 
1 
No support needed  
  
2 
Generation and documentation of local CWR diversity  
  
3 
Access to seed of CWR's  
  
4 
Training to improve crop yields and value addition to increase incomes 
  
5 
Training to improve management of CWR 
  
6 
Fairs, awards and recognition for “custodianship” 
  
7 
Opportunities to participate in governmental monitoring and 









Rewards for CWR conservation – please specify and rank preferred type of rewards   
No Information related to rewards of CWR's 
Which three among the listed types 
of rewards do you may most prefer?                               
[A=highly preferred, B=2nd most 
preferred, C=3rd most preferred] 
1 
No support needed  
  
2 
Access to educational materials and literature (including 
for schools)   
3 
Access to agricultural machinery, farm inputs and other 
farm infrastructure    
4 
Access to general infrastructure (i.e. bricks, cement, 
school desks, etc)   
5 
Access to transport (i.e. Push-bikes) 
  
6 
Access to value addition infrastructure at a reduced cost 
  
7 
Fairs, awards and recognition for “custodianship” 
  
8 




















Appendix 7: In situ and ex situ coverage of priority CWR in existing Zambian PAs 














Cucumis zeyheri 0 0 0 0 
Eleusine coracana 34 23 0 137 
Eleusine indica 4 36 3 3 
Oryza longistaminata 102 51 56 112 
Pennisetum purpureum 4 50 0 5 
Solanum incanum 1 25 0 1 
Sorghum bicolor 1 20 0 2 
Vigna juncea 6 19 0 13 
Vigna unguiculata subsp. 
dekindtiana 30 32 20 86 
















8 Dairy Shorthorn (Original)














Appendix 9: List of institutions and roles of participants attending both 
workshops 
Person position Institution 
Initial workshop 
 Chief exec RBST  
Field officer  RBST  
Chair of Conservation Committee FAnGR Committee 
Advisor  FAnGR Committee 
Associate Professor in Human 
Geography  Plymouth University  
Breed society chief exec Gloucester Beef Society 
Specialist Breeding Advisor Signet (ADHB) 
Breed secretary  The Dexter Cattle Society 
Chief Exec 
British Pig Association & FAnGR 
Committee 
Breed Census and Records rep Traditional Herefords Breeders Group 
PhD Student  SRUC 
Research Economist  SRUC 
 
Final weighting and scoring workshop 
Field officer  RBST  
Field officer  RBST  
Conservation Grazing  Natural England  
RBST Chairman  RBST 
Trainee Vet AB Europe 
Conservation officer Natural England  
Conservation Grazer Pasture-Fed Livestock Association 
PhD Student  SRUC 












Appendix 10: Information arising from workshop discussions with expert 
stakeholders concerning UK FAnGR conservation  
The workshop was conducted at the RBST headquarters in Stoneleigh, Warwickshire in April 
2018. It was facilitated by Warwick Wainwright with assistance from some RBST staff. The 
workshop included participants representing five different institutions including RBST, SRUC, 
Natural England, Animal Breeding Europe and the National Trust. Participants were receptive to the 
idea of using more holistic criteria to monitor breed status but with some concern about how such 
approaches might be used to inform policies. The key findings of the workshop were as follows:  
 
 Current NBAR support is driven by UK commitments to the CBD. Conservation is 
therefore primarily seen as a biodiversity issue rather than a wider food security and 
cultural heritage requirement. 
 UK Government is keen to simplify existing incentive and regulatory schemes by reducing 
bureaucracy and increasing automation. Any future rare breed support scheme must meet 
this requirement.  
 Focusing only on conservation grazing was identified as a useful approach for cattle and 
sheep but limited in scope and future incentive schemes must be made more inclusive of 
other livestock species (mainly horses and pigs).    
 The criteria suggested in this workshop were deemed more holistic than current 
monitoring approaches and a useful approach to identify the multiple benefits accrued 
from breed preservation and how actions to reduce endangerment may be more effectively 
targeted.   
 Moving to differentiated support structures was met with some concern given the potential 
scope for misuse by Government if criteria (e.g. marketability) are incorrectly interpreted.  
 There may be scope for future agri-environment support to develop specialist, competitive 
funding pots that target explicit biodiversity and/or environment related outcomes. Such 
ring fenced funding could be used to target heritage attributes of rare breeds (poorly 
considered in current economic incentives). 
 This work demonstrates large gaps in data coverage. Better characterisation of rare breed 
traits is a major challenge that requires significant funding but could demonstrate 
important characteristics denoting option value.   
 Group participant weightings of the different indicators suggest endangerment (50%) was 




Appendix 11: Summary of criteria and sub-criteria used in the MCDA model 





* Effective population 
size (Ne) 
Linear 
Ne is a metric that takes account of the total 
number of animals in a population but 
importantly also their breeding structure. A low 
Ne signifies a greater risk of declining genetic 
diversity within breeding populations. 
* % change to Ne over 
last 5 years  
Linear 
 
This criterion determines % change to Ne over 
last 5 years.  This is to determine the trend of Ne 
for each breed. 
* Geographic origin Categorical 
Maximising difference in geographic origin may 
aid wider capture of genetic diversity. 
Marketability 
(utility) 
* Product designations Categorical 
Product designations - e.g. PDO may be used to 
promote production methods that employ 
traditional breeds. 
* Breed branded 
products 
Categorical 
The sale of breed specific products across the "big 








* Adaptability and 
hardiness 
Categorical 
Is breed considered adaptive to different 
production environments and is it hardy. 
* Ability to graze wet 
sites 
Categorical 
Can the breed maintain condition while grazing 
wet/marshy sites? 
* Heat stress  Categorical 
Does the breed harbour tolerance or susceptibility 
to heat stress? 
Endangerment 
* No. of embryos 




An embryo collection consists of two embryos 
collected per female. 
* No. of males 
collected from  
Preference 
value 
The number of different males with semen 
collected from and stored in cryobank. 
* No. of semen straws 
stored in cryobank 
Preference 
value 




The percentage of a breed’s total population that 
is concentrated within a 65km from the mean 
centre of each breed.   
* No. of pedigree 




Estimated by multiplying the average number of 
female registrations over the previous three 
complete years by standard Defra multipliers for 
each species. 






Number of pedigree sires which produced 
pedigree registered offspring in most recent year. 
* % change in number 
of pedigree females 
during last 5 years  
Preference 
value 
Based on % change between in number of 
pedigree registered females during last 5 years.   
* No. of active herds  
Preference 
value 
 Number of herds which have registered pedigree 




Appendix 12: Criteria weights used for scoring the breeds. 
    Effective population size (Ne) - [40] - (12)  
Diversity - [30] 
 
% change to Ne - [40] - (12)  
    Geographic origin - [20] - (6)  
    Breed branded products - [40] - (4)  
  Utility - [50] - (10) Conservation grazing demand - [40] - (4)  
Current marketability - [20]   Product designations - [20] - (2)  
    Adaptability and hardiness - [33] - (3.3)  
  Traits - [50] - (10) Ability to graze wet sites - [33] - (3.3)  
    Heat stress - [33] - (3.3)  
    No. of embryo collection stored - [5] - (2.5)  
  Ex situ - [15] - (7.5) No. of semen straws stored - [5] - (2.5)  
    No. of males semen collected from - [5] - (2.5)  
Endangerment - [50]   Geographical concentration - [20] - (10)  
    
No. pedigree breeding females in 2016 - [15] - 
(7.5)  
  In situ - [85] - (42.5) 
No. pedigree males registering offspring in the 
most recent year - [15] - (7.5)  
    
% change in pedigree breeding females 
registered over last 5 years - [15] - (7.5)  
    No. active pedigree herds - [20] - (10)  

















Appendix 13: Breed sensitivity analysis  







  Effective population size (Ne) ++ R.R 
Devon 
Vaynol ++ % change to Ne + Luing 
  Geographic origin  ++ Vaynol 
  Breed branded products ++ Gloucester 
  Conservation grazing demand + Vaynol 
  Product designations  ++ Gloucester 
  Adaptability and hardiness + Red Poll 
  Ability to graze wet sites + Red poll 
  Heat stress ++ Red poll 
  No. of embryo collection stored + Red poll 
  No. of semen straws stored ++ B.White 
  No. of males semen collected from + Luing 
B.Whitee ++ Geographical concentration + Vaynol 
  No. pedigree breeding females in 2016 + Vaynol 
  No. pedigree males registering offspring in the 
most recent year 
++ Vaynol 
  % change in pedigree breeding females 
registered over last 5 years  
+ Highland 
  No. active pedigree herds + Vaynol 
Key: '+++' = cumulative weight change of >5 points would change preferred breed; '++' = cumulative 
weight change of 5-15 points would change preferred breed; '+' = cumulative change of <15 points to 
















Appendix 14: Summary statistics for each principal component for all the breed 
scoring criteria (top table) and criteria nodes (bottom table). 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Eigen value 4.874 2.800 2.507 1.510 1.171 0.976 0.866 
Proportion of Variance 0.287 0.165 0.147 0.089 0.069 0.057 0.051 
Cumulative Proportion 0.287 0.451 0.599 0.688 0.757 0.814 0.865 
 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12 PC13 PC14 
Eigen value 0.685 0.500 0.478 0.251 0.192 0.107 0.040 
Proportion of Variance 0.040 0.029 0.028 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.002 
Cumulative Proportion 0.905 0.935 0.963 0.978 0.989 0.995 0.998 
 PC15 PC16 PC17     
Eigen value 0.025 0.017 0.001     
Proportion of Variance 0.001 0.001 0.000     
Cumulative Proportion 0.999 1.000 1.000     
 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 
Eigen value 2.208 1.285 0.712 0.515 0.280 
Proportion of Variance 0.442 0.257 0.142 0.103 0.056 



















Appendix 15: The variable loadings (rotations) for each principal component 
Only PCs with eigen values > 1 are shown for all breed scoring criteria (top table) 
and criteria nodes (bottom table). 
  PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 
Ne -0.290 0.355 0.004 0.084 -0.154 
ChangeNe -0.035 -0.245 -0.323 0.333 -0.135 
GO -0.115 -0.034 0.295 0.169 0.581 
BP 0.086 0.248 0.234 -0.519 0.018 
CG -0.239 -0.384 0.315 0.005 -0.043 
PD 0.226 0.246 0.302 -0.017 -0.292 
AH -0.249 -0.415 0.070 0.010 0.073 
GWS -0.325 -0.183 0.094 -0.052 -0.181 
HS -0.148 0.140 0.136 -0.145 0.483 
NEC -0.287 -0.080 0.175 -0.233 -0.192 
NSS -0.258 0.101 -0.289 -0.405 0.068 
NMSC -0.080 -0.342 -0.239 -0.488 -0.135 
GC 0.139 -0.057 0.382 0.060 -0.413 
PBF 0.373 -0.255 0.087 -0.031 0.124 
PBM 0.342 -0.167 0.147 -0.300 0.078 
CPBF -0.215 -0.072 0.429 0.084 -0.028 
NAH 0.347 -0.289 -0.022 -0.048 0.096 
 
  PC1 PC2 
Diversity 0.520 -0.257 
Utility -0.098 0.781 
Traits 0.452 0.433 
Ex.situ 0.469 0.294 
In.situ -0.544 0.227 
Note: the loadings are essentially the coefficients of the PCs and show how the variables correlate to the 












Appendix 16: Hypothetical allocation of a ‘breed improvement fund’ across breed 
societies under different scenarios.  
Breed Budget: S1 Budget: S2 Budget: S3 Budget: S4 
High/low 
difference 
B.Galloway 499,457  487,515  535,332  465,839  69,493  
B.White 597,177  582,640  631,692  579,710  51,982  
D.Shorthorn 53,720  53,720  53,720  53,720  0  
N.D.Shorthorn 85,053  85,053  85,053  85,053  0  
R.R.Devon 553,746  618,312  546,039  517,598  100,713  
Dexter 477,742  523,187  513,919  393,375  129,812  
Galloway 510,315  463,734  524,625  538,302  74,569  
Gloucester 500,640  463,734  500,640  500,640  36,906  
Guernsey 510,315  511,296  503,212  527,950  24,738  
Highland 597,177  558,859  674,518  517,598  156,920  
I.Moiled 597,177  594,530  578,158  610,766  32,608  
L.Red 423,453  463,734  385,439  445,135  78,295  
Longhorn 412,595  463,734  374,732  414,079  89,001  
Luing 618,893  689,655  620,985  559,006  130,649  
Red.P 651,466  642,093  663,812  631,470  32,342  
Shetland 564,604  570,749  581,467  548,654  32,812  
Vaynol 9,693  9,693  9,693  9,693  0  
W.Park 488,599  463,734  481,799  517,598  53,865  
W.Shorthorn 250,893  250,893  250,893  250,893  0  
Total 8,402,714  8,496,863  8,515,728  8,167,081  348,647  
Stdev 191,564  195,021  199,757  184,698  - 
High/low difference 641,772  679,962  664,825  621,777  - 
In 'S1' the weights are equal; in 'S2' the diversity node was weighted 50 while endangerment and 
marketability were each weighted 25; in 'S3' marketability was weighted 50 while diversity and 
endangerment were each weighted 25; in 'S4' endangerment was weighted 50, diversity 30 and 
marketability 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
